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The Roles of Corporate IT Infrastructure
and Their Impact on IS Effectiveness
   
Markku Sääksjärvi
Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration
Department of Management
 PL 1210 Helsinki FIN-00101
saaks@hkkk.fi
Abstract – In the strategic alignment model of Henderson and
Venkatraman (1993) [1] IT infrastructure has an important but
only implicitly defined role. According to evolving literature, IT
infrastructure serves many different purposes in large
companies. We outline the main missions (roles) of the
corporate-wide IT infrastructure and its contribution to IS
effectiveness and study the relationship of IT infrastructure with
alignment processes and strategic integration. Our empirical
tests with data from almost one hundred large companies
resulted in three IT infrastructure roles, which reflect the IS
communality, strategic, and flexibility dimensions of the
corporate-wide IT infrastructure. The roles were not
symmetrically related to the IS effectiveness and alignment
perspectives. IT infrastructure roles had a significant interplay
with strategic integration in improving IS effectiveness.
However, the interplay of IT infrastructure roles with alignment
perspectives had only marginal effects.  Implications of the
results for research and practice are discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
A.  Evolving Importance of IT Infrastructure
    Recently, the role of corporate information technology (IT)
infrastructure as a solid, common base of business operations
and their information systems has emerged. IT infrastructure
is also being seen increasingly as an important factor
affecting a firm’s competitive performance. IT infrastructure
is critical to globally competing firms and to those which
employ a diverse group of technologies. IT infrastructure is
particularly important in facilitating the development of
global virtual corporations, virtual networks of partner
companies, and virtual value chains [2].
    Investments in IT infrastructure are long-term
commitments accounting for a considerable share of the total
IT budget, often over half [3]. A recent study of IS
investment priorities of large U.S. companies showed that
infrastructure investment was among the three most
important IT technologies. IT infrastructure helps the
company to integrate and accumulate earlier developments in
transaction processing, DSS systems and strategic
information systems. Also, IT infrastructure plays a
significant role in organizational restructuring and process
reengineering projects [4].
    Broadbent and Weill [5] defined IT infrastructure as the
base foundation of budgeted-for IT capability (both human
and technical), shared throughout the firm in the form of
reliable services, and usually managed by the IS group.
According to them IT infrastructure is the enabling base of
shared IT capabilities that provide the foundation for other
business systems.
    Corporate IT infrastructure typically consists of IT
components like common hardware, software,
communication technology, databases, standards, tools, etc.
These provide the base for shared services between a large
range of business applications. IT nfrastructure differs from
business applications in that it serves a shared and common
enabling foundation for the future applications and services
of all business units. According to [2], IT components are
converted into useful IT infrastructure services by a human
IT infrastructure composed of knowledge, skills and
experience. IT infrastructure capability is an important firm
resource that is difficult to imitate because it is created
through the fusion of technology and human skills.
According to Duncan [6], in some firms IT infrastructure
may make strategic innovations in business processes
feasible, while the characteristics of an infrastructure may
likewise hinder competing firms from imitating innovations
rapidly enough. According to her, IT infrastructure flexibility
should be understood as the degree to which its resources are
shareable and reusable across the firm. These qualities have
powerful value implications for the firm. A flexible
infrastructure may reduce time-to-market. According to
Duncan the set of resources that makes feasible both
innovation and continuous improvement of IT systems is not
single applications but the infrastructure flexibility. In her
opinion, planning alignment is less a measure of flexibility
and ability to meet unanticipated needs. Rather, it is a
measure of foresight that reduces the need for flexibility.
    Sääksjärvi [7] discussed the evolving concepts of product
platform and platform strategy and applied these architecture-
oriented constructs to the strategic development of software
products. He argued that the concept of product platform
could be applied to IT infrastructure management. This is
because product platforms and  IT infrastructures have many
similarities; their major task is to form a solid and common
basis for generating a whole series of products (applications),
they combine technology and human skills to generate useful
services, and they are important vehicles to integrate core
competencies into product architecture.
     According to Hanseth and Braa [8] benefits from IT
infrastructure only accrue through business applications.
However, IT infrastructure cannot be designed and managed
in the same way as information systems, as it is created by
several actors and used by several systems, and can thus be
changed only gradually. According to this view,
infrastructure may shift and drift largely outside the control
of any individual stakeholder. Instead of managing
infrastructure, in practice the firm can only cultivate it [9].
                                                                                                                                       
                                              
B. Roles of IT Infrastructure in Literature
    In the above literature review we can identify several
major “missions” or roles of corporate IT infrastructure.
Several authors see its mission primarily as the core of
common, shared and corporate-wide IT services. This role is
related to the commonalities of the business units’ IS needs.
Synergetic business units will make this role even more
important. This mission could be called the Common IS Core.
Sometimes this role is combined with, sometimes even
dominated by, the general economic objective to reduce IT
costs. However, the Common IS Core role is perhaps of no
real strategic value, it is an instrument to support more
important business systems.
    According to the business strategy related mission of
corporate IT infrastructure, it can enable strategic flexibility
and responsiveness in dynamic business environments. It can
also be seen as a prerequisite of effective business
connectivity for strategic partnerships and other collaborative
networks. One further strategic dimension of IT infrastructure
is its capability to accumulate important business knowledge,
which makes imitation of the infrastructure services difficult.
All the strategic expectations of IT infrastructure could be
united under a strategic role, called Strategy Enabler.
    Other authors found that the mission of corporate-wide IT
infrastructure is more about benefiting from flexible and
transparent integration of different technologies, both internal
and external. This mission could be called the Technical
Platform.
    The major attribute of this role is architectural flexibility
that makes implementation of new technologies and business
applications of external vendors fast and easy. This role may
be strategic, rather, from the IT point of view. However, in
dynamic market environments business strategies also may
benefit from the better responsiveness of the platform type of
IT infrastructure.
C. Objectives and Outline of This Paper
     In this paper we are interested in determining empirically
how the CIOs of large companies see the role of their IT
infrastructure, and how these roles are connected to IS
effectiveness. On the basis of the above literature search we
argue that IT infrastructure is an important factor affecting IS
effectiveness, both directly and through interplay with other
strategic factors affecting the alignment of business and IT
strategies. Therefore, we will refine the strategic alignment
model [1] and relate and define the interplay of IT
infrastructure with other key concepts of the model. In
particular, the interplay of the roles of IT infrastructure with
the generic alignment perspectives and with strategic
integration are of interest. We argue that this extension of the
strategic alignment model is needed because the original
model included only a brief notion of IT infrastructure, and
did not deal with it as a multidimensional factor affecting the
alignment itself through its interplay with alignment
processes.
  II. IT INFRASTRUCTURE IN STRATEGIC
ALIGNMENT
A. Strategic Alignment Model
     Henderson and Venkatraman [1] proposed their
framework to cope with the very problematic interplay of
business and IT domains in companies. Their alignment
framework separated between strategic and operative
abstraction levels, and included two central concepts as
abstract measures of alignment: integration and fit.
According to the model, it is important to make sure that both
the external (strategic) and internal (implemented) domains
fit together (correct implementation). In the same way, the
business and IT domains should be integrated at both the
strategic (planning) and the operative (implemented) levels.
The concept of strategic alignment is not an event but a
process of continuous adaptation and change.
    IT infrastructure has an important role to play in this
adaptation process, and organizational infrastructure is
crucial on the business domain side. However, the authors
used the term IT infrastructure in a general way,
symmetrically with the term organizational infrastructure,
without consideration of the special characteristics required
in IT infrastructure, e.g. in the generic alignment perspectives
proposed. Therefore, we try to determine what type of IT
infrastructure role would be most appropriate for each
generic alignment process on the basis of the above model’s
logic.
B. Alignment Perspectives and IT Infrastructure
    The strategic alignment model proposed four different
generic processes to achieve good alignment, that is, a high
level of both strategic and operative integration. Firstly, the
authors called the business strategy driven perspective
“Strategy Execution”. In this alignment process, business
specific applications are of importance. Therefore, IT
infrastructure has only a secondary role: the size and
composition of the corporate wide IT infrastructure could be
primarily determined as the commonality of various carefully
tailored business applications. From the presented theoretical
roles, the Common IS Core seems most appropriate.
    Another alignment perspective originating from the
business strategy domain was “Technology Transformation”.
In this perspective, business and IT executives should be
capable of benefiting from external IT opportunities and
integrate business and IT strategies. Instead of implementing
this strategy first into organizational infrastructure, this
perspective results in an enabling IT infrastructure that
responds to changing business realities. In this perspective,
the Strategy Enabler role is most appropriate.
    The third alignment perspective was called “Service
Level”. In this case, alignment started from the IT strategy
and connected IT infrastructure effectively with
organizational infrastructure. IT infrastructure was not an end
result, it was a bridge or general platform between external IT
and the business organization with its specific information
systems. Logically, the platform role well suits this position,
where the mission of IT infrastructure is to transfer new
                                                                                                                                       
                                              
technologies and applications to support the business
organization, independently of the corporate strategy and its
implementation. Obviously, the Technical Platform role is
most appropriate for this alignment perspective.
      The fourth generic alignment perspective was the
“Competitive Potential” perspective. However, IT
infrastructure had no special role to play in that generic
process.
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A.  Framework and Hypotheses
    The objective of our empirical study was to define the
roles of IT infrastructure in large companies and study the
relationship between a company’s IT infrastructure and IS
effectiveness. This relationship is implicitly built in the logic
of the strategic alignment model, but it was not explicitly
discussed and explained in the original articles. According to
the logic of the model, two interactions of IT infrastructure
are important regarding its effect on IS effectiveness. Firstly,
alignment processes (perspectives) may interact with
different IT infrastructure roles non-symmetrically. In
addition, the degree of strategic integration may be an
important factor with interrelated effects on IS effectiveness
together with IT infrastructure or at least with some of its
specific roles.
    These three interacting factors and their assumed relations
are designed in our research framework in Fig. 1. The
framework consists of direct, moderating and mediating
relations of IT infrastructure and IS effectiveness at the
company level. Grover, Cheon, and Teng [10] proposed a
similar research setting in studying the complex effects of
service quality and partnership on the success of IS
outsourcing.
    The left box of the model describes IT infrastructure roles.
Instead of a one-dimensional approximation of the IT
infrastructure, we model IT infrastructure as a synergetic
combination of three different roles. The roles are statistically
determined and purified also into one summary role measure.
Our basic assumption is that IT infrastructure roles are
positively related to IS effectiveness.
    The two boxes in the middle of the model describe the
moderating/mediating variables: alignment processes and
degree of integration. These are abstract concepts taken
directly from the original strategic alignment model. Our
basic assumption is that at least those generic alignment
processes that are logically interconnected with IT
infrastructure should have a significant interaction with IT
infrastructure roles, and therefore a moderating effect in
contributing to IS effectiveness.
    In addition, a high degree of integration that requires good
capabilities and the cooperation skills of business and IT
managers may be an important prerequisite of successful IT
infrastructure investments. Our assumption is that this
indirect and enabling role of strategic integration regarding
IT infrastructure makes strategic integration a mediating
effect on IT infrastructure roles. Higher values of integration,
together with strong IT infrastructure roles, should result in
better IS effectiveness than IT infrastructure roles alone.
    At the right side of the model is the dependent variable, or
the outcome (IS effectiveness). This variable will be
composed of several different IS effectiveness dimensions
found in the IS literature and then purified into a single,
aggregated construct.
    On the basis of the above considerations we generated the
following research hypotheses:
H1) IT infrastructure roles are positively related to IS
  effectiveness.
H2) The relation between IT infrastructure roles and  IS
       effectiveness is moderated by alignment perspectives.
H3) The positive relation between IT infrastructure roles and
  IS effectiveness is mediated by the degree of integration.
    If hypothesis H2 is true, it mean that there is an important
interaction between IT infrastructure roles and alignment
perspectives that affects positively IS effectiveness. In the
same way, positive evidence for hypothesis H3 will mean
that the degree of integration affects positively on IS
effectiveness, together with IT infrastructure roles.
B. Measurement of Key Variables
    IT infrastructure roles were defined by aggregating seven
statements expressing different purposes for building a
corporate-wide IT infrastructure.  The original statements and
the scales used are presented in the enclosed Table 2. The
same table also shows the resulting purified factorial roles
and key reliability measures.
    For the purpose of this paper, the alignment perspectives
were brief, verbal descriptions of the generic alignment
processes proposed by [1]. Only the two most critical
alignment perspectives for IT infrastructure were estimated
(Strategy Execution and Technology Transformation, Table
1). These two perspectives involve, even result in, the IT
infrastructure section of the alignment model.
    Degree of integration is a construct estimating the status of
integration, for example, how well business and IT managers
support and contribute to each others’ strategies, and how
well business and IT specialists support and contribute to
each others’ processes and information systems. We modeled
the degree of integration using eight different statements
collected from [1] and purified the overall measure using
factorial analysis. The result is shown in Table 2 enclosed.
    IS effectiveness, the dependent variable of this research,
was an aggregated construct of  ten different types of
effectiveness found in the literature. The items covered IT’s
contribution to support strategic company goals, to produce
relevant management information, to improve productivity,
etc. The original ten items were purified using factorial
analysis into one aggregated measure consisting of seven
uniform items. The resulting measure is listed in Table 2.
    The questionnaire was designed for the CIOs of large
companies. A CIO is a company’s most competent person to
evaluate the mission of the corporate IT infrastructure, and he
or she should be able to evaluate alignment processes and the
degree of integration.
                                                                                                                                       
                                              
                                                                                          H2 Moderating Effect
                                                                 H1  Base Effect
                                                                                          H3 Mediating Effect
                                                                                            Fig. 1. Research Framework
C. Data Collection
    Our finalized questionnaire consisted of variables from all
four sets described above. We then tested it in ten interviews
with CIOs from large companies to make all questions
semantically precise and understandable. We mailed the final
version to the CIOs of ca. two hundred of the largest
companies in Finland. The companies were the ca. 200 top
companies on the TOP 500, as measured by 1998 revenues.
The companies were called to verify the names of the CIOs,
enabling us to send the survey instrument and a personal
invitation directly to them. This helped us achieve a very
satisfactory response rate. A follow-up letter was mailed to
those who had not responded after three weeks.
IV. RESULTS
A. Response
     Within one month we had received responses from 91
companies, resulting in a considerable response rate of 44
percent. These companies represented both the industrial and
size distributions of the 200 largest companies. The
responding companies represented a variety of industries, the
largest two were manufacturing and retailing. The average
revenue of the companies was about FIM 3600 million (ca.
ECU 600 million), and the average number of employees ca.
3800. The relation of total IT cost to company revenue varied
between ca. 0.2 and 6 percent. From the overall company IT
cost, on average 41 percent was used to cover external
(outsourced) IT services.
B. Roles of IT Infrastructure
     Table 2 presents both the variables used and the results
obtained from a factorial analysis defining three different
roles of the corporate IT infrastructure. On the basis of these
results, we have proposed the following names for these
roles:
1. Common IS Core, where the mission of IT infrastructure
is to improve connectivity among suppliers, clients, and
partner companies, and to offer a compatible common
core for business applications.
2. Strategic, where the mission of IT infrastructure is to
support and enable implementation of corporate and
business strategies.
3. Flexible Platform, where the mission is to offer a flexible
basis for business applications while reducing costs.
    These roles were not far from what we had expected on the
basis of our literature survey and the basis of the strategic
alignment model’s logic. We had to edit the earlier
theoretical names to obtain a better fit with the factorial
profiles represented by the items loaded into each factor. The
above three roles reflect the IS communality, strategic, and
flexibility dimensions of corporate-wide IT infrastructure.
    From the profiles of typical IT infrastructure roles, it
became clear that a large majority of all respondents ranked
IT infrastructure as an important issue in their company, from
both the business and IT strategy perspectives.
C. Testing the Base Relation (H1)
    In Fig. 2 we have presented the correlation coefficients
between the roles of IT infrastructure and overall IS
effectiveness. These coefficients were significant except in
the Platform role. Even that role was almost significantly
related to IS effectiveness. Therefore, we could accept our
ALIGNMENT PERSPECTIVES
        1) Strategy Execution





1) Common IS Core
2) Strategy Enabler
3) Flexible Platform IS EFFECTIVENESS
                                                                                                                                      
                                              
hypothesis H1. Clearly, IT infrastructure roles contributed
positively to IS effectiveness.
    By observing the correlation coefficients between these
three IT infrastructure roles and the original effectiveness
items, we noticed that both the Common IS Core role and the
Strategy Enabler role were positively related to almost all
effectiveness items. However, the Flexible Platform role had
a significant correlation only with one effectiveness item, the
item measuring the trouble-free functioning of the operative
information systems. This is in balance with the general idea
that corporate IT infrastructure has to offer both a secure and
trouble-free technical base and provide skills needed to make
the use of operative information systems easy.
D. Testing Effects of Alignment Perspectives (H2)
    Our assumption was that the interplay of alignment
processes (at least the traditional Strategy Execution
perspective) with the roles of IT infrastructure (at least with
the Common IS Core role) will affect IS effectiveness even
more positively than IT infrastructure alone. This was
assumed because the empirically defined infrastructure roles
were near the theoretical roles drafted directly from the logic
of the strategic alignment model. Therefore, we could assume
that if the CIOs were able to fit their IT infrastructure with
the major alignment perspectives applied in their company,
then a moderating effect should exist between IT
infrastructure roles and IS effectiveness.
    According to Baron and Kenny [11] (see also [10]), a
variable is a moderator if it is not correlated with the
predictor (independent) variable and the interaction between
the independent variable and the moderator (their product) is
significant in a regression explaining the dependent variable.
These conditions were not ultimately true in the case of
overall alignment perspectives. The alignment perspectives
did not correlate significantly with IT infrastructure roles
(Fig. 2), but there was no significant interaction effect on IS
effectiveness.
  Common
   IS Core
  Strategic
   IT Infra
  Flexible
 Platform
               Overall
          IT Infrastructure
         IS Effectiveness     0.403**
   (0.476**)
    0.437**
   (0.539**)
    0.229*
   (0.180)
  0.524**       N=91
 (0.643**)    (N=33)
                 Overall
     Alignment Perspectives
    0.222*
   (0.036)
    0.263*
   (0.537**)
    0.093
  (-0.185)
  0.284*         N=91
 (0.191)        (N=33)
     Degree of Integration
    0.136
   (0.190)
    0.328**
   (0.367**)
    0.139
   (0.149)
  0.276**       N=91
 (0.350*)      (N=33)
                                     Figure 2.        Correlation between IT infrastructure roles and other variables
                                                                (correlation for information intensive industries shown in parentheses)
    In detailed role-by-role analyses, we found a weak
moderating effect between the traditional Strategy Execution
alignment and the Common IS Core role. The interaction of
these variables improved the regression by 11 percent, still
resulting in a low regression (ca. 29 percent). Thus, we had to
reject our hypothesis H2.
    There are several possible explanations for the above
result. Obviously, the alignment processes in companies were
still weak and evolving, perhaps because the CIOs could not
perfectly define the dominating alignment perspective quite
correctly since many of them were not on the company
steering committee. Furthermore, it is possible that the match
between IT infrastructure roles and the major alignment
processes in their companies was not yet good enough. For
these reasons, the higher values of alignment processes did
not seem to help IT infrastructure roles contribute to IS
effectiveness.
E. Testing Effects of Integration (H3)
    According to [11], a variable is a mediator if it is
significantly correlated with the independent variable (that
has an effect on the dependent variable in a regression), the
mediator variable affects the independent variable in a
regression where both variables are present, and its effect
reduces the independent variable’s effect on the dependent
variable.
    On the basis of the significant correlation in Fig. 2, degree
of integration could be a mediator of the overall IT
infrastructure, and also a mediator of the Strategic role. Our
tests showed that the degree of integration affected
significantly the regression. It improved the total explanation
from 28 to 43 percent. At the same the effect of IT
infrastructure roles was considerably reduced. In the case of
the strategic role, the mediating effect of integration was also
significant. Integration improved the regression from 19 to 33
percent. Both the Common IS Core role and the Platform role
had no correlation with the degree of integration. Therefore,
only the moderating effects could be tested. The Common IS
Core role had a significant interplay effect on IS effectiveness
together with the degree of integration. The degree of
integration improved the total regression percentage from 16
to 41. In the case of the Flexible Platform role, no interaction
effect could be observed.
                                                                                                                                       
                                              
    On the basis of the above results we could only partially
accept our hypothesis H3. In principle, degree of integration
seemed to be a significant contributor of IS effectiveness
together with IT infrastructure. However, the interplay of
integration with IT infrastructure was not symmetric in the
case of all three IT infrastructure roles. Degree of integration
was a significant mediator of the overall IT infrastructure and
of the Strategic  role, but it was a moderator of the Common
IS Core role. Finally, in the case of the Flexible Platform role,
integration dominated the relation with IS effectiveness.
    The practical explanation of the above results is that if
senior and business managers are capable of addressing IT,
and work effectively with the CIO (the degree of integration
is high), then the CIOs are more successful in getting the
necessary funds for their IT infrastructure investments.
Because many of the CIOs regarded IT infrastructure
investments as important, this may have affected their
perceptions of IS effectiveness in a positive way.
    In the case of the Flexible Platform role, integration had no
systematic interplay effect on IS effectiveness, mainly
because the platform role very often had high values when the
degree of integration was low. This was an indication that the
Flexible Platform role represented a defensive IT strategy in
companies where the interaction between business and IT
management was not working normally, and where the CIOs
had to work with their IT infrastructure without a clear role in
the strategic management of the company.
F. Effect of Information Intensity
    We were interested in the effect of the information
intensity of products and services on the interplay between IT
infrastructure roles and IS effectiveness. Therefore, in Fig. 2
we also show the correlation coefficients of industries with
high information intensity (these figures are presented in
parenthesis). In our sample, these industries were wholesale
and retailing, communications, financial services, public
administration, and other business services (including IT
services). The total number of companies representing these
industries was 33 (ca. 36 percent).
    The correlation coefficients followed the same line as
earlier, but they were considerably higher for these
information intensive companies. One difference was that the
Strategic IT infrastructure role correlated significantly with
the alignment perspectives. However, the alignment
perspectives together with this IT infrastructure role did not
have any mediating effect on IS effectiveness.
     In detailed analyses of the moderating/mediating effects of
the degree of integration we could identify that when high
information intensity exists the degree of integration was a
really significant mediator of the overall IT infrastructure, and
also of other single infrastructure roles except the Flexible
Platform role. In the case of the overall IT infrastructure
roles, the regression improved from ca. 41 to 55 percent, in
the case of Common IS Core alone from 23 to 48 percent, and
in the case of Strategic IT infrastructure alone from 31 to 43
percent.
    The above high figures demonstrated that corporate-wide
IT infrastructures are even more important contributors of IS
effectiveness in information intensive industries than in other
industries. Also, the positive interplay with the degree of
integration was stronger. It seems that these companies’
business and IT management had succeeded in finding a
better match between IT infrastructure and business strategy.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
    From the literature, we synthesized three different major
roles of corporate-wide IT infrastructure. Following the logic
of the strategic alignment model, we defined three theoretical
roles of IT infrastructure. Each of these roles seemed to have
a potentially different interplay and optimal match with the
generic alignment perspectives. Therefore, we assumed that
IT infrastructure in a large company has several roles, each
contributing differently to IS effectiveness. We assumed that
relevant alignment processes and a high degree of integration
together with IT infrastructure could result in even better
values of IS effectiveness than these IT infrastructure roles
alone.
    Our empirical analyses showed that IT infrastructure is a
real issue, and that it has considerable impact on IS
effectiveness in large companies. We defined statistically
three roles that reflected the IS communality, strategic, and
(technical) flexibility dimensions of the corporate-wide IT
infrastructure. All these roles were positively related with IS
effectiveness. However, the assumed moderating effects of
the alignment processes with these roles were not significant.
Despite the fact that the generic alignment perspectives could
be identified by the CIO’s, the match between the roles of IT
infrastructure and the alignment perspectives may not have
been optimal. Other possible reasons were also listed.
    We found that the degree of integration and the roles of IT
infrastructure had a significant interplay effect on IS
effectiveness. This effect varied from moderating to
mediating. High values of integration together with IT
infrastructure roles seemed to have an extra positive impact
on IS effectiveness. These effects were significantly stronger
in the case of information intensive industries, where IT
infrastructure roles seemed to be better developed on the
whole compared to other industries. The above results
indicate that a good relationship between the CIO and
business managers and their decision-making capability
regarding IT infrastructure investments will reflect in better
IS effectiveness, at least as perceived by CIOs.
    The importance of degree of integration as the key factor
contributing to IS effectiveness gives evidence of the strategic
alignment model’s relevance. However, the interesting non-
symmetric relation between the different IT infrastructure
roles and IS effectiveness supports our observation that IT
infrastructure is a more complex construct than proposed in
the original strategic alignment model. The three above IT
infrastructure roles will help corporate management to
understand better the complex issue of IT infrastructure in
large companies and thus make better decisions.
    Clearly, in the future we also have to survey business
managers on the real application of the generic alignment
perspectives and their combinations in large companies. Also,
the definition of valid measures of integration certainly will
benefit from careful surveys of line manager’s perceptions.
                                                                                                                                       
                                              
    Our results will encourage future work in defining practical
procedures to fit together effectively IT infrastructure
architectures and compositions with various alignment
processes, and encourage more case study comparisons of the
practical principles and procedures for managing IT
infrastructures in large companies.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
     The author would like to thank Olli Pöyry and Anssi Öörni
for useful discussions which helped to start this research, and
Erkki Räty for his excellent help in the empirical survey.
                                    REFERENCES
[1] Henderson, J.C. and Venkatraman, N. (1993), “Strategic Alignment:
Leveraging Information Technology for Transforming Organizations”, IBM
Systems Journal, 1993, Vol. 32, No. 1,  pp. 4–16.
[2] M. Broadbent, P. Weill, T. O’Brien, and B.S. Neo, “Firm Context and
Patterns of IT Infrastructure Capability”,  (S. Jarvenpaa,  A. Srinivasan, and
J.I. DeGross, Ed:s), Proceedings of the 17’th International Conference on
Information Systems, 1996,  pp. 174–194.
[3] P. Weill, and M. Broadbent, “Leveraging the New Infrastructure, How
Market Leaders Capitalize on Information Technology”, Harvard Business
School Press 1998.
       [4] V. Grover,  J.T.C. Teng, and K.D. Fiedler, “IS Investment Priorities in
Contemporary Organizations”, Communications of the ACM, February
1998/Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 40-48.
[5] M. Broadbent, and P. Weill, “Management by Maxim: How Business and
IT Managers Can Create IT Infrastructures”, Sloan Management Review,
Spring 1997,  pp. 77-92.
[6] N.B. Duncan, “Capturing Flexibility of Information Technology
Infrastructure: A Study of Resource Characteristics and their Measure”,
Journal of Management Information Systems, Fall 1995, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp.
37–58.
[7] Saaksjarvi, M. (1998).  Product Platform and IT Infrastructure in Strategic
Management of IT, in: (S.Urban and C.Nanopoulos, Ed:s), Information and
Management, Utilization of Technology-Structural and Cultural Impact,  Gabler
1998,  pp. 63-79
[8] O. Hanseth, and K. Braa, “Technology as Traitor: Emergent SAP
Infrastructure in a Global Organization”, (R. Hirschheim, M. Newman, and
J.I. DeGross Ed:s), Proceedings of the 19’th International Conference on
Information Systems, 1998,  pp. 188–196.
[9] C. Ciborra, and O. Hanseth,  “Toward a Contingency View of
Infrastructure and Knowledge: An Explorative View”, (R. Hirschheim, M.
Newman, and J.I. DeGross Ed:s),  Proceedings of the 19’th International
Conference on Information Systems, 1998, pp. 263-272.
[10] V. Grover, M.J. Cheon, and J.T.C. Teng, “The Effect of Service Quality
and Partnership in the Outsourcing of Information Systems Functions”,
Journal of Management Information Systems, Spring 1996, Vol. 12, no 4, pp.
89-116.
[11] R.M. Baron and D.A. Kenny, “The Moderator-mediator Distinction in
Social Psychological Research: Conceptual , Strategic, and Statistical
Considerations”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 6 (1986),
pp. 1173-1182.
TABLE 1. Original Survey Questions and Computed Variables (I)
                                Scale for all variables:  1 = Strongly disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Somewhat disagree; 4 = Neutral,
                                 5 = Somewhat agree; 6 = Agree; 7 = Strongly agree.
                                     A. Variables Describing Alignment Perspectives
Strategy Execution (STRATEX). The following statement describes the typical process to plan
and implement information systems in our company: “Based on the corporate strategy, specific
business strategies are first created and implemented into the organization and work processes.
On the basis of these, new business information systems are specified”.
Technology Transformation (TETRANS). The following statement describes the typical process
to plan and implement information systems in our company: “As part of the corporate strategy  also
information technology  strategy  will be  defined. Based on  this intergated strategy,  the common
corporate-wide IT infrastructure will be implemented. Business specific information systems
will be based on  this IT infrastructure”.
                                                     N         Mean   Std. Dev
                            STRATEX      88         4.19      1.687
                            TETRANS      81         4.26      1.657
                                                                                                                                      
                                              
         TABLE 2. Original Survey Questions and Computed Variables  (II)
                                  B. Items Measuring Purpose of IT Infrastructure
INF-01 To reduce IT costs by developing common systems and services
INF-02 To support implementation of corporate strategy at the industry level
INF-03 To support implementation of business strategies at the business unit level
INF-04 To offer an effective and flexible platform for business specific IS
INF-05 To improve compatibility with external vendors’ products       
INF-06 To improve connectivity of suppliers, customers, and business partners
INF-07 To enable fast and easy implementation of new information systems
                                    Factor Analysis of IT Infrastructure Roles
FACTOR                                                Item               Eigenvalue               Item Correlation
                                                                loading                                              with Total Score
F1. Common IS Core                                                          2.472
                  N  Mean  Std. Dev
INF-07     91  5.55    1.276         0.768                                                     0.830** 
INF-06     91  5.15    1.498         0.754                                                     0.827**
INF-05     91  5.49    1.215         0.693                     0.811**
F2. Strategic                                           1.405
INF-03     91                 5.59    1.341         0.792                        0.911**
INF-02     91                 6.14    1.179         0.677                        0.884**
F3. Flexible Platform                         1.046
INF-01     91                 5.44    1.292         0.702                                                    0.798**
INF-04     91                 5.65    1.168         0.600                                                    0.745**
                                      C. Items Measuring IS Effectiveness
EFF-01 Our IS function supports well the strategic company goals
EFF-03 Our information systems produce relevant management information
EFF-04 Our information systems have improved the productivity of our company
EFF-05 Our operative information systems are functioning trouble free
EFF-06 Our IS personnel have good professional skills
EFF-09 Our business units and corporate IS management work well together
EFF-10 Our IS management is effective
                                          Factor Analysis of IS Effectiveness
FACTOR                                               Item                  Eigenvalue           Item Correlation
                                                               loading                                              with Total Score
F1.  IS Effectiveness                                                           3.913
                 N Mean  Std. Dev
EFF-09    91  5.15    1.144        0.772                                                     0.760** 
EFF-03    91  4.82    1.313        0.738                                                     0.764**
EFF-04    91  5.75    0.961        0.722                    0.714**
EFF-10    91  4.87    1.114        0.720                    0.728**
EFF-01    91  5.12    1.084        0.709  0.713**
EFF-05    91  5.37    1.151        0.676  0.684**
                                   EFF-06    91                 5.10    1.116        0.518                                                      0.569**
                                                         D. Items Measuring Degree of Integration
INT-01 Our IS strategy is based on the business strategy and supports important business objectives
INT-02 Our senior management has good knowledge and skills of IT, and IS management of the company business
INT-03 Our senior management and IS management meet frequently enough
INT-04 Our business management has good IT knowledge and skills, and IS management understands business problems
INT-05 Senior, business, and IS managers have a shared view of the role of IT in our company
INT-07 Employees of the important business units are capable of using our IS and proposing relevant changes
INT-08 Business management and IS management meet frequently enough
INT 09 IS personnel know well our business processes and are able to propose relevant changes in their IS
                                            Factor Analysis of Degree of Integration
FACTOR                                                Item            Eigenvalue          Item Correlation
                                                                 loading                                      with Total Score
F1. Integration                                                                4.738
                 N Mean  Std. Dev
INT-02    90  4.46    1.383          0.831                                                 0.842**
INT-04    90  4.56    1.350          0.805                                                 0.824**
INT-08    91  4.63    1.372          0.803                                         0.830**
INT-03    91                 4.73    1.620          0.759                     0.816**
INT-05    91                 5.03    1.320          0.724                     0.735**
INT-09    91                 4.80    1.204          0.674                                                 0.629**
INT-07    91                 4.69    1.245          0.629                                                 0.581**
                                   INT-01    91                 5.23    1.230          0.476                  0.537**
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Abstract.   This paper describes the development of the
Measure to Manage Performance (M2P) method for
preparing Service Level Agreements for IT outsourcing
contracts in the Australian Government sector.
This method links the payment for the provision of services
that support business applications with an assessment of
penalties or bonuses that reflect the quality of these services
in business terms.  The method follows the principles for
measurement developed from experience and from the
literature concerning IT Effectiveness, IT Balanced
Scorecards, and IT Investment.  It was developed, after
considerable effort, to provide the “end-to-end, business-
based” measurement system that has been required in
contracts but not yet delivered.
I. WHAT IS NEEDED
The work described in this paper started with a joint
approach to me by a Government organization and its
provider of Information Technology services, seeking
improvements in the use of their Service Level
Agreement.  Both parties realized that something had to be
done but they did not know what to do.  This feeling is
present for several other IT outsourcing contracts between
Australian Federal Government agencies and their IT
service providers.
These parties had a sole-supplier outsourcing contract
covering all aspects of IT over five years.  The contract
was for a ‘partnering” approach but it was rigorous
contract and had tight contract management, as
recommended by authorities such as Lacity and
Hirschheim [1] and Willcocks and Lacity [2].
As for ‘traditional’ methods ([3], for but one example)
and the many other IT Outsourcing contracts currently in
use in the Federal Government sector, this contract
contains a Service Level Agreement that specifies
performance in component-based, technical terms.  For
example, these contracts describe “Service Levels” for
time to respond to a Help Desk call or percentage available
time for a server or response time over a Local Area
Network segment.  If these Service Levels are not met
then “Service Credits” are deducted from the payments
made by the client agency.  These Service Credits are
usually expressed in terms of a percentage of the monthly
bill or fixed dollar amounts for each shortfall against a
Service Level.
Both the purchasing agency and the provider company
know that performance measurement is important in
successsful IT outsourcing.  So their contract has clauses
stressing detailed, precise measurement, based upon strong
legal advice (see [4] for a public recommendation of
‘sound practice’) and the evidence that the success of
outsourcing contracts depends upon service quality being
measured and managed [5].
They know that performance measures are an important
guide to the required behaviour and it is easy to send the
wrong signals.  The use of ‘wrong’ performance measures
can lead to conflict or to people reacting to where they see
the rewards lying rather than where the organization
receives the most benefit [6].  So the measures should
show rewards for performance that enhance the service
rather than punish inadequate performance.  They want
good service, not the money from penalties imposed for
unacceptable performance.
They share the wishes of other Federal Government
agencies, in my experience over 10 years with more than
20 tenders, to:
•  express the Service Levels in business terms, so
that their business managers can monitor their
quality and anticipate implications for
information management;
•  build Business Cases for new initiatives with a
full understanding of the implications for service
and costs;
• provide encouragement for good performance;
•  reduce the risks associated with the provision of
services through knowing the areas of service that
have the greatest impact upon the business;
•  know that they are receiving the performance
they are paying for, without it being measured in
terms that they do not understand and through
tools operated by the provider;
•  see the performance “end-to-end”; that is, there
are no intermediate measures for components that
had to be aggregated in some way to show the
performance from the PC to the mainframe;
•  use the measures in a charge-back arrangement,
so individual business managers can see the bill
for their particular areas, even if they do not pay
for it directly (so realizing the benefits of IT
Chargeback that are described in [7]); and
• be manageable; that is, avoid the present practice
of having hundreds of Service Levels.
The purchaser and provider also both know that the
traditional approach to measurement of performance does
not work well.  The wishes listed above are not being met.
The traditional approach leads to disputes about what is
the actual performance, who is responsible for shortfalls,
and how the contract should be interpreted when
determining Service Credits.  There are constant reports of
delays of months in resolving bills arising from these
disputes.  More importantly, the business managers of the
purchaser agency constantly complain that they are not
receiving the level of service that they need.  Of course,
their expectations may be unrealistic and they may be
reflecting concerns about the use of outsourcing itself but
there is no way of showing, in terms that they understand,
that performance is adequate.
There is an implicit acknowledgment that the existing
approaches will not work because there are clauses written
into every contract in the Federal Government sector for
the provider to develop a method for assessing “end-to-
end, business-based” measures.  Despite such an
obligation in the contract, and a long standing desire to
introduce better measures, the provider of concern has not
been able to suggest acceptable contract performance
measures.
Unfortunately, the major advisory firms have not been
able to make any suggestions either.  Actually, they
expressed interest in what was developed through this
work because it would be of use to their clients and they
had nothing available.
So, the task was to design a system for measuring the
performance of the IT services provided under contract
that would please both the purchaser and provider by
meeting the wishes listed above.
II. WHAT IS AVAILABLE
There are at least three facets of systems measurement
that could be used as a basis for designing the
measurement system.  They are IT Effectiveness, IT
Benchmarking/ Balanced Scorecard, and IT Investment
measurement.  Elements from each of these facets are
useful but not sufficient for the purpose.  The
measurement of performance carried out by staff from a
purchasing agency and a provider under contract is not the
same as measuring the performance of internal staff or
evaluating investment.  The presence of a contract leads to
the need for precise expression of requirements and
obligations, which will be vetted explicitly and
deliberately by lawyers.
The measurement of IT Effectiveness (“Are we getting
value for money?”) has been an issue for the life of the IS
discipline, of course.  The work by [8] did provoke
thought about the ultimate measure of value-for-money –
that the system is effective for the money that has been
expended upon it.
Various frameworks have been suggested for linking IT
performance to business value across the enterprise ([9],
[10]).  As most of this work shows that user satisfaction is
a powerful measure, so we wished to incorporate it in our
measurement system.
However, many of these measures are too general for
use in a contractual arrangement.  We need other measures
as well.
There has been a flurry of work examining ways of
measuring internal performance (“Do we provide value for
money?”).  This work is mostly based upon the Balanced
Scorecard approach of Kaplan and Norton [11].  (This
approach is already in use in this purchasing agency for its
business operations, so it accepts it.)  Examples of the use
of the Balanced Scorecard for assessing the performance
of internal IT services include Willcox [12] and the US
General Services Administration [13], which does give a
detailed guideline based upon the Balanced Scorecard for
developing IT performance metrics for use in public sector
organizations.  Other approaches are described in [14].
Similarly, and more pertinently for this project, the
Australian National Audit Office [15] has provided
guidelines for performance measurement in the Australian
public sector.  Actually, this area of performance
measurement is very large, with many Web-sites dedicated
to providing guidelines or tools (see [16], [17]).
These measurements are very useful for determining
how to enhance the performance of internal IT staff but
can they be used to assess the performance of an external
service provider?  Many of the quadrants in the Scorecard
are hard to apply when measuring contractual
performance.  For example, how can we assess ‘Learning
and Growth’ when it is provided by some other
organization?  So, we need to be able to link the measures
back to the organization’s vision, goals, and objectives but
take account of the separation of responsibilities over two
organizations.
Similarly, the measures used to assess IT Investments
(“Should we buy this service”?) are also useful but not
enough for our needs.  The chapters in Willcocks and
Lester [18] discuss many measurement concepts, such as
“Organizational Performance Index” or more interpretive
evaluation approaches, as does Bendor-Samuel [19].
Again, we must ask, “how can these measures apply when
payments are to be made for very specific statements of
work, with every deviation likely to end in a form of
financial penalty, for a public sector organization that
expends money but has no profit margin and extensive
political pressures at work?”.
We needed a measurement system that meets the wishes
and makes use of the existing approaches, where
appropriate.  The following section shows the steps in
developing such a contract performance measurement
system.
III. WHAT WE DID
Representatives of the purchaser and provider formed a
steering committee for the measurement project.  We
developed a set of evaluation principles to be kept in mind
when designing the contract performance measurement
system., based upon the academic and professional
literature mentioned above.
A. Service Levels
The steering committee was keen to develop “five or
six” values that could be used to assess the relationship
between the two firms, rather than a set of detailed
performance measures.  Accordingly, we held a series of
meetings with members of the purchasing agency to
determine their business values.  These meetings included
a half-day electronic meeting, using the Grouputer ([20]),
that developed over 70 possible values, which were
arranged into a values tree to show links back to the
business objectives and down to particular measures.
However, the steering committee and other members of
the agency started to disagree with the level of detail to be
captured in the measures.  The other members preferred a
set of technical measures that could be formed into three
quality indices:  management, per user, and activity
(mainframe applications, mostly).
There was a change in personnel within the steering
committee and in other agency personnel.  The change led
to transferring development of the measurement system
from the first agency to another one that shared the same
outsourcing contract.  This agency had the same wishes for
a performance measurement system and took over the
project with the same intent and more purpose.
We began to see that neither general relationship
measures nor quality indices formed the self-organizing
system that we wanted.  They did not readily allow for
reflecting the different priorities that managers placed
upon the different services that were provided.   They did
not allow for the impact of loss of service at different
times of the working day or peak times in the year.
So, we moved to a system that adjusts payments for
services according to the quality of the supply of those
services, which was determined from the impact of
particular applications at particular times.
B. Payments and Service Credits
We had also been exploring salary-based Service
Credits to reflect the impact of shortfalls in Service Level.
These Credits were based upon the cost to the agency if
staff were unable to carry out their work because of
unavailable or slow systems.  This approach had been put
forward in some of the contracts that I had helped to
develop as an alternative to the fee percentage or fixed
charge arrangements that were in place in most
Government contracts.
As well, we considered using value-based pricing [21]
or Private Finance Initiatives [22].  One of the major
differences between the conditions faced by this purchaser
and the organizations using these other pricing approaches
was that the purchaser had many tasks supported by many
systems.  There were too many functions to determine the
value added by the provider or the attribution of IT costs
to transactions that could be used as a basis for payments.
We needed to show how the various IT services supported
various business tasks, with some attribution of
contribution for charge-back purposes, without having
detailed measures of resource allocation.
What we did know was which application used which
systems resources (or ‘components’ in the language of the
provider, such as mainframe or LAN server or operating
system or Help Desk advice).  So, we used the link
between component and application as the basis for the
measurement of quality adjustments to payments.  We also
kept the principle implicit in these pricing approaches that
the size of any penalties or bonus for the quality of service
reflected the impact of the performance upon the business.
C. Satisfaction with Service
The literature concerning the evaluation of service
quality (especially SOFTQUAL [22], based upon
SERVQUAL [23]) did provide guidance about measuring
the overall performance of the provider.  Customer
Satisfaction Surveys can act as a general sweeping up of
the intangible, over-all views of the agency staff.
Accordingly, we developed an on-line questionnaire based
upon a sub-set of the questions from SOFTQUAL.
D. Selling the Method
As part of the process of both gathering ideas and
gaining commitment to the changed measurement system,
we held a series of meetings with senior business staff
across the country.  We presented the description of the
method (as given below) and sought their reactions, both
at the time and in follow-up messages.
We had many meetings with purchaser and provider
staff.  These meetings were used to keep the staff
informed, to resolve implementation issues, and to gather
the information that is needed to build the measures and
their standards.  Staff from both organizations have
accepted the use of the system, believing that it should
lead to better performance.
The method was introduced into operation in January
but still in parallel with the operation of the existing
system.  As at the end of February, the parties are still
negotiating over price and performance standards.
IV. WHAT WE HAVE: THE MEASURE TO MANAGE
PERFORMANCE METHOD
We built a contract management system called Measure
to Manage Performance (M2P) that does reflect the impact
of business activities that do not meet the required
standard and when these activites were disrupted.  The
payment for the provided services is measured in the same
units as the Service Credits for shortfalls in the required
services.
Table 1 shows the differences between traditional
performance measurement approaches and the M2P
system.  The details of the M2P system are given below.
A. Basis for Measurement
The core of the measurement system is an ‘activity’.
An activity can be a business application, such as a
database system or an Office suite.  It could be a support
activity, such as Help Desk services or preparing a
proposal for a new application.  The performance of each
activity is measured by one or more measures, such as
response time for an application or quality of
communication about the progress of a project.
B. Parts of M2P
The M2P system comes in three parts:
•  A Service Level Agreement that clearly and
completely shows responsibilities for providing
services and the required standards for the
services, in business terms;
• calculations of the payment for the services;
• assessments of quality of service.
Figure 1 shows the flow between the parts of the M2P
method used to calculate the activity charges.
The M2P software ensures that changes to activities  or
measures automatically appear in all Service Level
Agreements as well as in the payment models.  This
integration of the elements of the performance system
ensures that the consequences of such changes can be
forecast and that there is no dispute because the Service
Level Agreement is at odds with the payment schedules.
Produce Services Level Agreement
The purchaser lists all of the activities that have an
noticeable impact upon the agency, taking account of the
priority placed upon them and the number of users of the
activity.  The activities are in turn linked to the services
(tasks and the systems components) needed to support the
activities.
These links are used to build the Service Level
Agreement (SLA), as part of the contract.  The SLA
describes the services that are the responsibility of the
provider and the quality standards for each activity.
The required quality of each measure is also defined in
the Service Level Agreement.  The definition includes
who makes the measurement, using what instrument, to
what precision, under what conditions.  Each of the
measures that are at the core of the system has a standard,
defined as an Acceptability Band rather than a single
point.  For example, response time can have a band
between three seconds and five seconds.  If the measure
falls below the lower limit of the band (five seconds) then
penalties are paid.  If it falls above the upper limit (three
seconds) then a bonus could be payable if it has been
determined that this improved performance leads to some
benefit, such as staff productivity, to the agency.
The Service Level Agreement also defines the
consequences if the standard for an activity is exceeded
(bonus) or not met (penalty).  These consequences are
based upon the priority for the activity, as judged by
business managers.
Determine Charges
There are three payments or adjustments.  The first
payment, as shown at the top of Table 2, is for the
management fees that are fixed each month.  The second
payment is for the number of ‘seats’ (users of PCs in
effect) supported by the provider.  The third charge is for
the activities that involve mainframe, server, or PC
processing.
M2P calculates the payments according to the amount
of support provided to the staff carrying out business tasks.
The main component of the payment is the Activity User
Hour (AUH) charge.  The AUH charge depends upon how
many people use how many activities for how long, as
requested by the Contract Manager at the start of the
billing period.
Quality Adjustments for Services
If a user reports the performance of an activity as falling
below the Acceptance Band then it is deemed to be
“Unavailable to Standard”.  The time an activity is
Unavailable is taken from the report to the Help Desk until
the Help Desk confirms with that user that the activity is
now back to standard.  M2P uses an automatic ‘feed’ from
the vendor’s Help Desk records to determine how long
these applications were Unavailable.
If the provider feels that users have unrealistic
expectations then they can make the measure as defined in
the Service Level Agreement.  In the case of response
time, the measure is made ‘end-to-end’ in that it taken
from when a user presses a return key for the application
in question until the appropriate reponse is completed.
If transaction monitors are not available, which is the
responsibility, and at the cost, of the provider, then a
sample of measures using stopwatches can be used, as it is
precise enough.  Usually substantiation is not needed, as
the activities usually are stopped rather than just slowed
when a component fails.




Who makes measure Provider, using their monitors and
instruments
Purchaser, using user reports to the Help Desk





All applications Only those applications with a priority and
usage (about 100) above a meaningful amount
(about 25 out of 55 possible)
Timing of
measurement
All of the time, usually every 15 minutes When shortfall is observed by user
Measurement band Measures percentage of performance
below a single level.  For example, “95%
of responses less than 3 seconds”, “system
available 99.5%”
Measures band of performance.  For example,
“response time: 5 to 3 seconds”
Express measures in
business terms
No, uses technical measures such as
“internal host response time”, “time to
resolve first call”, “network transient time”
Yes, use business measures such as ‘user




No connection between technical measures
and benefits
Business managers set priority for activities
and hence for linked measures
Encourage good
performance
Use Service Credits only as penalties Performance above top of Band can lead to
bonus, allows incentives
Show components
that have risk for
quality of services
Provider is unable to determine which
service has the most impact upon Service
Credits
Provider can readily see the link between
service and Service Credit so that resources




Low.  Measures are for individual
components (mainframe processing,
communications, LAN transit, PC
processing)
High.  Measures are made at the user end and
reflect time from user back to user.
Help with charge-
back arrangements
Some versions determine resources
allocated to activities and calculate costs of
resources
Payments, Service Charges, and bonuses are
allocated to business areas according to the
number of people in those areas using each




At least 50 measures, with some contracts
having over hundreds




No link between the loss of service and the
business activty dependent upon that
service.  Penalties often set regardless of
the activities involved in the failure
Business managers weight each activity
according to the leverage that activity
provides to their business area
Allow for when
services are not up to
required level of
performance
No.  A failure at 12 at night has the same
consequence as a failure at 12 in the day.
Yes.  Different times (day, week, or year)
carry different weights to reflect the impact
upon the users.  Losing access to a client’s
records at a peak time is weighted more than
losing that access late at night.
Once a call has been made to the Help Desk saying an
activity is below standard then the usual problem
resolution tasks are carried out.  One of these tasks is the
root cause analysis that determines why the activity was
not to standard.  This analysis identifies the component
that failed or the task that was not undertaken properly.
The analysis is also used by a joint purchaser-provider
team that forms each month to consider the reports of
disruptions from the Help Desk in order to determine the
responsibility for the failure, as the purchasing agency is
still responsible for application development, which can
cause many of the disruptions, especially for enterprise
servers.  This team acts as the first point of audit to ensure
that shortfalls are identified correctly.
Once the joint team identifies the “failed” component,
the predetermined links between activities and services
show all of the activities that were effected by this failure,
even if there were reports from users only about one
activity.  The failure triggers the consequences given in the
Service Level Agreement (see Table 2).
On the other hand, if the provider can show that the
standards are exceeded for an activity, then the bonuses
described in the Service Level Agreement apply.
As a general rule, the Service Credits are not to be paid
in cash (as deductions from the invoices).  The purchaser
expects the provider to give additional remedial services at
no cost to the extent of the Service Credit.




Activity Number of users
Personnel MIS x 100 20 5 Personnel MIS for 125 pers
Financial MIS x 50 200 15







Mainframe 1 1 1 Mainframe
Apps server 1 1 1 1 1
File server 1 1 1 1 1 1
LAN 1 1 1 1 1
DOS 1 1
Quality
Within 3 - 5 secs 1 Within 3 - 5 secs
Within 5 - 10 secs 1
All functions present 1
No security breach 1
Payment
Penalty Penalty for each hour 1 1 1 for Penalty
Bonus for each hour 1 or bonus
TimeZone Wt
MF 09:00 - 19:00 1 1 1 1 1 MF 09:00 - 19:00
Holiday 09:00 - 12:00 1 1 1 0.9 1 Holiday 09:00 - 12:00
Wt 1.2 Budget time May 08:00 - 22:00 1 1 1 1.2 Budget time May 08:00 - 22:00
Location Priority (1 = top, 9 = bottom)
Priority 2 Head Office - Operations 5 2 x Priority 5 for Head Office - Operations
Head Office - Finance 1 2 x
Regional Office - Sales 1 x
AUH = - 
Cost_AUH  * 
200 * 2 * 1.2 
for each hour
Figure 1.  The links between Elements of the M2p System
The grey links show how the elements form into the Service Level Agreement on the right of the figure.
The outlined links show how the elements determine the penalty for the incident report given at the left of the figure
Present Charges in Cost Monitor
M2P presents the charges and the adjustments in a Cost
Monitor.  There is a Cost Monitor for the Contract
Manager, showing the payment and the adjustments for all
activities supported throughout the agency.  As well, there
are Cost Monitors for each of the Business Managers,
showing the payments and the quality for the services that
are relevant to their activities for their business functions.
Staff Satisfaction
A predetermined percentage of calls to the Help Desk
trigger the on-line satisfaction surveys.  Once the tasks
required by the call have been completed, the callers are
asked about the quality of the service that they received.
Every six months a percentage of the staff of the agency is
asked about their expectations for the quality of service, to
help in the setting of standards.  Staff who have not made
calls to the Help Desk are asked whether they have no
problems or prefer to use the “black Help Desk”.
Other Measures
Not all of the measures are calculated through reports to
the Help Desk.  The Contract Manager for the purchasing
agency monitors the performance in preparing business
cases and in communicating the progress of projects.  The
provider is asked to remedy any shortfalls in these areas as
required in the Service Level Agreements.
V. WHAT WE ARE LEARNING FROM THE USE OF THE M2P
METHOD
We have learnt, without any surprise, that there are
resistances to moving to a new measurement system.  The
Table 2.  Summary of Service Levels and Credits used in the M2P Contract Performance Measurement
System
Management charge
Costs that are fixed regardless of the number of users supported or the extent of the provided support.  The charge
covers such items as account management fees, project management, and preparing Business Cases for new initiatives
Acceptable (good management) Unacceptable (poor management /communication)
Pay agreed fixed amount each month
+ Pay for accepted Business Case
+ Pay for projects completed ahead of agreed forecast by
percentage of number of Activity User Hours for that
activity depending upon the project
Activity dependent upon project is deemed
Unavailable if project is late and lack of
communication leads to agency wasting resources
Seat charge
Support of Organizational users, regardless of the size or complexity of the applications used.  The support can
include Service Desk calls for changes to passwords or basic infrastructure used by all or any application, including
procurement of items or restoration of data.
Acceptable (satisfactory support / service provided) Unacceptable
Paid agreed amount for each seat for each month
+ Support calls paid for each call, to agreed “bucket” limit
+ Service calls paid for each request, unless it was a defect
call (report of component failure), which is not charged
Calls above “bucket” (for example, because of
inadequate training) not paid
Slow response to calls deemed to render Unavailable
the activity that is the subject of the call
Activity Time charge
Cost of using applications over time, taking account of the resources needed in providing each application (such as
remote access, electronic mail, and groupware) or support activity (such as providing detailed advice to end-users)
Acceptable (Activity available to standards) Unacceptable (at least one standard not achieved)
Pay for each activity =  agreed cost for each
activity_user_hour * business leverage for activity * pre-
agreed number of users of activity * pre-agreed time of use
of activity * weight for time zone
+  percentage of AUH charge for activities above standard
Adjust payment for each activity = part of hourly cost
of labour *business leverage for activity * number of
users of activity * time for which activity is
unavailable to standard * weight of time during which
activity was unavailable
Staff Satisfaction
Overall satisfaction of users and managers with service provided by Help Desk and on-site support staff.  Measured
by an on-line survey sent to 10% of staff, immediately after they have made use of these services.  Includes six
monthly survey to determine why such services are not used.
Acceptable (median rating over items is 6/7) Unacceptable (rating less than 6/7)
Extend the contract by three months for every three months
where this rating is maintained
Provider to take remedial action at no further cost
basis for the resistance is inertia, because of the effort of
having to make changes, the worries of the unknown, and
suspicions between the parties that the other would gain an
unforeseen advantage.
We have learnt that business managers, in this agency at
least, are very keen to see “where their dollar goes”.  They
do want to know how well their staff are being supported
by the IT systems.  Accordingly, they are keen to see M2P
work.
There is a tacit move towards selective sourcing [1]
underway as well.  The purchasing agency is beginning to
see that it can do better with internal resources in some
areas and so it is seeking to change the pricing regime and
Service Level Agreement to reflect this move.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Measure to Manage Performance method for
measuring performance under contract is based upon
measurement principles derived from experience and the
assessment/ evaluation literature.  It does supply a unique
and powerful method for measuring - and so enhancing –
the “business-based” performancein demand now.
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Abstract-This paper evaluates the impact of information sharing
strategies on the performance of a supply chain. We consider
three forms of information sharing strategies: (1) order
information sharing where every stage of the supply chain only
knows the orders from its immediate downstream stage; (2)
demand information sharing where every stage has full
information about the market demand; (3) inventory
information sharing where each stage shares its inventory levels
and demand information with its immediate upstream stage.
Our results indicate that information sharing improves supply
chain performance when demand is relatively stable. More
importantly, we find that a hybrid information sharing strategy,
which uses demand information sharing in the distribution
network of the supply chain while using inventory information
sharing in the supplier network, is the ideal strategy to improve
supply chain performance when demand mix is volatile.
I. INTRODUCTION
    More and more companies have recognized that there is a
direct link between the performance of supply chains and the
availability and quality of timely information. It is widely
known that Wal-Mart and Proctor & Gamble (P&G) share
information regarding the retail sales of P&G products at
Wal-Mart stores. This information enables P&G to do a better
job of managing its production of these products and provides
Wal-Mart with greater “in store” availabilities. Furthermore,
new successful companies such as Dell and Cisco are already
sharing information with suppliers and customers to reduce
working capital and inventories. The flow of information
through the supply chain enables them to match supply
closely to consumer demand and to anticipate changes in the
marketplace. The wide use of advanced information
technologies (e.g., EDI and Web technologies) in supply
chains also suggests that companies have come to realize the
importance of information sharing.
    Academic researchers have also showed a growing interest
in the value of information sharing in supply chains. The
value of information in inventory management is studied by,
e.g., Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang [4], Chen [2], Chen,
Drezner, Ryan and Simchi_Levi [1], Gavirneni, Kapuscinski
and Tayur [3], and Tan [8]. Closely related to our paper is the
research conducted by Tan, who tested the impact of
information sharing strategies on the performance of supply
chains. Her research relies on a multi-agent simulation model,
whereas ours depends on analytical models.
    While information is commonly described as valuable,
there is little research on what kind of information supply
chain members should share and how to share it in a supply
chain. In this paper we attempt to achieve two main
objectives. First, we study how information sharing affects
supply chain performance, which consists of four dimensions:
inventory, backorder, fill rate and cycle time. We develop
simple analytical models to evaluate the impact of different
information sharing strategies on supply chain performance.
Second, we investigate the potential of a hybrid information
sharing strategy, which uses demand information sharing in
the distribution network and uses inventory information
sharing in the supplier network, to improve the overall
performance of the supply chain when demand is volatile.
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next
section describes the bullwhip effect and information sharing
in the supply chain context. Section 3 evaluates three forms
of information sharing strategies: order information sharing,
inventory information sharing and demand information
sharing. In section 4, we propose the hybrid information
sharing strategy. In section 5, we conclude and identify
opportunities for future research.
II. INFORMATION SHARING IN SUPPLY CHAINS
    Lack of information sharing is a common root cause for
many supply-chain related problems. An important
observation in supply chain management, widely known as
the bullwhip effect, suggests that demand variability is
magnified as it is further upstream in the supply chain. The
bullwhip effect is a major concern for companies because the
increased variability in the order process requires each
facility to increase its safety stock in order to maintain a
given service level and therefore leads to increased inventory
cost. The importance of information sharing lies in reducing
the bullwhip effect by synchronizing supply with demand. In
this section, we discuss the bullwhip effect and information
sharing in the supply chain context.
A. The Bullwhip Effect
   In the simplest sense, the bullwhip effect refers to the
phenomenon that the systematic distortion in real demand is
amplified as it is passed upstream through the supply chain.
The bullwhip effect has been observed in many industries.
P&G observed that although the end-customer demand for
diapers was fairly stable over time, the diaper orders issued
by retailers to its wholesalers or distributors were quite
variable. Furthermore, even larger fluctuations exist in the
orders that P&G received from its wholesalers. Finally, the
variability in the orders for materials to P&G’s suppliers was
even larger.
    The bullwhip effect is a main concern in supply chain
management for several reasons. First of all, the increased
order variability requires each supply chain member to hold
excessively high and variable inventory levels in order to
meet a boom-and-bust demand pattern. Secondly, high stocks
and poor service often go together. Despite the overall
overstocking throughout the supply chain, the lack of
synchronization between supply and demand leads to a very
high inventory at certain times and complete stockout at other
times. Finally, the bullwhip effect increases not only the
physical inventories but also operating costs. Poor demand
forecasts based on the distorted demand lead to uncertain
capacity planning and missed production schedule. Hence,
the bullwhip effect should be minimized or eliminated.
    In order to minimize the bullwhip effect, we need to
identify the root causes of the bullwhip effect. Previous
research suggests that this amplification of demand is
primarily caused by the problems of management
intervention [4]. While it is true that the common effects in
supply chains, such as large batch sizes, rationing game, and
price variations, exaggerate the bullwhip effect, our study
suggests that the bullwhip effect is inherent in a traditional
supply chain even without these problems. Several
characteristics of the supply chain that can cause the bullwhip
effect include (1) lead times; (2) supply chain uncertainties;
(3) information gap; and (4) supply chain structure. First,
each stage of the supply chain amplifies the demand
variability because of the time lag between placing an order
and receiving it. We will show that lead times cause an
increase in demand variability. Second, the amount of safety
stock used to buffer against supply and demand uncertainties
amplifies the bullwhip effect. Since the order placed by each
stage of the supply chain to its supplier consists of the
amount it needs to meet its demand and the safety stock, high
and variable safety stock level magnifies the bullwhip effect.
Third, without sharing of demand information, an upstream
supplier is forced to forecast demand based on the orders
from its immediate downstream stage. Such an arrangement
will cause the supplier automatically to lose track of the real
demand pattern. Finally, supply chain structure can contribute
to the bullwhip effect, e.g., the length of the serial channel
can lead to the bullwhip effect because the order variability is
amplified at each stage of the supply chain.
    The differences in understanding about the bullwhip effect
lead to the different ways of eliminating it. Previous findings
suggest that the bullwhip effect can be mitigated through
modifications in behavioral practice and operational practice.
Our study suggests that information sharing among supply
chain members plays a critical role in countering the bullwhip
effect.
B. Information Sharing Strategies in Supply Chains
    A great deal of controversy exists about the impact of
information on supply chain performance. While some
authors have reported very beneficial impact, others have
found marginal, no, or negative impact. Determining the
value of information is a fundamental research problem for
information system researchers. In this paper, we argue that
information sharing can significantly reduce the bullwhip
effect and improve supply chain performance. For this
purpose, we evaluate three common information sharing
strategies: order information sharing, demand information
sharing and inventory information sharing. The three
information sharing policies are described as follows.
Order Information Sharing: In the case of order
information sharing, each stage of the supply chain does not
know the status of its downstream stages and forecasts are
based only on the orders from its immediate downstream
stage, which, as we will see, can be significantly more
variable than real demand. The beer game is probably the
most famous case that demonstrates order information
sharing in a traditional supply chain. Even when the end
consumer demand is relatively stable, the bullwhip effect
intrinsic in the chain leads to high inventories, poor forecasts,
and delays which in turn cause lost customers, lost
production, lost sales, and lost time.
Demand Information Sharing: On the other extreme,
demand information sharing assumes total real demand
visibility. Real-time demand information is transmitted from
the end-consumer back through every stage of the supply
chain. This means that any real change in demand can be
known at all points in the supply chain. With real demand
information, the bullwhip effect is minimized and channel
partners can forecast future demand more accurately, reduce
safety stock, and anticipate customer needs. Direct sales
model, sharing of POS data, and collaborative planning and
optimization belong to this type of information sharing.
Inventory information sharing: In this form of information
sharing, a stage of the supply chain shares information about
its inventory levels and actual demand rather than places
orders with its supplier. Since the supplier knows its
downstream customer’s demand, this strategy eliminates at
least one tier of information distortion, i.e., the downstream
customer stage. Moreover, by monitoring its downstream
inventory levels, the supplier can synchronize its production
and delivery schedule with the downstream customer’s
demand and maintain a high level of availability. This policy
is a kind of partial information sharing because the supplier
looks at only its downstream stage. This strategy is currently
common in the grocery and fashion retailing industry. Vendor
managed inventory (VMI), schedule sharing window, and
continuous replenishment belong to this type of information
sharing.
Information sharing provides benefits in terms of
reduced order variability and supply chain visibility. For
example, demand information sharing allows each stage to
forecast accurately based on real demand in order to reduce
the overall level of safety stock compared with sales.
Information sharing also affects other performance
measurements, such as fill rate, backlog and cycle time.
Perhaps, some measurements may be worsened because of
information sharing. For example, Chen [2] reports that high
demand variability decreases the value of information. The
reason is that the reduced inventory gives each stage less
buffer to cope with sudden increase in its downstream
demand and causes a very large backlog. As a consequence, a
different information strategy may affect the performance
differently. In the next section, we develop mathematical
models to evaluate these information sharing strategies.
III. EVALUATING INFORMATION SHARING STRATEGIES
    Consider a linear supply chain with N stages. Consumer
demand arises at stage 1, stage 1 orders from stage 2, etc.,
and stage N orders from an outside supplier. This triggers
material flow in the opposite direction. Each stage has a fixed
lead time. We first assume that each stage maintains a high
service level so that the supply chain can be “decoupled” into
N single-stages. We also assume that the demands are
independent across periods and each stage faces a normal
demand. Finally, we assume that each stage replenishes its
stock by following a periodic-review policy with a fixed
review time, one period and that when the demand in a period
exceeds the on-hand inventory, the excess is backordered.
The objective is to find out how information sharing can
affect the performance of the supply chain.
   For each stage of the supply chain, let
   St = order-up-to inventory level in period t,
   L = lead time plus 1 (review period),
   Qt = order quantity in period t,
  tmˆ = forecast demand in period t,
   tsˆ = forecast standard deviation of demand in period t,
   Dt = real consumer demand in period t,
   I(t) = average inventory level in period t,
   B(t) = average backorder level in period t,
   a = customer service level,
   b (t)= average fill rate in period t.
   Let z be the safety-stock factor. One common form of a
periodic inventory policy is to set the target inventory level in
period t, St, is equal to [5].
St = L tmˆ + z L tsˆ ,         (1)
where
z = [1/2 )/2( p ]ln[a/(1-a)],
z L tsˆ is an estimate of safety stock and a is the customer
service level, which measures the proportion of periods in
which no stockout occurs. For a given service level, we can
determine the safety factor z with the above formula.
A. Performance Measures
   For a given stage of the supply chain, we use the following
four performance measurements to evaluate the supply chain
performance.
Inventory: Inventory is the key driver to the supply chain
cost. Inventory measured in dollars hides many problems.
The amount of the inventory often accurately demonstrates
the performance. The average inventory level is the sum of
safety stock and average cycle stock, and is given by
I(t) = z L tsˆ + tmˆ /2.         (2)
For a given target service level a, we can compute the safety
factor z and then the average inventory level and vice versa.
Fill rate: Fill rate measures the proportion of demands that
are met from the inventory on hand. It is an important
indicator of availability. The long-run relationship between
the safety-stock factor and fill rate can be expressed as the
approximation formula in [7]
 b (t)= 1-[exp(-0.92–1.19z–0.37z2)] L tsˆ / tmˆ .         (3)
Backlog: Backorder is associated with a loss of customer
goodwill. It's another driver to the supply chain cost.
Expected shortage per replenishment cycle is [7]
B(t) = tsˆ L Gu(z),         (4)
where Gu(z) is the probability that a unit normal variable
takes on a value of z or larger.
Cycle time: Cycle time is defined as the amount of time that
elapses from the instant that an order is placed until it arrives.
It is an important indicator of supply chain performance,
especially when firms compete on speed of delivery. Let RT
be the response time to the customer demand. A customer
order is delayed with probability (1–a). Hence, the overall
average cycle time CT equals to
CT = L + (1 - a)RT.                 (5)
   Several observations can be made from Equation (1) to (5).
First, average inventory and backlog are increasing functions
of the standard deviation of demand. Second, fill rate is a
decreasing function of the standard deviation of demand.
Third, cycle time is a decreasing function of a service level
and an increasing function of response time. Empirical
evidences demonstrate that reduction of demand uncertainty
can reduce the response time through improvement in
planning and scheduling, and communication. Hence, the
performance of the supply chain squarely relies on demand
uncertainty seen by each stage. Inventories are often used to
protect the supply chain from uncertainties, but it is an
expensive solution. We will quantify how information
sharing can reduce demand uncertainty at each stage of the
supply chain and hence improve supply chain performance.
B. Order Information Sharing
    In the case of the order information sharing, demand
forecasts at each stage of the supply chain are based only on
the orders from its customer. We assume that each stage uses
the simple moving average forecast method with n
observations to estimate the mean and standard deviation of
demand, i.e,
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where 1--
k
itQ is the order placed by stage k-1 in period t-i.
   To simplify our analysis, assume that each stage, k, follows
a period review policy where the target inventory level is of
the form
k
tS  = (Lk + SSk )
k
tmˆ , k = 1, . . ., N,         (8)
where Lk is the lead time between stages k and k+1 plus 1, SSk
is the safety stock expressed in units of the average demand.
    Note that (8) is just a special case of (1) with the safety
stock z L tsˆ = SSk 
k
tmˆ . In practice, many companies use
policies of this form. For instance, a retailer facing an order
lead time of three week may choose to keep its target
inventory level equal to four weeks of forecast demand, with
the extra week of inventory representing its safety stock. The
more volatile the demand, the larger SSk becomes. At stage k,
we can determine the variance of ktQ  relative to the variance
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   Observe that ktQ  may be negative, in which case we
assume that the excess inventory is returned without cost.
Using (7) and (8), we can write the order quantity ktQ  as
k
tQ  = (Lk + SSk )
k
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    Taking the variance of ktQ , we get
Var ( kQ ) =[1+2(Lk + SSk)/n+2(Lk + SSk)
2/n2]Var( 1-kQ ).   (9)
    Hence we can deductively derive the following expression
for the variance of the orders placed by stage k









 k = 1, . . ., N.       (10)
    The increase in demand variability is an increasing
function of Lk, the leadtimes, and SSk, the safety stock, and the
decreasing function of n, the number of observations used in
demand forecasting. More importantly, the variance increases
multiplicatively at each stage of the supply chain. This
expression shows the bullwhip effect that demand
information increases quickly as one moves up a traditional
supply chain. Empirical evidence also shows that the orders
placed by a retailer tend to be much more variable than the
end consumer demand seen by that retailer. This increase in
demand variability propagates up the supply chain, distorting
the orders received by upstream channel members. Based on
(2) to (5), the increased demand variability not only requires
each stage to increase its safety stock in order to maintain a
given service level but leads to an increase in backlog and
cycle time and a drop in fill rate.
C. Demand Information Sharing
    On the other extreme, demand information sharing
assumes that the first stage of the supply chain (i.e., the
retailer) shares its real-time demand data with each of the
subsequent stages. Since each stage has real demand
information, each stage will use the same estimate of the
mean demand.








    When demand information is shared among stages, an
echelon inventory policy is used. Consider an echelon
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    If we perform an analysis similar to that presented above,
we have the following expression for the variance of the

















               Var(D),   k = 1, . . ., N.          (12)
    In comparison with (10), (12) demonstrates that the
increase in demand variability at each stage of the supply
chain is additive not multiplicative. So using real demand
information, each stage can use real demand to create more
accurate forecasts, rather than relying on the orders received
from its downstream stage, which, as shown in (10), can be
significantly more variable than the real demand. Hence
demand information sharing can reduce the bullwhip effect
and reduce the safety stock to the minimum.
    Intuitively, as consumer demand becomes more volatile, it
would be more beneficial for stage 1 to share its demand
information with the upstream stages. But even for demand
information sharing, as shown in (12), there still exists an
increase in order variability at every stage of the supply chain
because of the time lag and the safety stock. Therefore, if
each stage plans its safety stock based on real demand, it is
insufficient to meet the orders from its downstream customer.
When the variance of real demand is very high, the increase
in order variability can be substantial. Hence the backlog
problem is aggravated as one moves upstream through the
supply chain. This in turn results in low fill rates and long
cycle time.
D. Inventory Information Sharing
    In this type of information sharing, a stage shares its
inventory status and actual demand with its immediate
upstream stage. To a large extent, this strategy looks at only
one supply chain link and belongs to partial information
sharing. Suppose stage k-1 shares its actual demand and
inventory status with stage k. Two distinct characteristics of
this relationship are the following. First, because stage k
knows the demand of stage k-1, it can implement the echelon-
based inventory control. Both stage k and stage k-1 forecast
the mean of demand based on the demand of stage k-1 in n
periods. We have
1ˆ tm  = 




















2 / n,   k = 3, . . ., N,
where 2--
k
itQ  is the order placed by stage k-2 and received by
stage k-1 in period t-i.
Fig. 1. Standard deviation of orders placed across a 5-tier supply chain
   If we perform an analysis similar to that presented in sub-
section C, we can derive the variance of the orders placed by
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    When k=2, inventory information sharing performs like
demand information sharing. In comparison with (10), (13)
demonstrates that the increase in demand variability between
stage k and stage k-1 is additive not multiplicative. Stage k
can use the actual demand of stage k-1, which is less variable
than the orders received from stage k-1, to create more
accurate forecasts. Thus, inventory information sharing
eliminates one stage of information distortion, i.e., stage k-1,
and consequently reduces some degree of the bullwhip effect.
Therefore, inventory information sharing can create more
accurate forecasts and keep less safety stock than order
information sharing. But it does not perform as well as
demand information sharing in terms of inventory savings
because the demand of stage k-1 may be distorted by the
further downstream stages.
    Moreover, by monitoring its downstream inventory status,
stage k can synchronize its production and delivery schedules
with the downstream demand to ensure that products are
consistently available to stage k-1. Thus, stage k provides
stage k-1 with high level of availability. In other words,
inventory information sharing is able to maintain a low
backlog, a high fill rate, and a short cycle time.














% BENEFIT COMPARING INFORMATION SHARING STRATEGIES TO







Fill rate -7.54% 5.59%
Cycle time -0.95% 16.15%
   We have demonstrated that information sharing can reduce
the bullwhip effect, mainly caused by the lead times and the
safety stocks in the supply chain. Fig. 1 presents the
simulation estimates of the standard deviation of orders
across a 5-tier supply chain. It shows that information sharing
reduces the order variability dramatically and thus reduce
supply chain inventory. Insufficient inventory, however,
causes an increase in backlog and cycle time and a drop in fill
rate when demand is volatile.  The following observations
can be made from the results above.
Different information sharing policy gives its distinct
“signature” performance. First, in the case of order
information sharing, the increased demand variability
requires each stage to increase its safety stock in order to
keep a given service level and leads to overstocking
throughout the system. This strategy also has a high backlog,
a low fill rate, and a long cycle time since a boom-and-bust
order pattern results in a very high inventory at some times
and complete stockout at other times. Second, demand
information sharing can significantly reduce the bullwhip
effect and thus reduce its safety stock to the minimum. But
the minimum safety stock causes an increase in backorder
cost and cycle time, and a drop in fill rate under volatile
demand. Finally, Although inventory information sharing
does not perform as well as demand information sharing in
terms of inventory, this strategy is able to maintain a low
backlog, a high fill rate, and a short cycle time by
maintaining sufficient inventory and efficient production and
delivery planning.
Information sharing improves supply chain performance
when demand is relatively stable. In the case of order
information sharing, the demand variance increases
multiplicatively at each stage of the supply chain. With
demand information sharing, the bullwhip effect is minimized
since the demand variance increases additively at each stage
of the supply chain. Inventory information sharing can reduce
at least one level of distortion. The reduction of the demand
variance is also achieved by the reduced safety stock at each
stage of the supply chain. Based on (2) to (5), lower demand
variance not only reduces inventory but improves other
performance measures.
   Using a multi-agent simulation model, Tan simulated a
generic supply chain with four stages: retailer (tier 1),
distributor (tier 2), manufacturer (tier 3) and supplier (tier 4)
[8]. The end-demand is generated by Uniform[8500,11500].
Table I shows the simulation estimates of the percentage
TABLE II
% BENEFIT COMPARING INFORMATION SHARING STRATEGIES TO










Inventory 88.89% -97.78% 20%
Backorder -463.64% -36.36% 27.27%
Fill rate -44.83% 2.3% 3.45%
Cycle time -183.4% 14% 22%
benefits realized through information sharing. Demand
information sharing experiences 84.19% and 19.06% in
inventory and backlog respectively while there is a drop in
fill rate and a slight increase in cycle time. Inventory
information sharing experiences 64.48% decrease in
backorder, 5.59% increase in fill rate and 16.15% decrease in
cycle time while its inventory savings 53.96% is not as
significant as that of demand information sharing. These
results verifies that information sharing improves supply
chain performance (especially inventory) when demand is
relatively stable and that different information sharing policy
behaves differently.
The Benefits of Information sharing are reduced when the
variance of demand is very high. While demand
information sharing lowers supply chain inventory, the
reduced inventory gives each stage of the supply chain less
buffer to cope with the increased demand uncertainty under
volatile demand. The reason is that each stage of the supply
chain underestimates the variability of its downstream
demand by planning the safety stocks based on real demand.
Inventory information sharing, on the other hand, gives the
best customer service, but the bullwhip effect and the high
product availability may drive the inventory up when demand
is highly volatile.
   Table II presents the simulation estimates of the percentage
benefits realized through information sharing under volatile
demand mix. This experiment considers four end products
that share one common platform. Although the total demand
are constant, the demand for each product changes randomly
and cyclically (refer [8] for details). The results demonstrate
that demand information sharing experiences 463% increase
in backlog, 44.83% drop in fill rate, 183.4% increase in cycle
time and that inventory information sharing experiences
97.78% increase in inventory. Therefore, information sharing
is not very beneficial under demand volatile. In the next
section, we will propose a hybrid information sharing
strategy to cope with volatile demand mix.
IV.  HYBRID INFORMATION SHAHRING STRATEGY
   Another important task of this research is to devise an ideal
information sharing strategy for a supply chain under volatile
demand. We have already seen that the value of information
sharing relies heavily on the nature of demand. Moreover,
each different part of the supply chain has its own distinct
characteristic and may require a different information sharing
strategy. In this section, we propose a hybrid information
sharing strategy, which uses demand information sharing in
the distribution network of the supply chain and uses
inventory information sharing in the supply network, for
managing a supply chain with volatile demand mix.
   Our primary motivation in developing the hybrid
information sharing strategy comes from our experience at a
major electronics manufacturer that manufactures radio
products. One of the goals of the manufacturer is to control
inventories in its distribution network through enhancing the
value of information, providing insights for its global supply
chain, which consists of local and offshore suppliers,
factories, super distribution centers (DCs), regional DCs and
dealers. These facilities are distributed all over the world. By
moving to a more systems integrated environment, the
company adopted schedule sharing window to schedule
factories based on product usage and inventory level
information supplied by their downstream stages at the
supply chain. But the problem is that DCs strive to maintain a
high customer service level by setting very large windows
and dealers do not want carry inventories and want
immediate deliveries; hence, the company carries several
months of inventory at its DCs. The root cause of the problem
is a mismatch between the schedule sharing strategy and its
distribution network.
    The radio product is a customizable product that provides
more than one hundred of localized versions of a basically
similar product to satisfy the requirements of different
markets. Its demand changes mainly in product mix rather
than volume. In this case, we find that hybrid information
sharing should be an ideal strategy for the radio supply chain.
The key to understanding the hybrid information sharing
strategy is that it takes into account both the position on the
supply chain and the nature of demand.
A. The Supplier Network and the Distribution Network
    A typical supply chain can be divided into the supplier
network (upstream of final assembly) and the distribution
network. Each sub-network has its distinct characteristics.
The supplier network, in which products are in the raw or
semi-finished states that will be transformed and assembled at
the manufacturer, is further away from the end consumer. Its
inventories, including parts, components and sub-assemblies,
have less value, greater commonality, and greater flexibility
than finished products. Partnerships between suppliers and
final assembly are important because a better knowledge of
the supplier production schedules and part availability is of
high value to the manufacturer in order to get the supplies in
time for production. Another reason for such partnerships is
that different input factors are complementary. Hence the
objective of the supplier network is to improve its availability
and responsiveness to the manufacturer.
    On the other hand, the distribution network is close to the
consumers. Finished products have a much higher value,
greater differentiation, and less flexibility than components.
High inventory cost rates and high demand uncertainty
require both the manufacturer and distributors to better
forecast demands based on real demand. Thus the objective
of the distribution network is to signal the right demand and
reduce the inventory through reducing the bullwhip effect.
    Therefore, the supplier network and the distribution
network may require different information sharing strategies.
In a volatile market place, inventory information sharing may
be a good policy for the supplier network because it offers the
best customer service. Demand information sharing, on the
other hand, may be a good strategy for the distribution
network because it provides each stage with real demand
information and minimizes the bullwhip effect. Matching the
information sharing strategy with the position on the supply
chain can improve the supply chain performance.
B. Demand Pattern
    Life would be easy if demand was stable. But supply
chains in many industries often suffer from an excess of some
products and a shortage of others because of an inability to
forecast demand accurately. In a volatile market, demand
may change in demand volume, product mix, or both. Thus
demand variability has two major dimensions: quantitative
variability and qualitative variability. Quantitative variability
captures changes in volume while qualitative variability
captures changes both in demand mix and in the nature of the
demand.
    On the basis of their demand patterns, products fall into
one of three categories: functional products, customizable
products, or innovative products. Functional products, such as
shampoo for dry, normal and oily hair, have a stable demand.
Many companies have customized their products to satisfy
the requirements of different market segments. The demand
mix of a customizable product, such as cellular phone, may
vary widely while the total demand does not change much.
Demand for innovative products, such as fashion apparel, has
both quantitative variability and qualitative variability.
C. Hybrid Information Sharing Strategy
   In section III, we only talked about quantitative variability.
When demand has a small quantitative variability, demand
information sharing is the ideal strategy because it minimizes
supply chain inventory by reducing the bullwhip effect. Even
when demand has a certain degree of quantitative variability,
inventory buffers in its distribution network can be used to
absorb the variability. Actually, retailers usually have to hold
more inventory than it is required to meet sales in order to
show a full stock level so that the stores look like they are ‘in
business’. Based on our performance equations, the
deployment of the inventory at retailers also enables rapid
replenishment to the consumer.
   When demand mix is highly volatile, however, the use of
finished goods inventory (FGI) is not only very costly but
also inflexible. When there are rapid changes in the nature of
the demand owning to shifts in customer preferences and/or
introduction of new, improved products, the old products
already made and held in inventory would have a reduced
value or simply become obsolete [6]. This is especially true
for customizable products and innovative products. For the
supply chains that supply such products, hybrid information
sharing, which takes advantage of the strengths of both
demand information sharing and inventory information
sharing, is the ideal strategy.
    On the one hand, the distribution network benefits from
this strategy. First, demand information sharing in the
distribution network can reduce qualitative variability since
each stage in the distribution network can benefit from the
value of centralized demand information and consequently
make accurate forecasts to minimize inventories and improve
customer service performance. Second, demand information
helps each stage to make segment-specific forecasts and
deploy FGI properly to buffer against qualitative variability.
Finally, the manufacturer is the best place to decouple supply
from demand because significant product differentiation often
occurs in the distribution network. If the total demand does
not change much even though the demand mix varies widely,
the manufacturer can benefit from the risk-pooling effect and
produce to accurate forecasts; otherwise, it can reactive
capacity to buffer against quantitative variability.
    On the other hand, the supply network also benefits from
the strategy. First, component commonality is a key
characteristic of customized products. Different models of a
customizable product, e.g, the radio product as mentioned
above, usually share a platform or other components. The
suppliers of such common components can fully benefit from
the risk-pooling effect. Moreover, inventory information
sharing gives the best customer service, e.g., a high fill rate, a
low backorder, and a short cycle time. Therefore, this policy
has its obvious advantages at the supplier network, where the
availability and responsiveness of suppliers will be critical for
the manufacturer’s production planning and scheduling.
Finally, since many suppliers in the supplier network usually
are smaller companies with limited financial resources and
technical expertise, it is infeasible and very expensive to use
real demand to drive decisions.  Hence the goal of the
supplier network is to improve service level and
responsiveness.
    Our simulation results indicate that hybrid information
sharing is a powerful strategy. As shown in Table II, this
policy experiences 20% decrease in inventory, 27.27%
decrease in backorder, 3.45% increase in fill rate and 22%
decrease in cycle time. It also offers best customer service
among all the information sharing strategies while reducing
the inventory significantly. The results also show that while
demand information sharing lowers the supply chain
inventory, the reduced inventory jeopardizes the customer
service; the bullwhip effect in inventory information sharing
drive the inventory up although this policy gives good
performance.
V. CONCLUSIONS
    Companies have long been aware of the value of
information sharing in supply chains; however, there has not
been much research into how information impacts on supply
chain performance, what kind of information supply chain
members should share and how they should share it. Our
study offers the following insights into these long-standing
concerns. First, information sharing improves supply chain
performance when demand is relatively stable since
information sharing can significantly reduce the bullwhip
effect. Second, different information sharing strategies have
different impacts on supply chain performance. While
demand information sharing lowers supply chain inventory,
the reduced inventory gives the supply chain less buffer to
cope with rapid change in demand. Inventory information
sharing can give the best customer service but the bullwhip
effect may drive the inventory up under volatile demand.
Corporations often need to trade off gains in some
dimensions of performance against losses in other measures.
Finally, hybrid information sharing is an ideal strategy when
demand is volatile in terms of demand mix. This strategy uses
demand information sharing in the distribution network to
reduce demand uncertainty associated with product mix while
using inventory information sharing in the supplier network
to guarantee reliable supplies.
Our ongoing studies are aimed at formalizing the hybrid
information sharing strategy. We are also investigating how
the value of information depends on the physical
characteristics of a supply chain, such as product structure,
supply chain structure, demand patterns, and production and
distribution process.
REFERENCES
[1]  F.Y. Chen, Z. Drezner, J.K. Ryan, and D. Simchi-Levi, “The bullwhip
       effect: managerial insights on the impact of forecasting and information
       on variation in a supply chain,” in Quantitative models for supply chain
       management, S. Tayur, R. Ganeshan, and M. Magazine Eds. Norwell:
       Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999, pp. 417-439.
[2]  F. Chen, “Echelon reorder points, installation reorder points, and the
       value of centralized demand information,” Management Sci., vol. 44, pp.
       S221-S234, December 1998.
[3]  S. Gavirneni, R. Kapuscinski, and S. Tayur, “Value of information in
      capacitated supply chains,” Management Sci., vol. 45, pp. 14-24, January
      1999.
[4]  H.L. Lee, P. Padmanabhan, and S. Whang, “Information distortion in a
       supply chain: The bullwhip effect,” Management Sci., vol. 43, pp. 546-
       558, April 1997.
[5]  H.L. Lee and C. Billington, “Material management in decentralized
       supply chain,” Operations Research, vol. 41, pp. 835-847, September-
       October 1993.
[6]  L. Li, “The role of inventory in delivery-time competition,” Management
       Sci., vol. 38, pp. 182-197, February 1992.
[7]  S. Nahmias, Production and Operations Analysis, Homewood: Richard
       Irwin, 1989.
[8]  G.W. Tan, “The impact of demand information sharing on supply chain
       network,” PhD thesis, Department of Business Administration,
       University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, July 1999.
Effects of Electronic Markets on Negotiation Processes
Michael Ströbel
IBM Research, Zurich Research Laboratory
Säumerstrasse 4
8803 Rüschlikon Switzerland
Abstract- Negotiation can be regarded as playing a game with
certain rules. If the rules change, the game has to be played
differently. Compared to traditional markets, electronic
markets can have fundamentally different characteristics such
as cost structure or the level of transparency. These differences
have already stimulated the tremendous success of one breed of
electronic market negotiations: auctions. But auctions offer only
limited support for the negotiations that will be necessary in
more differentiated markets for complex goods and services.
This paper relates the implications of specific electronic market
characteristics to the effectiveness of major types of
negotiations. The analysis reveals why bidding protocols
currently dominate bargaining protocols and suggests that
future negotiation support beyond auctions should be based on
integrative multilateral protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Negotiations have been identified as critical coordination
mechanisms for the interaction of providers and consumers
in future electronic markets that transcend the selling of
uniform goods [1]. This has inspired research with origins in
the area of negotiation science [2],[3], autonomous agents
[4],[5], and auctions [6]. However the primary focus of these
research efforts is on the automation or extension of existing
negotiation protocols. More fundamental questions have
been neglected so far.
A broad variety of negotiation protocols has evolved in
traditional markets. What are the reasons that some types of
protocols have not been implemented in electronic markets?
Are all traditional negotiation protocols promising candidates
for electronic markets or are there protocol types that are
more efficient due to certain characteristics of electronic
markets?
A study of the interdependencies between economical
characteristics of electronic markets and features of negotia-
tion processes can provide insight into this issue and outline
future research. It turns out, that first, one can expect the
number of negotiated agreements to increase in electronic
markets. Second, protocols with multilateral character seem
to be suited especially to benefit from electronic market
characteristics. Third, missing formalisations of the integra-
tive negotiation process currently prevent fully automated
implementations and will probably continue to do so in the
future.
To present these conclusions, this paper is organised in the
following way: Section II briefly introduces negotiations as
part of the agreement phase of business transactions and
provides a basic classification of negotiation protocols.
Section III analyses major characteristics of electronic
markets. These characteristics are then used in Section IV to
specify a need for negotiations in electronic markets and in
Section V to examine the implications for processes in the
agreement phase. In Section VI we review our findings based
on negotiation support that is currently available in electronic
markets. Finally, Section VII discusses conclusions of this
assessment and our future direction of research.
Throughout this paper we will postulate hypotheses to
summarise our findings.
II. AGREEMENT PHASE
Four phases of interaction can be identified in business
transactions [7]:
• Knowledge (gathering information concerning prod-
ucts, market participants etc.)
• Intention (specifying supply and demand with offers
to buy etc.)
• Agreement (identifying the terms and conditions of
the transaction and signing a contract)
• Settlement (execution of the agreed-upon contract,
payment, post-sales support etc.)
Each phase consists of several interaction processes. The
interface between the intention and the agreement phase is an
offer. If at least one party submits an offer, the agreement
phase is initiated. In the simplest case another party merely
has to accept this offer in order to reach an agreement. In
case of an agreement the transition to the settlement phase is
marked by a signed contract.
In the following sections, processes in the agreement
phase are examined in more detail. For one of these proc-
esses – negotiation - a classification is provided.
A. Processes in the agreement phase
We identify the following high-level processes to be part
of the agreement phase. Matching is the initial process that
identifies candidate offers for an agreement. Input to the
matching process is either a set of requirements (constraints
and preferences identified in the information phase) paired
with a number of offers or a set of offers-to-buy and offers-
to-sell. Correspondingly the output is either a set of offers
that fulfil the constraints or matching offers with high
agreement potential. Hence matchmaking provides data sets

















Figure 1: Processes in the agreement phase [8]
In the scoring process the set of matching offers is evalu-
ated and ranked to determine the best offer. The ranking can
be a result of comparing single attributes such as price or of
more complex evaluations based, for instance, on multi-
attribute utility theory [9]. If a party is satisfied with the best
offer, signing a contract by accepting the offer completes the
agreement phase.
Negotiating takes place when, based on the offers made in
the intention phase, an agreement cannot be reached or the
agreement has potential for optimisation and the parties
intending to carry out the transaction want to discuss their
offers. From the perspective of one party, negotiating is
characterised by the modification of one’s own offer or the
efforts to change another party’s offer. After the negotiation
process, scoring can be initiated again to compare the negoti-
ated agreement with other potential agreements.
If after scoring or after the negotiating process an agree-
ment has still not been reached, the entire agreement phase
can be restarted, for instance, by preparing new offers in the
intention phase or reviewing the initial requirements in the
knowledge phase.
B. Classification of negotiations
Many attributes can be used to classify negotiations [10].
For the purpose of this paper the following attributes are of
primary interest:
• Distributive versus integrative negotiations. In dis-
tributive negotiations one issue is subject to negotia-
tion and the parties involved have opposing interests.
One party tries to minimise (to give as little as possi-
ble) and the other party tries to maximise (to receive
as much as possible). Distributive negotiations are
also characterised as ‘win-lose’ negotiations. The
more one party gets, the less the other party gets. In
integrative negotiations multiple issues are negotiated
and the parties involved have different preferences
towards these issues. Two parties want for example to
buy a company, but one is interested primarily in the
human capital whereas the other is interested in the
patent portfolio. These variant valuations can be ex-
ploited to find an agreement with joint gains for both
parties. If their preferences are the same across multi-
ple issues, the negotiation remains distributive until
opposing interests are identified. In such a case, both
parties can realise gains; thus another name for this
class of negotiations is ‘win-win’ negotiations [11].
• Bilateral versus multilateral negotiations. This char-
acterisation of negotiations refers to the numbers of
parties participating in the negotiation. Only two par-
ties participate in bilateral negotiations, whereas in
multilateral negotiations either the one-to-many or
many-to-many negotiation situation applies. In addi-
tion, parties involved in multilateral negotiations can
typically inspect offers from other parties (unless the
offers are intentionally sealed). Similarly, multilateral
negotiations are also characterised as public competi-
tive negotiations, whereas bilateral negotiations have
a private character and are therefore often referred to
as cooperative negotiations.
Combinations of attributes within this classification can be
used for a high-level design of negotiation protocols. A
protocol for negotiations defines the rules by which parties
come to agreements. We will compare the two most com-
monly used protocol families (shaded areas in Figure 2)
multilateral distributive negotiations (bidding) and bilateral
integrative negotiations (bargaining) in more detail later in
this paper.
A classification is not necessarily persistent during a real
negotiation process. An integrative negotiation can be re-
duced to a distributive negotiation if only one issue is sub-
jected to discussion and all other issues are temporarily fixed.
On the other hand a distributive negotiation can be extended







Figure 2: Types of negotiations
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF ELECTRONIC MARKETS
Electronic markets are information systems that coordinate
business transactions through the forces of supply and
demand [12]. From an economics perspective, electronic
markets can, but do not necessarily have to, differ funda-
mentally from traditional markets. The following primary
characteristics are relevant to the discussion in this paper:
• Virtuality. Electronic markets are virtual markets,
which means that the objects of transactions and mar-
ket participants do not have to be physically present.
Participation in virtual markets can be both synchro-
nous and asynchronous. It is not necessary for con-
sumers and providers to meet at the same time. Par-
ticipants might also use software agents to act on their
behalf or to provide notification of events. Accord-
ingly, virtual markets do not generally incur return
costs, because goods do not have to be transported
back and forth [13].
• Transparency. Electronic markets can be completely
transparent due to zero or marginal search costs [14].
Market transparency is defined as the ability of mar-
ket participants to observe information about the
trading process. Information can be related to current
or past prices, quotes, offers, volume and the identi-
ties and motivations of market participants. This in-
formation in electronic markets is available through
advanced search and comparison services such as
shopping agents or directories. Furthermore electronic
transactions multiply the opportunities to collect data
about consumers’ purchasing behaviour. Sources of
information range from records of online payments to
logs of site visits and page views1.
• Size. An important characteristic of electronic markets
is that they are, in principle, not limited to political or
regional borders, enabling trade with partners from all
over the world. The entry thresholds for the market
are generally low, which increases the number of po-
tential trade partners significantly compared to tradi-
tional markets. It has to be considered though that
partners might be located in another country with a
different culture, different trade customs etc. [15],
which can heighten the complexity of interaction.
• Cost. The costs for managing interactions (transaction
costs such as advertising, searching potential trade
partners and subsequent coordination) are generally
low due to a high degree of automation and the cheap
connectivity of the Internet [16]. In the early devel-
opment stages of electronic markets, switching costs
for consumers were rather high due to significant
setup costs for electronic transactions (connections to
proprietary market systems such as SABRE or
Apollo). These costs have decreased as the Internet
                                                          
1
 The future availability of personalised consumer information is difficult
to estimate because of the current discussion regarding privacy in the
Internet.
and its related standards (TCP/IP, HTTP, XML etc.)
homogenise the access channels. Once companies
have connected to the Internet they can switch mar-
kets and providers at virtually no cost from a technical
point of view (costs might still be imposed by system
providers, e.g. for client software or registration).
IV. NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS
Given the characteristics of electronic markets an impor-
tant question is whether we can expect to see more or fewer
agreements that are based on negotiations in electronic
markets compared to traditional markets.
In general, there are many reasons already prevalent in
traditional markets to negotiate the price as well as terms and
conditions of a transaction, opposed to fixed offering. It is,
for instance, very difficult to fix a price for transactions that
are unique (e.g. power plants), are subject to diverse con-
sumer valuations (e.g. fashion goods, art), are perishable (e.g.
food, newspaper advertisements) or that face very dynamic
demand (e.g. network bandwidth, electricity).
Key to a specific view of the need for negotiations in
electronic markets are low transaction costs and especially
low search costs. If search costs for price information are
zero, we can expect that consumers enjoy perfect price
information. This typically leads to price wars. Providers
then have the following alternatives: make price comparisons
more difficult, differentiate their products, or create markets
that emphasise product information over price information
[17]. As we will show now, all of these strategies are incom-
patible with advertising fixed offers.
To impede price comparisons basically means to reintro-
duce search costs. Typically this can be done by charging
different prices to different consumers for the same transac-
tion. Perfect price discrimination achieves this through
exploiting differences in consumer valuations. This discrimi-
nation strategy requires detailed consumer information,
customised products and independent billing. Such condi-
tions can occur in electronic markets [18]. Hence price
discrimination requires knowledge about the situation-
specific individual consumer valuations, which cannot be
analysed based on fixed offers.
By differentiating horizontally or vertically, providers can
decrease the substitutability of their products/services and
customise offers to the requirements of specific consumers or
market segments (mass customisation). In such a market it is
possible for providers to extract consumer surplus even
among consumers who have perfect price information. This
is the case because consumers tend to remain loyal to provid-
ers of products and services that best match their require-
ments. With a differentiation strategy, fixed pricing is again
rarely possible because in the extreme case every transaction
is unique and non-repetitive.
Markets that emphasise product information steer consum-
ers to the provider with the best offer. Providers might even
be able to charge for this service, which then raises the entry
barrier for competitors. But if product information dominates
price information, then it is again advantageous for providers
to omit price information completely because individual
prices are always more efficient than uniform pricing (as has
been shown by Phlips in [19]).
A specific discussion is necessary regarding markets for
commodities. There are not many options to differentiate or
emphasise product information for mass-marketed consumer
products such as CDs or books - the online selling of com-
modities is though often bundled with add-on services (e.g.
sound samples or gift-wrapping). But there is also a shift
towards negotiated agreements in electronic markets driven
by new possibilities to increase consumer power. Services
such as the buyer consortium Accompany [20] accumulate
demand in order to negotiate better prices. This is, because of
minimal interaction cost, also effective for low-value goods.
The conclusion therefore is that we can expect more nego-
tiations to take place in the agreement phase of electronic
markets than in traditional markets. Supporting electronic
negotiations is therefore not only a necessity but also a
critical success factor for many markets, which may face
price wars and exiting providers.
Hypothesis: The number of negotiated agreements will
increase in electronic markets.
The market for airline tickets is the most popular and most
intensively studied example of an electronic market that
displays a pattern of virtualisation, price wars and differen-
tiation/discrimination strategies. Currently it is easy to search
for convenient flights but finding the best rate is cumbersome
because the number of different tariffs is huge. Airlines
deliberately introduced this discriminated price structure
(early reservation discounts, frequent flyer bonus, weekend
tariffs etc.) to reduce market transparency after a phase of
open price competition [21].
Just recently the next level of dynamic offering was intro-
duced to the market. After airlines started to run auctions for
unsold tickets, services such as Priceline [22] now allow
consumers to specify the amount they are willing to pay for a
ticket. Then Priceline will query the market to see if an
airline is willing to accept this price. Differentiation strate-
gies are also manifested in new bundled offers that for
instance combine business class tickets with free rental cars.
This clearly shows that the market is constantly moving
towards more variable prices and more differentiated offers,
resulting in more negotiated agreements.
V. EFFECTS ON AGREEMENT PROCESSES
The specific characteristics of electronic markets not only
affect the likelihood of negotiations in general but also have
implications for the execution of agreement processes and
the sources of power in negotiations. In the following sec-
tions we develop several additional hypotheses regarding the
implications of electronic markets.
A. Implications for pre-negotiation processes
The characteristics of electronic markets can affect the
processes precedent to negotiations in the agreement phase in
the following way.
1) Matching: Because the number of potential trade part-
ners increases with the size of the market, the chances of
finding a closer match to the requirements specified are
higher. The matching process itself benefits from the virtual-
ity of the market because the process can be based solely on
the comparison of offer and request information without the
need to inspect transaction objects physically in order to
retrieve attributes for the matching. Several mechanisms
already exist to support the matching process (e.g. [23]),
allowing improvement of the situation at the beginning of
negotiations.
Hypothesis: Greater size and virtualisation are beneficial to
the matching process.
2) Scoring: The more information available in the market,
the better for the scoring process. Detailed information, for
instance about providers (history, references etc.) or the
range of service/product attribute values across the market
(e.g. warranties vary from 1 to 3 years), increases the number
of input parameters to be considered and reduces the uncer-
tainty about the decision to determine the best match.
Hypothesis: Transparency is beneficial to the scoring
process.
B. Implications for the negotiation process
The analysis in the previous section suggests that pre-
negotiation agreement processes generally benefit in the
context of electronic markets. If the execution of processes in
the pre-negotiation stage is already simplified, this also has
positive effects on the negotiation process itself simply
because the selection of potential agreement candidates is
more effective (matching results with better quality at lower
cost, scoring with higher accuracy and less uncertainty).
Compared to traditional markets, negotiations with a higher
agreement potential can be pursued and negotiations with no
zones of agreement are identified a priori. But this generic
benefit of electronic markets is, on the level of single char-
acteristics, biased towards the different types of negotiations.
In the following discussion we will focus on a comparison of
bargaining versus bidding with the goal to determine which
characteristic is most beneficial to which type of negotiation.
1) Bargaining: If personalised consumer information is
available to the extent that a provider organisation knows
about the preferences of its consumers, this is very favour-
able for the integrative negotiation process because the
exchange of preference information is a necessary require-
ment [24].
If greater size results in a higher number of agreement
candidates, bargaining is more complex because it requires
comparing multiple preference profiles and managing multi-
ple simultaneous bilateral negotiation sessions.
With regard to costs, the fact that transaction costs are low
is not critical for bargaining because integrative negotiations
do not rely on high quantities of standardised simple interac-
tions such as price bids in distributive negotiations. Interac-
tions in integrative negotiations are much more unstructured
(inquiries, positional statements, challenges etc.) and costs
are mostly associated with the decision process (see Section
VI). In addition, low costs for setting up a transaction and
switching providers also allow short-term trade relationships,
which are not based on long-term mutual commitments but
are established dynamically. Parties therefore might not have
previous experience or make further deals with each other.
Traditional strong arguments for concessions such as past
compromises or linking with potential future deals are
therefore weaker in an electronic market if short-term rela-
tionships are prevalent. This will make negotiations less
amicable, which is not favourable for integrative negotiations
regarding their joint-problem solving nature.
Hypothesis: Bargaining benefits especially from high
transparency.
2) Bidding: Multilateral distributive protocols are repre-
sented by auctions. Auctions benefit from the size of elec-
tronic markets because they rely on competition. With an
increasing number of competing consumers and providers,
negotiating parties are forced to unveil their true valuations
and the resolved prices are more efficient than in traditional
bilateral negotiations [25]. Participants also benefit directly
from low transaction costs. Whereas providers generally
have to pay setup costs and a proportional sales fee, the
participation of consumers is free, which again amplifies the
size factor. Searching for the right auction item is cheap and
already supported by various search engines and agents (e.g.
AuctionWatch [26]). As multilateral protocols, electronic
auctions also benefit from virtuality because the potentially
high number of participants are not required to be at the same
place at the same time. High transparency on the other hand
is not crucial in electronic auctions because a rational strat-
egy for bidding in typical electronic auction protocols such
as the Dutch or Vickrey auction is only dependent on a
bidder’s internal reservation price. Determination of the
reservation price does benefit from high transparency. But
this task is usually performed in the knowledge or intention
phase and, as will be shown in Section V.C.2 transparency
can even have a negative impact on the bidding process.
Hypothesis: Bidding benefits especially from greater size,
low transaction costs, and virtuality.
C. Implications for negotiation power
We can informally define power in negotiations as the
ability to influence the other party in a way that contributes
to the achievement of personal goals in a negotiation.
In business negotiations the following sources of power2
might be used [27]:
• Resource control (money, time, critical services or
human capital)
• Information power (ability to assemble information
that supports a position, respect, or credibility)
• Personal power (attractiveness, emotion, integrity,
persistence and tenacity)
Sources of power are applied in negotiations, for instance,
to persuade or to put pressure on the other party. But these
sources of power call for special consideration in an elec-
tronic market setting. Negotiation power is a relational
concept. One party tries to gain a power advantage in a
certain area.
In Section IV, an example for increased consumer nego-
tiation power in electronic markets was introduced as an
argument to support the increased likelihood of negotiations.
The source of greater negotiation power in the example of
buyer consortia is based on the accumulation and coordina-
tion of demand, leading to an increase of the resource con-
trolled (in this case consumer money).
It is difficult though, to gain information power (having
more or better information than the other party) if the cost of
searching for information is low. In markets with high
transparency we can assume that both parties always have
the same level of information. Therefore it will be very
difficult to gain information power.
As electronic markets are virtual exchanges, sources of
personal power are not present. Current technology does not
yet provide any means of conveying attractiveness or anger,
for example, other than through the wording used in elec-
tronic mails. The desired high degree of automation is also
not favourable for expressing personal power because the
main goal of automation is to reduce personal involvement.
Hypothesis: Better means to coordinate resource control
lead to stronger consumer negotiation power -
but sources of information and personal power
are vanishing in electronic markets.
This again has biased implications for the negotiation pro-
cesses.
1) Bargaining: Information power is not critical in the
joint problem-solving effort of integrative negotiations. More
important is to share any kind of knowledge that leads to
pareto-optimal solutions. On the other hand personal power
has historically played an important role in traditional bar-
gaining, especially in face-to-face negotiations. But research
[28] indicates that avoidance of threats, positional statements
and other kinds of messages related to personal power
promote integrative solutions.
                                                          
2 Two other sources of power are identified: legitimate power and one’s
location in the organisational structure. These sources are not relevant in
the context of non-hierarchical market coordination.
Hypothesis: Lack of personal power is beneficial to bar-
gaining solutions.
2) Bidding: For bidding, information power is important.
Given better information than one’s competitors, a partici-
pant might have a more accurate estimate of the reservation
price and therefore a reduced risk of paying too much. If
information power is not achievable, the common value
assumption holds. All bidders have the same valuation
(reservation price) and the winner has to pay a price higher
than the common valuation, suffering the winner’s curse
[29]. This will deteriorate incentives for participation. Per-
sonal power however does not matter for bidding because the
interaction is restricted to the submission of price bids.
Hypothesis: Lack of information power is disadvantageous
for bidding participation.
VI. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT NEGOTIATION SUPPORT
In this section we will discuss briefly the existing support
for electronic negotiations in order to review the hypothetical
implications for negotiation processes derived in the previous
sections.
From a current perspective, support for electronic negotia-
tions is limited to distributive negotiations and, more specifi-
cally, to bidding [30]. The most successful and popular
application of bidding is the electronic auction. Today, large
transaction volumes in electronic markets are coordinated via
auctions in business-to-consumer as well as business-to-
business scenarios. Successful examples include auctions for
bandwidth or procurement. Many variations of protocols are
used (e.g. [31]). Less ubiquitous types of bidding are imple-
mented based on autonomous agents (e.g. the Kasbah project
[32]). These agents incorporate a specification of the nego-
tiation strategy (risk friendly, risk averse) used in the nego-
tiation with competing agents that act on behalf of other
market participants.
The fact that bidding dominates electronic markets
whereas applications of bargaining are missing completely
provides a high-level backing for the hypotheses we derived.
Figure 3 summarises the biased effects of electronic markets
on bidding and bargaining.
Bidding benefits more from the factors size, cost and vir-
tuality, whereas only one factor is more favourable for
bargaining: transparency. Based on this analysis and assum-
ing equal power of the impacts, protocols based on bidding
seem to be better suited for electronic markets than protocols
based on bargaining.
This is strengthened by the fact that the characteristics of
greater size and low transaction cost are a reality in many
markets today. We reasoned in Section IV that high transpar-
ency is unstable because providers have an incentive to



































Figure 3: Biased effects of electronic markets
Figure 3 suggests very generic arguments that favour mul-
tilateral integrative protocols as suitable electronic market
negotiation protocols on a macro-market level. The choice
and design of a protocol for a single market scenario will
also be driven by other considerations such as the nature of
the traded product (value, configuration space etc.).
There is another reason why bidding currently dominates
bargaining, which we denote as the ‘formalisation frontier’.
The goal of complete automation is the execution of tasks
with no human intervention. To investigate the degree of
possible automation necessary, aspects such as formalisation
of the task and sufficient aspects such as the efficiency of
automated processing versus human execution have to be
considered [33]. Regarding formalisation, the decision tasks
within the respective negotiation processes are especially
critical.
It is possible to host bidding services in a completely
automated way because formalisations for the decision task
have been developed: the winning bid is the one with the
lowest, second-highest or highest price (depending on the
type of auction). Even for more complex scenarios (bids on
price and quantity, combinatorial auctions) clearing algo-
rithms have been developed [34],[35]. Participation in the
bidding process (monitoring bids, reacting on outbids etc.) is,
again depending on the type of auction, also automisable
with software agents (e.g. eBay’s proxy bidding). This is the
case, for instance, when there is only one rational strategy to
bid (see above). Hence, only one decision task cannot be
formalised in an efficient manner: the determination of the
maximum bid (the reservation price).
Typically, negotiations demand decisions under uncer-
tainty (unknown reservation price of the other party, possi-
bility for future concessions from the other party etc.).
Hardly ever can decisions such as the determination of the
reservation price be isolated from a number of interdepend-
ent business parameters (e.g. the level of stock or available
manufacturing capacity) or other related decisions (in real
estate scenarios there might be concurrent negotiations
between a buyer/seller and buyer/bank). In the case of
bidding, this critical decision usually takes place in the
knowledge or intention phase and is therefore beyond the
scope of the agreement process.
Due to its integrative character, the situation is more com-
plex for bargaining. If multiple attributes are subject to
discussion and the negotiating parties have different prefer-
ences towards these issues, the task to host a service that
determines and selects the most efficient agreement is not
trivial. This is especially the case if the bargaining situation
is ill structured (incompatible offers, not all attributes are
known a priori, there are many non-quantifiable attributes
etc.) and preferences are subject to change. The achievement
of win-win solutions might also require suggesting creative
alternative solutions, potentially with new attributes outside
the initial agreement zone.
For these reasons, decision tasks in the bargaining process
are much more difficult to formalise than in the bidding
process and therefore much more difficult to automate.
Kersten and Noronha [36] even question completely the
possibility of achieving complete automation for integrative
negotiations and argue for a combination of decision support
and software agents.
But the cost reduction achievable with a high degree of
automation is one of the necessary success factors for elec-
tronic markets. Nobody has an incentive to participate in a
market where the cost of coordination is higher than the
improved efficiency of the agreements it provides. This
limits negotiations with high coordination costs to markets
for high-value transactions, where the potential for optimis-
ing agreements is correspondingly high. Therefore the lack
of formalisation for integrative negotiations currently im-
pedes implementations in electronic markets- and will do so
in the future, unless either formalisations can be found or the
scope of electronic markets is extended to goods of higher
value, which enables agreement processes with human
intervention.
VII. SUMMARY
On the basis of fundamental characteristics of electronic
markets, we demonstrated that negotiations are not only
needed in electronic markets but also that product differen-
tiation, price discrimination and buyer accumulation strate-
gies will lead to even more negotiated agreements than in
traditional markets. This can already be verified using the
example of the airline flight market.
However the characteristics of electronic markets also
have an impact on negotiations and other processes in the
agreement phase of electronic transactions. It is our belief
that these agreement processes should, in general, be easier
to execute in an electronic market with biased impacts on the
negotiation process itself. We postulated these findings in
several hypotheses, which have to be evaluated in the future,
based on the performance of real agreement processes in
electronic markets. The tremendous success of electronic
auctions provides early support of one of our main argu-
ments: negotiations based on bidding especially benefit from
electronic market characteristics.
Given that integrative negotiations are needed in electronic
markets we come to the conclusion that to support these
kinds of negotiations is better not to implement pure bar-
gaining but to use integrative negotiation protocols that share
the multilateral character with bidding protocols. Integrative
multilateral protocols have to our knowledge not been
considered so far for use in electronic markets. But based on
the findings presented in this paper, they seem to be a prom-
ising candidate for negotiation support in differentiated
markets for complex products and services. However, the
conclusion of this analysis is not that there is no space for
distributive protocols in the future. Distributive negotiations
will continue to play an important role in electronic markets,
but it is our belief, that in comparison to traditional markets,
there will be a shift towards more integrative negotiations.
One of the challenges to the design of multilateral integra-
tive protocols was identified in this paper as the formalisa-
tion frontier. Assuming that complete automation is not
feasible, the design has to incorporate a smooth transition
from automisable processes (e.g. matching) to the core
negotiation activity, which relies to some extent on human
intervention.
Our next step is to design such a negotiation protocol and
to combine it with the matchmaking and scoring facilities
that have already been developed as part of the virtual
marketplace project [37]. These facilities exploit the benefits
of electronic markets in the pre-negotiation stage. The
envisioned extension of the marketplace will eventually
result in an integrated framework for agreement processes
that support multi-dimensional negotiations beyond simple
discussions of price.
In addition, we will extend this analysis to a more detailed
framework that maps specific business models to criteria for
the selection and design of negotiation protocols.
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Abstract - We show that bundling is the optimal pricing 
strategy for a base good monopolist who also supplies a 
supplemental good under zero marginal cost of production. 
Without the exit of the rival firm, bundling is a profitable 
strategy because it increases the profits in the base good 
market.  We show that bundling lowers social welfare as 
well as rival firms’ profit if the supplemental goods are 
close substitutes.  Otherwise, bundling may actually 
generate welfare enhancements.  Our analysis applies 





We define a ‘base good’ as one of two complimentary goods 
which must be purchased and installed prior to consume the 
supplemental goods, where a ‘supplemental good’ provides 
consumption benefit when only used in conjunction with the 
base good.  A base good may give consumption benefit without 
supplemental goods but supplemental goods always require a 
base good.   Markets that fit this base-supplemental goods 
description include: hardware – software, operating system - 
application software, and local phone - long distance service. 
We narrow our focus in the current paper and consider the 
situation in which the base good market is monopolized and the 
supplemental goods are provided by two firms, one of which 
may be the base good monopolist.  We assume that consumers 
have unit demands; i.e., they wish to purchase only one of the 
supplemental goods.  For example, in the personal computer 
(PC) industry, the operating system (OS) is a base good, and 
application software programs are the supplemental goods.  
Microsoft monopolizes the PC operating system market, and 
competes with other firms in various application software 
markets; e.g., MS Word versus WordPerfect, Excel versus 
Lotus 1-2-3, and Internet Explorer versus Netscape Navigator. 
In October 1997, the United States Department of 
Justice(DOJ) filed a lawsuit against Microsoft for violating an 
earlier consent decree which prohibited (among other things) 
bundling the Internet Explorer (IE) with the Windows operating 
system.  The DOJ claims that bundling Internet Explorer with 
Windows is an anti-competitive move designed purely to drive 
Netscape out of the web browser business.  The DOJ would like 
to force Microsoft to either remove its web browser from the 
Windows system or include a copy of Netscape Navigator with 
each sale of Windows 95.1  Meanwhile, Microsoft claims that 
                                                           
1 Department of Justice, “Petition by the United States to 
Show Cause Why Respondent Microsoft Corporation Should 
the consent decree allows them to integrate IE with Windows 95 
since it benefits the consumers by giving them more choices at 
a lower price.2  Microsoft also argues that IE is an integrated 
part of its Windows system since Windows will not boot without 
IE.3 
The DOJ’s condemnation is based on the ‘leverage theory’, 
which says that bundling provides a mechanism whereby a firm 
with monopoly power in one market can use the leverage to 
monopolize a second market.  However, the Chicago school has 
criticized ‘leverage theory’ and argued that the main motivation 
for bundling is price discrimination.  Furthermore, they have 
argued that bundling could be socially beneficial, or at worst 
ambiguous behavior.4 
It is Whinston (1990) who revives the leverage theory of 
bundling. He shows that in the presence of scale economies and 
strategic interaction in the bundled good market, bundling can 
be a profitable strategy by driving bundled good market rivals 
out of the market.  Whinston’s model requires the exit of the 
rival firm for the profitability of bundling strategy.  As Choi 
(1996) correctly points out, if competitor has already paid the 
sunk cost of entry and there is no avoidable fixed cost, bundling 
cannot be a profitable strategy.  To overcome this problem, Choi 
considers the long run effects of R&D on competition.  
Consequently, his model results in foreclosures in the 
innovation market instead of the bundled good market. 
The critical difference between the Chicago school literatures 
and recent leverage theory literatures comes from the market 
structure of the second market.  Chicago school literatures 
assume that the second market is perfectly competitive, while 
Whinston (1990) assumes that the second market is not.  We 
consider a duopoly supplemental good market, which is similar 
to Whinston.  However, we find that without the exit of the rival 
firm, bundling strategy is profitable.  
                                                                                                    
Not be Found in Civil Contempt,” Antitrust Case Filings, 20 
October, 1997 (http://www.usdoj.gov/art). 
2 Bill Gates,  “US v. Microsoft: We’re defending our right to 
innovate,” Wall Street Journal, 20 May, 1998. 
3  Microsoft Corporation, “Memorandum of Microsoft 
Corporation in advance of the October 27, 1997 scheduling 
conference before the court,” Microsoft Press Pass, 27 October, 
1997 (http://www.microsoft.com/presspass). 
4 See Whinston (1990) for the summary of Chicago school’s 
argument. 
  
Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1998) show that bundling very large 
numbers of goods can be profitable if marginal production costs 
for goods are zero.  The reason is that the law of large numbers 
makes it much easier to predict consumers’ valuations for a 
bundle of goods than their valuations for the individual goods 
when sold separately, and as a consequence, the seller can 
extract higher consumer surplus.  However, their basic setup is 
different from other literatures and ours because their single 
seller model has no consideration of competition, while we 
analyze the monopolist incentives of bundling of second good in 
which market has serious competition. 
Through base-supplemental relation, we analyze the 
incentives for a base-good monopolist to bundle a supplemental 
good with its platform, and determine the conditions under 
which this is an optimal strategy.  We show that bundling a 
supplemental good with a base good is a profitable strategy for 
the base good monopolist, even without the exit of a 
supplemental good rival and without foreclosure of the 
supplemental good market.  This is our difference from other 
leverage theory literatures.  A bundling strategy increases the 
profit in the monopolized base good market. 
The next question we analyze is the welfare implications.  
Specifically, is welfare lower (DOJ’ belief) or higher 
(Microsoft’s claim)?  We find that the welfare effect of a 
bundling strategy depends on the degree of substitutability 
between the two competing supplemental goods.  If two goods 
are close substitutes, then it decreases social welfare.  
Otherwise, a bundling behavior may increase social welfare. 
This paper is organized as follows.  We describe the basic 
setting of our model in section 2.  Section 3 analyzes the 
equilibrium prices and profits under three possible ownership 
structures.  Section 4 explains whether or not firms have an 
incentive to merge and finds the equilibrium ownership 
structure.  Section 5 examines the welfare implication of firms’ 
mergers and pricing strategies.  Section 6 provides a summary 
and conclusion. 
 
2. Basic Model 
 
There are three firms in this model: one firm (firm Bm) 
monopolizes the base good market and two firms (firm 1 and 
firm 2) produce supplemental goods (S1 and S2, respectively).  
The marginal cost of producing a base good or a supplemental 
good is zero.  As we will explain later, the zero marginal cost of 
a supplemental good is the critical assumption for our analysis. 
 All fixed costs are sunk. 
The tastes of consumers for the supplemental goods are 
uniformly distributed along the unit interval and the population 
is normalized to one.  The locations of two supplemental good 
firms are fixed: firm 1 is located at x=0 (left-end point) and firm 
2 is located at x=1 (right-end point).  A consumer incurs ‘utility 
loss’ which is proportional to the difference between  the 
supplemental good and her taste.5  
                                                           
5 ‘Utility loss’ in this mode l is similar to ‘transportation cost’ 
in linear city model (see Tirole(1988) Section 7.1).  
When a consumer located at x purchases S1, her net benefit 
from consumption is 
         V = u(B, S1) - pS1 - tx - pB                                        (1) 
         u(0, Si) = 0 , and u(1, Si) > 0  
where u(B, S1) = u(B,S2) is the utility from the supplemental 
good, u(B, 0) is the stand-alone benefit of the base good B, pSi is 
the price of supplemental good Si , pB is the price of the base 
good, and t is the degree of utility loss which  represents the 
degree of differentiation between the supplemental goods.  For 
simplicity, we assume that u(B,0)=0, which prevents a 
consumer from buying only a base good without purchasing a 
supplemental good in equilibrium.  Finally, we assume that 
consumers have unit demand so each consumer either purchases 
zero or one unit of the good.   
The supplemental goods are differentiated more for the 
consumers when t is higher.  As t increases, both supplemental 
good firms have more monopoly powers.  On the other hand, if 
t = 0, the two goods are identical, which results in the Bertrand 
competition with homogeneous goods. 
A consumer located at x will buy S1 if  
 
  u(B, S1) - pS1 - tx - pB   >   u(B, S2) - pS2  - t(1-x) -  pB    and  
  u(B, S1) -pS1  - tx - pB    >   0   
 
Similarly, she will buy S2 if  
 
 u(B, S2) - pS2  - t(1-x) - pB   >  u(B, S1) - pS1  - tx - pB     and  
 u(B, S2) - pS2  - t(1-x) - pB   >  0   
 
Finally, she won’t buy anything if 
 
 u(B, S1) - pS1  - tx - pB  <   0   and  
 u(B, S2) - pS2  - t(1-x) - pB   <   0 
 
The game consists of three stages.  In the first stage, the 
ownership structure is determined; the monopolist decides 
whether or not to merge with one or both of supplemental good 
firms.  We assume that there is a transaction cost to change the 
ownership structure.  In the second stage, the monopolist sets 
the prices of its products, and consumers purchase and install 
the base goods.  In the third stage, the remaining supplemental 
good firm(s) sets the price of the supplemental goods and 
consumers purchase them. 
After the first stage, the ownership structure will be one of the 
following: 1) independent ownership, 2) partial integration, and 
3) full integration.  Under independent ownership, the 
monopolist sets pB in the second stage and supplemental good 
firms set pS1 and pS2 in the third stage.  Under partial integration 
or full integration, the monopolist not only sets the price of the 
base good  but also sets the price of the integrated supplemental 
good firm’s product simultaneously.  This gives a Stackelberg 
leader’s advantage to the integrated firm. 
Since the equilibrium outcome can be derived by backward 
induction, we first analyze the equilibrium prices and profits 
under three different ownership structures. 
  
3.  Three Ownership Structures 
 
3.1. Independent Ownership   
 
To figure out the equilibrium outcome under independent 
ownership, we need to distinguish  between the uncovered and 
covered markets.  In other words, some consumers choose not to 
purchase goods in equilibrium under certain circumstances.  
Intuitively, one may think that the market is likely to be 
uncovered when u(B, Si) is small or the utility loss t is large.  
Whether the market is covered or not is also affected by the 
firms’ pricing strategy.  The higher the price, the more likely it 
is to be uncovered.  We start with the uncovered market case. 
Since the market structure of two supplemental goods is 
symmetric under independent ownership, we consider only the 
demand for S1 and the consumers located between zero and 1/2 
when the market is uncovered.  The demand function for S1 and 
base good can be derived from the marginal consumer who is 
indifferent between purchasing both B and S1 and not buying 
anything.  Therefore, from the marginal consumer’s net benefit 
function u(B, S1) - pS1 - tx -pB = 0, the demand for the two 
complementary goods B and S1 can be derived as 
 
   x(pB, pS1) = (1/t) (u - pS1 - pB )                                       (2)
6 
 
where u º u(1,Si), i=1,2.  Note that the demand function for S1 
is not affected by the price of S2. 
The monopolist’s profit is pB (pB,pS1) = 2 pB  x, and firm 1's 
profit is  p1(pB,pS1) = p1  x.  Since the monopolist is a 
Stackelberg leader, we can calculate the equilibrium outcome 
by substituting the response function of the supplemental firm 
into the monopolist’s profit function.  The response function is 
p1(pB) = (u - pB ) / 2, and the monopolist’s profit function is 
pB(pB,pS1(pB)) = pB (u - pB)/2.  Therefore, we calculate the 
equilibrium outcome as follows. 
 
     pB
U,I = u / 2 
     pS1
U,I = pS2
U,I = u / 4 
     xU,I = u / (4t)                                               (3) 
      pBU,I = u2 / (4t)  
     p1U,I = p2U,I = u2 / (16t) 
 
Superscript ‘U,I’ stands for the uncovered market case under 
independent ownership.  For (3) to be an equilibrium, xU,I must 
be less than 1/2, and t must be larger than u / 2 .  This implies a 
high degree of differentiation of the two supplemental goods.    
Now, we need to find the optimal strategy of the firms when 
t < u / 2.  In this situation the market is covered.  If we consider 
the marginal consumer who is indifferent between purchasing 
B and S1 and purchasing B and S2, then the consumer’s location 
x is given by equating the costs for S1 and S2, i.e., u(B,S1) - pS1 
                                                           
6 For this demand equation, we assume that t > 0.  Otherwise, 
a marginal consumer does not exist. 
- tx -pB = u(B,S2) - pS2 - t(1-x) - pB.  Therefore, the demand 
function is x(pS1, pS2) = (t - pS1 + pS2) / 2t.  By simultaneously 
solving the first order conditions of these two profit functions, 
we get the equilibrium prices and profits of the supplemental 
good firms.  Once the supplemental goods’ prices are derived, 
the base good price will be the price which makes the benefit of 
consumption equal to zero for the marginal consumer.  
However, this is not the optimal strategy for the monopolist.  
The problem for the monopolist is that this demand function 
excludes the base good price, so the monopolist is not able to act 
as a Stackelberg leader. 
As a Stackelberg leader, the monopolist can set the base good 
price such that the marginal consumer is indifferent between 
buying B and S1, buying B and S2, or buying nothing.  Recall the 
response function of a supplemental good firm is pi(pB)=(u - pB 
) / 2.  By substituting this into a consumer’s benefit function and 
setting pB to make the benefit be zero for the consumer who is 
located at x=1/2, we can get the optimal strategy of the 
monopolist.  Therefore, the optimal outcome in the covered 
market case under independent ownership is as follows:.  
 
  pB
C,I = u - t 
  pS1
C,I = pS2
C,I = t / 2 
 xC,I = 1 / 2                                                                     (4) 
  pB C,I = u - t  
  p1C,I =p 2C,I = t / 4 
  
Superscript ‘C,I’ represents the covered market case under 
independent ownership.  From (3) and (4), we can conclude that 
the equilibrium outcome is (3) if t ³ u / 2 and is (4) if t < u / 2 
under independent ownership. 
 
3.2  Partial Integration 
 
Now, we consider the case when the monopolist merges with 
firm 1.  Equivalently, this may be the situation where the 
monopolist also provides one of the two supplemental products. 
 This ownership structure is the current situation of Microsoft 
and Netscape in the OS and web browser market.  In this case, 
pS1 is simultaneously determined with pB in the second stage, 
while pS2 is still set in the third stage.  Therefore, the integrated 
firm is now a Stackelberg leader while firm 2 is a Stackelberg 
follower.  For the partial integration, once again, we consider 
the uncovered and covered market cases separately.   
When the market is uncovered, the demand function for B and 
S1 is given as (2) and the demand for B and S2 is y(pB,pS2) = (1/t) 
(u - pS2 - pB ), where y is the marginal consumer’s distance from 
the right end point.7  In the second stage, the integrated firm sets 
pB and pS1 to maximize the joint profit pB,I = (pB + pS1) x(pB,pS1) 
+ pB y(pB,pS2) and firm 2 sets pS2 to maximize the profit p2 = pS2 
y(pB,pS2) in the third stage.  The response function of firm 2 is 
p2(pB)=(u - pB ) / 2 which allows us to calculate the optimal 
outcome.  
                                                           
7 In the independent ownership case, xU,I = yU,I. 
  
 
      pB
U,P = u / 2 
      pS1
U,P = 0,    pS2
U,P = u / 4 
      xU,P = u / (2t),   yU,P = u / (4t)                                   (5) 
        pB,1U,P = 3u2 / (8t) 
        p2U,P = u2 / (16t) 
 
Superscript ‘U,P’ represents the uncovered market under 
partial integration while subscript ‘B,1’ represents the 
integrated firm.  The condition for the uncovered market is xU,P 
< 1- yU,P , which is 4 t > 3 u. 
Now, suppose 4 t < 3 u, then the degree of differentiation of 
the two supplemental goods is relatively small so that the market 
is covered.  The best strategy of the monopolist is to make the 
marginal consumer indifferent between buying B and S1, buying 
B and S2, or buying nothing.  We obtain the equilibrium 
outcome by using firm 2's response function p2(pB) = (u - pB) / 
2 and the marginal consumer’s location constraint,  
 
      xC,P = 1- yC,P.  
      pB
C,P = u  - (2/3) t 
      pS1
C,P = 0,  pS2
C,P = t /3 
     xC,P = 2 / 3, yC,P = 1 / 3                                             (6) 
        pB,1C,P = u - (2/3) t 
     p2C,P = t /9 
 
Superscript ‘C,P’ represents the covered market under 
partial integration.  From (5) and (6), we can conclude that 
under partial integration the equilibrium outcome is (5) if 4t ³ 
3u  and (6) if 4t < 3u. 
The most interesting result is that the optimal price of:  S1 is 
zero (pS1 = 0) regardless of the coveredness of the market.  The 
intuition why the integrated firm is better off by a zero price for 
the supplemental good is as follows.  If firm 1 sets pS1 = 0, then 
firm 2 lowers pS2 because the two prices are strategic 
complements in a covered market.   This enables the monopolist 
to charge a higher price for the base good.  The increase in profit 
from the base good market exceeds the reduction in profit from 
the supplemental good market.  Therefore, when the market is 
covered, the source of gain is from the base good market. In the 
uncovered market, the integrated firm is still better off.  More 
consumers will purchase B and S1 because the total price has 
fallen. Cournot called this the ‘elimination of double 
marginalization’.  
However, a zero price of the supplemental good cannot 
guarantee the optimal outcome, due to the time inconsistency 
problem.  The integrated firm announces pS1 = 0 in the second 
stage and sells S1 in the third stage.  If consumers believe pS1=0, 
then those who have purchased the base goods with price pB
C,P 
would buy either S1 or S2 in the third stage.  Once the integrated 
firm has sold the base good, however, it would be better off 
selling S1 with positive price in the third stage.  The optimal 
renegotiation price is pS1 = t/3 when the market is covered and 
pS1 =  u/ 4 when the market is uncovered.  In this case, some 
portion of consumers who have already purchased the base 
goods will not buy the supplemental goods. 
One way to solve this problem is to sell S1 together with the 
base good in the second stage.  This is called a ‘bundling 
strategy’.  Therefore, we conclude that the optimal strategy of 
the integrated firm under partial integration is a ‘bundling 
strategy’.  However, this result is not robust to a non-zero 
marginal cost. If the marginal production cost of the 
supplemental good is c and c>0, then pS1
U,P = c and pS1
C,P=c/2. 
Since the zero price of the supplemental good is a necessary 
condition for the bundling strategy, bundling can not be the 
optimal strategy of the integrated firm under a non-zero 
marginal cost.   
In the software industry, it is commonly believed that the 
marginal production cost is zero. Therefore, if the supplemental 
good is a software, we assert that the optimal strategy of the 
integrated firm is to bundle a supplemental good with base 
good.  
Another interesting result is that the rival firm can still 
capture a significant portion of market in spite of bundling.  
When two supplemental goods are not close substitutes (when t 
is large), this is not a surprising result, because switching from 
S2 to S1 causes big utility loss to the consumers locating near the 
right end point.  However, even if two goods are very close 
substitutes, so the value of t is very small, the rival firm still 
obtains one-third of the market share.  This is because the rival 
supplemental good price is also close to zero when two goods 
are close substitutes.  The bundling strategy will not force the 
rival firm to exit the market.9    
Whinston (1990) and Choi (1996) argue that bundling is 
profitable strategy because it drives the rival firm out of the 
market.  However, in our static model, it is still profitable even 
without the exit of rival firm, because it increases profits in the 
base good market.8  We can claim the following proposition.
       
 
     <Proposition 1>  When the marginal production cost 
of a supplemental good is zero, ‘bundling’ the 
supplemental good with the base good is the optimal 
strategy of the integrated firm.  The rival firm will not be 
driven out of the market by a bundling strategy regardless 
of the degree of differentiation of two supplemental goods.  
However, a bundling strategy increases profits in the base 
good market.   
 
This proposition has three arguments.  The first one is that the 
integrated firm’s optimal strategy is bundling strategy, the 
second one is that the rival firm retains significant market share 
in spite of bundling strategy, and the third one is that the purpose 
of the bundling strategy is to increase profit in the base good 
                                                           
8 One may insist that the integrated firm does not increase 
profits in base good market but simply changes the timing of 
collection of profits in the supplemental good.  We show that the 
integrated firm does increase profits in base good market in the 
Appendix. 
  
market.  The first two arguments do not need further proofs and 
we need to show only the last one. 
As we will show in the next proof, pB,1C,P is larger than pBC,I 
+ p1C,I.  If we consider the profits from the sales to consumers 
who used S1 under independent ownership, i.e., x < 1/2, then the 
integrated firm has smaller profit under partial integration than 
independent ownership because (pB,1C.P)/2 = u/2- t/3  is smaller 
than (pB C,I )/2 + p 1C,I = u/2 -t/4.  The reason for pB,1C,P > pBC,I 
+ p1C,I  is, then, that the profits from the sales of the base good to 
the consumers with S2 i.e, x>1/2 are increased under partial 
integration.  Therefore, we can say that the result of bundling 
strategy is to increase the profit in the base good market 
 
3.3 Full Integration 
 
The final ownership structure we analyze is the case when all 
firms are integrated.  Here, the integrated firm sets pS1, pS2 , and 
pB to maximize the joint profit in the second stage.  If the market 
is uncovered, the equilibrium outcome is as follows. 
 
          pB
U,F = u / 2 - pS1
U,F 
         pS1
U,F =  pS2
U,F  
         xU,F = yU,F = u / (2t)                                            (7) 
             pB,1,2U,F = u2 / (2t) 
 
Superscript ‘U,F’ represents the uncovered market with full 
integration, and subscript ‘B,1,2' is the merger of all three firms. 
The condition for the uncovered market is xU,F < 1 - yU,F , 
which implies t > u.  If the utility loss is relatively small so that 
t < u, then the equilibrium outcome is as follows.  
 
       pB
C,F =  u - pS1
C,F -t/2 
       pS1
C,F =  pS2
C,F  
       xC,F = yC,F = 1 / 2                                                  (8) 
           pB,1,2C,F = u  - t/2 
 
Superscript ‘C,F’ represents the covered market under full 
integration. 
From (7) and (8), we can say that under full integration the 
equilibrium outcome is (7) if t ³ u, and (8) if t < u.  Note that 
there is no unique solution for prices in this full integration case. 
  As long as prices satisfy the equations in (7) or (8), they can be 
equilibrium prices.  However, just like the partial integration 
case, the integrated firm confronts a time inconsistency 
problem.  One familiar solution to this problem is to bundle the 
two supplemental goods with the base good.  The price of the 
bundled package is u/2 and u - t/2 from (7) and (8) respectively. 
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9  We don’t consider the horizontal mergers between two 
supplemental good firms.  It is easy to show that there is no 
incentive for horizontal mergers in our model.  When the market 
is uncovered, two supplemental good prices are not 
interdependent, and as a result there is no gain from horizontal 
To check whether firms have an incentive to merge, we must 
compare the profits of firms under various ownership structures. 
 As we suggested in the previous section, the subgame outcome 
depends on the relative magnitude of the utility loss and 
consumption benefit of the goods.  Therefore, we consider four 
possible cases: (a) t < u/2,  (b) u/2 £ t < (3/4) u, (c) (3/4) u £ t 
< u, and (d) u £ t.  The degree of differentiation between the two 
supplemental goods is smallest in case (a) and largest in case 
(d).  Or, we can say that the closeness of substitutability between 
the two supplemental goods is the highest in case (a) and the 
lowest in case (d).  In this section, we check the incentives for 
merger.   
We first assume that transaction costs are negligible.  We 
consider the case when t < u/2, so two supplemental goods are 
very close substitutes.   In this case, the market is covered 
regardless of ownership structure. Suppose the initial 
ownership structure is an independent ownership.  By 
comparing the profit of the firms in (4) and (6), we can 
determine if there is an incentive for partial integration.  We 
conclude that the monopolist will merge with firm 1 because  pB 
C,I + p1C,I < pB,1C,P (see Appendix for the proof of proposition 2). 
 We also find that firm 2 realizes a reduction in profit under 
partial integration.  Next, we compare the profit in (6) and (8) to 
determine if firms are better off under full integration.  We find 
that the fully integrated firm’s profit in (8) is greater than the 
sum of the profits in (6), so firms are better off under full 
integration.  
Note that the joint profit of the integrated firm is the same as 
the sum of three independent firms’ profits.  There is no reason 
to change from independent ownership to full integration.  The 
equilibrium structure is full integration when transaction costs 
are small.  Under independent ownership, there is an incentive 
for partial integration, and under partial integration there is an 
incentive for full integration. 10   
A similar analysis applies to other cases. If the utility loss is 
in the range u/2 £ t < (3/4) u, then the market is uncovered 
under independent ownership yet covered under partial 
integration or full integration.  Therefore, (3), (6), and (8) are 
compared.  Like the previous case, we find that the monopolist 
has an incentive to merge with firm 1 while firm 2 is hurt by this 
partial merger.  We also find an incentive for full integration. 
Next, if (3/4) u £ t < u, then the market is covered only under 
                                                                                                    
integration.  When the market is covered, the horizontally 
merged firm’s optimal strategy is to split the market half and 
half, which is the same strategy before the merger. Clearly, there 
is no incentive for horizontal integration. 
10  If we consider the division of integrated profit among the 
original individual firms, then because of the negotiation power, 
each supplemental good firm earns as much as the unintegrated 
rival supplemental good firm’s profit under partial integration 
(t/9) and the monopolist gets the residual surplus.  However, the 
division of profits of integrated firm is of little interest to us. 
  
full integration while uncovered under other structures.  We 
compare (3), (5), and (8).  There is an incentive for the base 
good monopolist and firm 1 to integrate.  Note that firm 2's 
profit is not affected by this merger contrary to the two previous 
cases.  Firms have higher profits under full integration than 
under partial integration. 
Finally, when u £ t, so the differentiation of two supplemental 
goods is very large, then the market remains uncovered under 
any ownership structure.  We compare (3), (5), and (7) and find 
an incentive for a monopolist to merge one of the two 
supplemental good firms.  All firms are also better off under full 
integration. 
We can conclude with the following proposition. 
 
<Proposition 2>  When the transaction costs of mergers 
are negligible, the equilibrium structure of ownership is 
always full integration. 
 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
Now, let’s introduce positive transaction costs of mergers in 
our model.  The equilibrium ownership structure is determined 
by the relative magnitude of transaction costs and gains from 
integrations.  For example, when t < u/2, so when the market is 
covered, the gain of partial integration is t/12, while the gain of 
full integration is t/18.  If the transaction cost is smaller than 
t/18, then full integration is an equilibrium.  If the transaction 
cost is between t/18 and t/12, then partial equilibrium is an 
equilibrium.  Finally, if the transaction cost is larger than t/12, 
then any initial structure is the equilibrium. 
For all other cases, the gain of partial integration is greater 
than the gain of full integration with the exception of the case  t 
³ u. When t ³ u, the two gains are equal.  Therefore, we propose 
that the gain of partial integration is greater than or equal to the 
gain of full integration (see the proof in Appendix). 
 
<Proposition 2'>  Since the profit gain of partial 
integration is not smaller than that of full integration, the 
equilibrium structure is partial integration if the cost is 
smaller than the partial integration gain and larger than 
the full integration gain.  It the cost is smaller than the full 
integration gain, then the full integration is the 
equilibrium.  If the cost is larger than the partial 
integration gain, then the initial structure is the 
equilibrium. 
 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
 
5.  Welfare Analysis 
 
Since welfare is consumer surplus plus profits, we need to 
compute consumer surplus for each case.  Consumer surplus is 
the summation of a consumer’s net benefit.  Therefore, 









where x is the distance from the left end point, y is the distance 
from the right end point, and x* and y* represent the locations of 
marginal consumers.  Computed welfare for (3), (4), (5), (6), 
(7), and (8) are as follows. 
 
      WFU,I = 7u2 / (16t)                                                  (3)’ 
      WFC,I = u -  t/4                                                (4)’ 
      WFU,P = 19u2 / (32t)                                                (5)’ 
      WFC,P = u - (5/18)t                                                  (6)’ 
      WFU,F = 3u2 / (4t)                                                    (7)’ 
      WFC,F = u - t/4                                                         (8)’ 
 
We consider the four different cases (as we did in the 
previous section) to determine the welfare effect of integration 
and pricing strategy.  For the welfare analysis, we assume that 
the transaction costs are negligible for simplicity.  First, we 
concentrate on the welfare effect of partial integration.  Under 
partial integration, we have already showed that the integrated 
firm’s optimal strategy is to bundle the supplemental good with 
the base good.    
For case (a), in the previous section, t< u/2, the integrated 
firm charges a lower price for the bundled goods than under 
independent ownership.  So, the consumers who buy B and S1 
under independent ownership are better off.  Although pS2 is 
lower, because pB is higher, consumers who purchase B and S2 
pay more.  Besides the consumers who switch from S2 to S1 
incur higher utility loss.  The reduced profit of firm 2 is also 
larger than the increased profit of the integrated firm. The 
negative effects are unambiguously larger than the positive 
effects, hence, a partial merger and bundling strategy reduce 
welfare. 
For case (b),  u/2 £  t < (3/4) u, consumers with B and S1 are 
better off while consumers with B and S2 pay more.  The total 
welfare effect which includes utility and profits cannot be 
unambiguously determined.  If the utility loss is relatively small 
(t < 0.510 u), then we have welfare loss.  Contrarily if t > 0.510 
u, then partial integration and bundling strategy are welfare 
enhancing. 
Finally, for case (c) or (d), (3/4)u < t, the market is uncovered 
in both cases.  Consumers with B and S1 are better off due to a 
lower total price while consumers with B and S2 are indifferent 
because the bundling strategy does not affect firm 2.  The 
integration brings only the elimination of double 
marginalization.  So, the partial integration and bundling 
strategy are always welfare enhancing.  Therefore, we can 
conclude as follows.   
 
<Proposition 3> Partial integration and bundling 
strategy reduce welfare when two supplemental goods are 
close substitutes (t £ 0.510u).  If the degree of 
differentiation of two goods is quite high, then partial 
integration and bundling strategy have welfare enhancing 
results (t > 0.510u).   
  
Proof: See Appendix 
 
Now, we check the welfare effect of full integration.  For case 
(a), full integration restores welfare to the level under 
independent ownership.  Therefore, society would be better off 
by full integration in this case.  For other cases, it is 
straightforward to show that welfare under full integration is 
greater than under partial integration.  Firms’ total profits are 
higher under full integration (recall that firm’s always have 
incentives for full integration) and consumers with B and S2 are 
better off by a lower joint price.  Only some portion of 
consumers with B and S1 who previously enjoyed the benefit of 
partial integration are worse off.  The latter effect is 
overwhelmed by the former effect.  Besides, welfare under full 
integration is the largest among three possible ownership 
structures.  The distortion of an economy may be the smallest 
under full integration. 
 
<Proposition 4> If the market is covered regardless of 
ownership structure, then welfare under full integration is 
equal to that of independent ownership.  In all other cases, 
full integration brings the highest social welfare among the 
three ownership structures. 
 




We have shown that to bundle a supplemental good with a 
base good is the optimal pricing strategy of the base good 
monopolist who also supplies supplemental goods.  Without the 
exit of rival supplemental good firm, the bundling is profitable 
because it increases the profits in the base good. 
We have also shown that the bundling strategy reduces social 
welfare as well as rival firm’s profit if the two supplemental 
goods are close substitutes.  The rival firm still retains a 
significant market share even in this case.  Therefore, contrary 
to the DOJ’s argument, Microsoft (the base good monopolist) 
does not become a supplemental good (web browser) 
monopolist simply by bundling IE with Windows.  Moreover, a 
bundling strategy is not always harmful for society.  When two 
supplemental goods are not close substitutes, we have shown 
that bundling strategy may increase welfare.  The equilibrium 
ownership structure depends on the transaction costs of mergers 
and the initial structure. 
Finally, we may carefully think about the political 
implication.  On the belief that Microsoft is leveraging its 
monopoly power of OS market to other supplemental goods 
markets, some people insist that the government should split 
Microsoft into a base good firm and supplemental good firms.11 
                                                           
11 For example, the Silicon Valley Research Institute (SRI) 
proposes dividing Microsoft into five different companies 
calling them “Baby Softs”.  This is analogous to the divestiture 
of the telecommunication monopoly AT&T (The New York 
Times, May 25, 1998).   
 This may increase social welfare if the divestiture is not too 
costly.  According to our model, however, the merger with the 
remaining rival firm (Netscape) would increase social welfare 
even higher.   
As we mentioned earlier, the DOJ would like to force 
Microsoft either to remove its web browser from Windows 
packages or to include a browser made by rival Netscape.  One 
may think that removing Internet Explorer from Windows is the 
easiest solution.  However, this might not be the best solution.  
Suppose the monopolist can commit to a supplemental good 
price when it sells the base good.  If the monopolist wants to 
build its reputation over time, so the commitment is binding, 
then it can attain the same profit as bundling strategy by 
announcing pS1=0.  To increase social welfare, ironicaly, the 
government could set a price floor by removing the product 
from the package.  Contrarily, including the rival’s product in 
the package might be a solution by itself, because this brings the 
same welfare results as under full integration.  The only problem 
is the division of profit, i.e., at what price the monopolist buys 
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Proof of Proposition 2 
 
We need to show i) pB I + p1I < pB,1P and ii) pB,1P + p2P < 
pB,1,2F for all four cases of utility loss.  Case (a), t < u/2.  i) pB C,I 
+ p1C,I = u-(3/4)t is smaller than pB,1C,P = u-(2/3)t and ii) pB,1C,P 
+ p2C,P  = u-(5/9)t is also smaller than pB,1,2C,F = u-t/2. 
Therefore, i) and ii) hold for this case.  Case (b),when t is 
between u/2 and (3/4)u. i) pB U,I + p1U,I = 5u2/(16t) and pB,1C,P 







- , which approximates as 0.444u < t < 
1.056u.  Since u/2 £  t < (3/4)u, we can say that 5u2/(16t) is 
smaller than u-(2/3)t for this range of t. ii) see (a)-ii. Therefore, 
i) and ii) hold for this case. 
Case (c), when t is between (3/4)u and u. i) pB U,I+ p1U,I 
=5u2/(16t) is smaller than pB,1U,P=3u2/(8t). ii) pB,1U,P + 
p2U,P=7u2/(16t) and pB,1,2C,F=u-t/2.   7u2/(16t) is smaller than 






- , which approximates 
as 0.646u < t < 1.354u .  Since (3/4)u £  t < u, we can say that 
7u2/(16t) is smaller than u-t/2 for this range of utility loss.  
Therefore, i) and ii) hold for this case.  
Case (d), when t ³ u. i)we already showed this in the above 
(c)-i).  ii) pB,1U,P+ p2U,P = 7u2/(16t) is smaller than pB,1,2U,F = 
u2/(2t).  Therefore, i) and ii) hold for this case.  From the four 
cases (a), (b), (c), and (d), we conclude that  pB I + p1I < pB,1P 
and pB,1P + p2P < pB,1,2F.   Hence, the equilibrium structure of 
ownership is always full integration when the transaction costs 
of mergers are negligible. <Q.E.D.> 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2' 
 
All we need to show for this proposition is that the profit gain 
of partial integration is not smaller than the profit gain of full 
integration.  For case (a), the gain of partial integration is t / 12, 
while the gain of full integration is t / 18.  Therefore, the 
proposition holds for this range of utility loss.  For case (b), the 
gain of partial integration is u - (2/3)t - 5u2/(16t), while the gain 
of full integration is t / 18.  The former is larger than the latter if 






- , which approximates as 
0.476u<t<0.908u .  Since u/2£ t<(3/4)u, this inequality is true 
for this case.  Therefore, the proposition holds for this range of 
utility loss.  For case(c), the gain of partial integration is 
u2/(16t), while the gain of full integration is u - t/2 - 7u2/(16t). 
The former is always larger than the latter because the 
difference of the two is (t-u)2/2 Therefore, the proposition holds 
for this range of utility los.  For case(d), both the gain of partial 
integration and the gain of full integration are u2/(16t).  From 
(a), (b), (c), and (d), we conclude that the profit gain of partial 
integration is larger than or equal to the profit gain of full 
integration. <Q.E.D.> 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
 
We need to compare welfare under independent ownership 
and welfare under partial integration.  For case (a), so when t < 
u/2,  WFC,I = u-t/4 is larger than WFC,P = u-(5/18)t.  For case 
(b), so when u/2 £ t < (3/4)u, WFU,I = 7u2/(16t) and WFC,P = 







- , which approximates as 0.510u < t 
< 83.614u.  Since we consider the utility loss between u/2 and 
(3/4)u, we can say that WFU,I >WFC,P if u/2 £ t £ 0.510u, and 
WFU,I <WFC,P if 0.510u < t < (3/4)u.  For case (c) and case (d), 
WFU,I = 7u2 / (16t) is smaller than WFU,P = 19u2/(32t).  
Therefore we conclude that partial integration causes welfare 
loss if t £ 0.510u, so if two supplemental goods are close 
substitutes.  If t > 0.510u, then partial integration is welfare 
enhancing. <Q.E.D.> 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
 
For case (a), it is trivial to show that WFC,I  = WFC,F > WFC,P 
.  For other cases, we need to show that the welfare under full 
integration is the largest.  For case (b), all we need to check is 
whether WFU,I < WFC,F or not.  This inequality holds if and only 
if u/2 < t < (7/2)u.  Since u/2 < t < (3/4)u, this is true for this 
case.  For case (c), since we showed that WFU,I  < WFU,P in the 
previous proposition, we need to show that  WFU,P < WFC,F. 







which approximates 0.725u < t < 3.275u. This is true because 
we are considering the case when (3/4)u < t < u.  For case (d), 
it is easy to show that WFU,I < WFU,P < WFU,F.  From (b), (c), 
and (d), we conclude that the full integration brings the highest 
social welfare. <Q.E.D.> 
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Abstract- Traditionally, companies aiming to achieve
competition among suppliers have used sealed bidding
procedures in their sourcing processes.  The advances in
information technology and in particular the Internet now allow
these companies to use different and more complex auction
mechanisms. In particular multidimensional auctions are a
natural extension of the standard sealed-bid auctions, but these
auctions raise a whole host of issues that have been little
investigated. In this article we focus on one of these issues,
namely the role of information feedback given during the
auction process. We describe various feedback policies and
analyze the expected impact on the performance of the auction
mechanism using the criteria of speed of convergence, allocative
efficiency and Pareto optimality. This can help both researchers
and practitioners in a more detailed and thorough analysis of
electronic auctions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although electronic markets have been in existence for over a
decade and especially the last few years have grown
exponentially, paralleling the growth of the Internet, the
accompanying theory is lagging behind substantially. In this
paper we will make a start with developing a theory for a
particular type of auction that holds great promise for
practical applications, namely the multidimensional auction.
Although currently consumer auctions such as eBay, Onsale,
Yahoo Auctions and Amazon Auctions are drawing most of
the attention, the business-to-business auction market is
expected to surpass the consumer auction market by several
orders of magnitude (InformationWeek, 1999). In this
research we will focus on the business-to-business context of
electronic auctions.
In the majority of business-to-business transactions, the
details of the transaction are not fixed in advance, but rather
they are determined through some form of negotiation
process. This negotiation process can take many forms, from
unstructured bargaining between two parties to the high-
speed market environments of stock exchanges to all kinds of
auctioning procedures. In this paper we will focus on the
latter category.
Traditional auction literature has dealt mainly with auctions
being used as a mechanism to sell goods. In this case the
bidders are the potential buyers and the bid taker is the seller
and the auction mechanism is used to determine the price of
the good being auctioned. If we were to model a common
procurement setting (in other words using an auction as a
mechanism to buy goods) with multiple suppliers competing
for the buyer’s order the roles of bidders and bid taker would
be reversed. In that case the bidders are the sellers and the bid
taker is the buyer.
This reversal from seller-driven to buyer-driven alone does
not inherently change the auction and in principle traditional
auction theory still applies. However in the reverse auction
(i.e. procurement) case, the bid taker is much more likely to
solicit bids that are based on more than just price alone.
Bidders now would not submit a one-dimensional bid of just
price, but instead submit a bid consisting of a vector of
characteristics such as price, quantity, quality, delivery time
and warranty. This provides another rationale for looking at
multidimensional auctions, however this is an area that is
little addressed in the current management, IS or economics
literature.
The paper is set up as follows: section II will review the
existing literature on electronic auctions and
multidimensional auctions, drawing from both the IS field as
well as economics. Section III outlines the general approach
we use to model multidimensional auctions. In section IV we
turn our attention to the little-addressed role of information
feedback given during the auction process. We outline
several feedback policies and analyze the impact they have
on the performance of the auction mechanism. Performance
is judged on three criteria: speed of convergence, allocative
efficiency and Pareto optimality. In addition, the concept of
an informational balance of power is outlined. Section V
concludes and also describes how these theories could be
validated empirically.
II. OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE
An important issue when analyzing electronic markets (and
auctions in particular) is the effect they have on the prices of
traded goods and services. Bakos (1991) originally
hypothesized that due to increased competition and less
overhead, prices in an electronic market would be lower than
in a traditional market. Lee (1998) and Crowston (1997)
among others have empirically tested this reduced price
hypothesis in several situations, but these tests have not led to
unequivocal results as in some cases prices actually went up
in an electronic market. Choudhury, Hartzel and Konsynski
(1998) also showed mixed consequences of the usage of
electronic markets and they suggest that the scope of the
electronic market (i.e. which phases of the transaction are
supported) is an important variable that has been overlooked
thus far.
Koppius, Van Heck and Wolters (1998) analyzed an
intermediate stage between a traditional and an electronic
auction when they investigated the introduction of screen-
based auctioning in a large Dutch flower auction.
Traditionally the flowers were driven into the auction hall on
carts, but the logistical complexities of this process led the
flower auction to experiment with screen-based auctioning.
Instead of physically showing the flowers, an image of the
flower was shown. Koppius, van Heck and Wolters (1998)
showed that in the new situation the worse product
representation (as perceived by the bidders) caused a
significant price drop.
Despite the obvious practical relevance, research specific to
electronic auctions is not very extensive. Van Heck and
Vervest (1998) provided a typology of web-based auctions,
based on the numbers of buyers and sellers. In the business-
to-business context under investigation here, we are dealing
with procurement auctions and to a lesser extent sales
auctions. Turban (1997) gave an overview of some of the
products that are being auctioned electronically and outlined
some potential benefits, such as cost reduction and inventory
clearance. A much more extensive overview is given by
Lucking-Reiley (1999). Wrigley (1997) suggested that
electronic markets in general and auctions in particular will
occur when one of the following characterizes the goods to be
sold: perishability, scarcity, possibility to deliver
electronically or to a geographically constrained market (such
as second-hand goods for instance). Their hypotheses were
partially confirmed by Van Heck, Koppius and Vervest
(1998), who compared four electronic auctions on the
Internet and identified some common success-factors, the
most important ones being increased scale of the market for
the seller and greater market visibility for the buyer.
With regards to the role of information technology when
analyzing auctions, we take the following stance. Like
Shapiro and Varian (1998), we contend that ICT does not so
much change the fundamental characteristics of the general
auction process, as the economic principles behind auctions
are still valid, but rather it enables new trading mechanisms
to be implemented that were previously unknown or
infeasible. Examples include Drexler and Miller (1988),
Rothkopf, Pekec and Harstad (1995), Varian (1995), Miller
(1996), Clearwater (1996), Gomber, Schmidt and Weinhardt
(1998) and Koppius (1998). For example, Drexler and Miller
(1988) describe what they refer to as the ‘escalator bidding
algorithm’. They liken bidding strategies to escalators: a
bidder chooses the initial height of the bid (the step at which
to enter the escalator) and the rate of increase per time unit
(the speed of the escalator); also he can enter bids on
different types of escalators at the same time that progress at
different speeds. Clearly this sort of bidding strategy would
be hard to implement without IT.
This view of IT’s role allows us to use results from
(microeconomic) auction theory when analyzing electronic
auctions. Most auction theory mainly deals with the
traditional auction of an indivisible good (possibly multiple
units of that good), with the auction process being conducted
on price. The past few years some progress has been made in
researching extensions to this framework, partly in response
to criticism that the assumptions of a game-
theoretic/mechanism design approach to auction theory are
not very realistic in a practical setting. See Rothkopf and
Harstad (1994) for an overview of such criticism.
The class of multidimensional auctions forms one very
interesting extension to the standard auction framework. In
these auctions, instead of consisting of just a single parameter
(i.e. price), a bid consists of a vector of attributes such as
quantity, quality, delivery time etc. in addition to price. When
auctions are used for procurement, such parameters are
generally not fixed in advance, but instead are determined by
the bidding (sometimes called tendering) process. As argued
before, this makes the multidimensional auction a very likely
candidate to be used in an electronic business-to-business
market, also because of the low cost of fulfilling the much
higher informational requirements of such a mechanism.
There have been several authors who investigated auctions in
a context of procurement or internal sourcing, which exhibits
multidimensional characteristics as shown, although they
have not always specifically identified it as multidimensional
auctions per se.
Van Damme (1997) gives an overview of the theory and use
of auctions as a procurement mechanism. Dasgupta and
Spulber (1989/1990) showed that setting a fixed quantity to
be procured is sub-optimal and that instead the decision of the
quantity to be procured should depend on the received bids.
They also investigated the multiple sourcing problem in
which the quantity to be procured is to be distributed over
multiple suppliers and gave an optimal two-stage mechanism
for this case.
Bushnell and Oren (1995) looked at the problem of setting
production levels and selecting an internal supplier for an
intermediate product and described how theoretically a
multidimensional auction could be used to set an efficient
transfer price for that intermediate product.
Thiel (1988) was the first to specifically investigate
multidimensional auctions. He showed that if the bid taker
(i.e. the procurer) has a publicly known, fixed budget and
does not value any savings, the multidimensional case can be
reduced to the one-dimensional case of a normal auction.
Unfortunately these assumptions are not entirely realistic
from a practical point of view.
Che (1993) looked at three different auction mechanisms for
two-dimensional auctions (on price and quality), based on
actual practices at the US Department of Defense. He showed
that under certain circumstances the three investigated
mechanisms yield the same expected revenue and that in all
circumstances, quality is either undervalued or overvalued
from the buyer’s point of view. In his analysis, he assumed
that the costs of the bidding firms were independent. Branco
(1997) extended Che’s analysis by deriving an optimal
auction mechanism for the more realistic case when the
bidding firms’ costs are correlated.
Cripps and Ireland (1994) approached the problem from a
slightly different point of view when they investigated
auctions in which the bid taker sets threshold levels for the
various characteristics that are not known to the bidders.
They analyzed three different bid evaluation schemes,
partially based on the tendering of UK television licenses.
The difference between the schemes was the order in which
each bid was evaluated (price first, quality second; quality
first, price second; price and quality simultaneously) and they
found that the three schemes produced the same results.
Note that sometimes the terminology multidimensional
auctions is used to denote combinatorial or combinational
auctions (Rothkopf, Pekec and Harstad 1998). Analysis of
these auctions generally focuses on bundling and valuation
issues of bids and should therefore not be confused with
issues related to the multidimensional auctions described
here, although some progress is being made on unifying the
two types (Koppius 1999).
III. A GENERAL MODEL OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL AUCTIONS
Consider the following simple procurement model in which
there is one buyer (i.e. bid taker) and n suppliers (i.e.
bidders). The bid taker has K attributes on which the buyer
must bid in order for a bid to be valid, hence all bids must be
K-dimensional vectors. The attributes may be any
combination of monetary and non-monetary attributes.
Possible attributes can include a fixed-price component, a
variable-price component, payment schedule, quantity
offered, various product quality attributes and issues such as
warranty policies.
A bid by firm i is denoted by );...;(
,1 iK,ii bb=b  with each
separate bk,i denoting the level of attribute k in bid i. The bid
taker has a private utility function U(b) that denotes the utility
he derives from a bid; this function converts both monetary
and non-monetary attributes into a utility. The bid taker can
choose to reveal his utility function (either truthfully or not)
or he can keep it secret and perhaps reveal different
information.
Analogous to the reserve price in conventional auctions, the
bid taker has several constraints βs(b)  (s = 1,…,S) regarding
the values of the attributes, resulting in a feasible bid region
for the bid taker denoted by BR*. These constraints may be
the just simple minimum or maximum values or more
complex functions describing some of the tradeoffs between
attributes (say for instance the maximum price increase for
faster delivery, possibly dependent on the quality level).
These constraints may or may not be communicated to the
bidders, depending on how much private information the bid
taker is willing to retain. The bid taker tries to maximize U(b)
s.t. b ∈ BR*.
Similarly, each of the bidders faces several constraints ci,t(b)
(t = 1,…,T) regarding the sets of attributes that he can offer,
resulting in a feasible bid region for each bidder denoted by
BRi. These are constraints that have to do with internal
production function, minimum price levels etc. They are
assumed to be private information, but not necessarily
independent. In fact in this procurement context they are very
likely to be quite strongly affiliated. Furthermore, each bidder
has a utility function pii(b) which he tries to maximize s.t. b ∈
BRi.
There are several different generic auction types the bid
taker/auctioneer could employ and in particular the sealed-bid
case is very common in practice. One of the reasons for this
is that the open outcry model would be very costly in terms of
communication unless the bidders all congregate in one
place, which is rather cumbersome, particularly when dealing
with a geographically dispersed set of suppliers. One of the
disadvantages of a single-shot auction is that there is no
opportunity for the bidders to react to other bids, but instead
estimates of other bidders strategies have to be used.
Speaking from a purely theoretical point of view, this should
yield the same results, but in practice things often work out
differently. For instance, market maker FreeMarkets Online
claims on their website (www.freemarkets.com) that they
achieve savings of up to 25% when using an English auction
instead of a single-shot auction.
Therefore we focus on a multiple-round setting, so that
bidders get a chance to update their initial bids, based on the
information feedback they receive from the auctioneer. This
line of reasoning is similar to one of the rationales for the
FCC auction design (Cramton 1995). This not only gives the
bidders the opportunity to react to other bidders, but more
importantly they have more options to explore the highly
complex bid space of multidimensional auctions with all its
potential tradeoffs. The information feedback given to the
bidders may include information on their own bid, such as
their bid score or bid ranking, but also information on other
bidders’ bids. The information feedback may be public or
private or a mixture of the two. The updating may occur
synchronously, meaning that all bidders have to submit a bid
before feedback is given and the next bidding round
commences, or it may occur asynchronously, in which case it
becomes an English variant of the multidimensional auction.
IV. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION FEEDBACK
To show the relevance of information feedback, we will first
describe a very simple deterministic situation. Assume a
procurement setting where there are two dimensions, namely
cost and delivery time. There are two bidders competing for
the order through an English auction. Bidder 1 can deliver at
a cost of c1=900 and delivery time d1=”on time”. Bidder 2 on
the other hand can deliver at a cost of c2=1000, but can
deliver d2=”early”. Suppose the bid taker values earlier
delivery at the cost equivalent of 10. If the bid taker truthfully
reveals this information, the end result will be that bidder 1
will win with a winning bid of 989. However, suppose the bid
taker were to tell the bidders he values earlier delivery by 90.
Bidder 1 would still win, but now with a winning bid of 909
instead of 989. Although the example is not particularly
realistic, since it assumes complete information on the bid
taker’s side for instance, it does show that different
information feedback policies do have an impact on the
outcome of the auction. Additionally it shows that sometimes
the bid taker can profit from misrepresenting his private
information. In general, misrepresentation is profitable for the
bid taker when used to push the most efficient bidder to the
limit, effectively by ‘subsidizing’ the second-most efficient
bidder.
Another reason to investigate the effects of different auction
feedback policies (other than utility of the bid) is that using a
utility function sometimes is not possible or desirable. For
instance, it may be illegal to misrepresent it (for instance in
government procurement) or announcing a utility function
may give monopoly power to one or more bidders. Or the bid
taker simply may not have an explicit utility function, but
instead only be able to do pairwise comparisons1. A third
reason is that it is an area that has received little attention thus
far, both from theorists and experimentalists (Kagel and Roth
1995, Ch. 7). Yet with the increasing popularity of auctions
and in particular the more complex electronic auction
mechanisms enabled by information technology, a theory on
the effects of information feedback is necessary more than
ever.
Any information feedback policy can be thought of to




4. Bid taker’s utility function
5. Bidder identities
The first category gives information regarding the bids
themselves. This is usually done in conjunction with elements
of categories 2 and 3, such as revealing the highest bid. An
interesting hybrid policy would be to not reveal information
about the bids received, but instead give each bidder a
number of alternatives that would improve on their current
bid (and perhaps top the current highest bid). This would
make it easier for the bidders to spot mutually beneficial
tradeoffs in the multidimensional space. See figure 1 for an
illustration of such tradeoffs in a two-dimensional case with a
bid being made on price and delivery time. Two iso-utility
curves are drawn, one for an arbitrary bidder, one for the bid
taker. The curves correspond to the utility of the bid being
                                                          
1
 Note that using pairwise comparisons will only be
equivalent to using a utility function when an unlimited
amount of pairwise comparisons can be done accurately and
with zero cost.
made by that particular bidder, i.e. the bid made is at one of
the intersection points of the two curves. The arrows indicate
the direction of utility improvement for each party. The bid
taker (i.e. buyer) prefers a lower price and a faster delivery
time, the bidder (i.e. seller) prefers a higher price and a later
delivery time. Areas I and III are areas in which any bid
would yield increased utility for both parties. A bid in area II
would yield decreased for both parties. A bid in the
remaining areas would yield a utility increase for one party
and a decrease for the other party. Note however that we have
assumed no further restrictions on the attributes, such as a
maximum price the bid taker is willing to pay or a minimum
delivery time the bidder can meet for instance. These may
prevent areas I and III from being feasible bids for both
parties. Note also how this example illustrates some of the
issues that arise in multidimensional auctions and not in the
standard one-dimensional auctions on price (due to the zero-
sum nature of standard auctions).
The second category refers to the revelation of the scores of a
bid, with score being the bid taker’s utility. Note that (bearing
in mind the information manipulation example given earlier)
the utility revealed need not necessarily correspond to the
actual utility of the bid taker, since misrepresentation may be
profitable. Also note that revealing a utility is only
meaningful if the scale of the utility is (partially) known to
the bidders.
The third category reveals information about the relative
ranking of the bid among all bids received, based on the bid
taker’s (possibly misrepresented) utility. This information can
be enhanced if the total number of bids received is revealed
as well.
The information from the second and third categories in
principle allows bidders to make partial inferences about the
bid taker’s utility function after a number of rounds.
However, the bid taker can also choose to reveal some
information about his utility function directly and that is the
fourth category. He may choose to reveal the utility function
entirely, but another option might be to reveal the direction of
fastest improvement upon the current bid. This corresponds
to the normal vector of the utility curve at the bid point (see
also the arrows in figure 1).
The fifth category constitutes the revelation of the identity of
the bidders. The identity of the highest bidder will generally
only be revealed at the end of the auction, but it is of course
possible to reveal the identity of the current high bidder
during the auction. In other cases one may want to have a
completely public auction in the sense that the identity of
each bidder is known at all times.
To analyze the effects of different feedback policies on the
performance of the auction mechanism, we need criteria by
which to judge performance, as performance can be measured
in different ways. We focus on three performance measures:
1. Speed of convergence
2. Pareto optimality
3. Allocative efficiency
Speed of convergence especially is an important issue in
auctions where transactions need to occur at a rapid rate. A
typical (one-dimensional) example is the Dutch flower
auctions. Since these deal with very large volumes of
perishable goods, each individual transaction needs to be
completed quickly. Hence the adoption of the Dutch auction
clock system that is capable of completing a transaction every
four seconds (Kambil and Van Heck 1998). No other auction
method can be expected to achieve this speed. In an auction
of a rare painting on the other hand, speed of convergence is
much less likely to be an issue, which makes an English
auction a more likely choice.
Pareto optimality in a multidimensional auction is measured
at the dyad level of (winning) bidder-bid taker. A (winning)
bid is Pareto optimal if no feasible bid can be made which is
a Pareto improvement, i.e. no mutually beneficial bids exist
for the bid taker and that particular bidder. Note that this not
necessarily means that the bid taker’s utility is maximized.
Allocative efficiency is achieved when the most efficient
bidder makes the actual winning bid. In standard one-
dimensional auctions, allocative efficiency is achieved when
the bidder with the highest valuation wins the auction. In the
reverse case under consideration here, it means that the
bidder with the lowest cost structure wins the auction. So a
multidimensional auction is efficient if, given a winning bid,
there does not exist a different bidder who could make a
feasible bid (feasible for both parties) that would improve the
bid taker’s utility.
Loosely speaking, efficiency ensures that the eventual trade
occurs between the ‘right’ trading partners, optimality
ensures that the total surplus of that trade is maximized.
g* (bidder’s iso-utility curve)
f* (bid taker’s iso-utility curve)






It is important to note that a winning bid can be Pareto
optimal, but not allocatively efficient and vice versa. An
optimal, inefficient winning bid can occur when the winning
bidder has Pareto-optimized his own bid relative to the bid
taker’s utility (no Pareto improvements possible, areas I and
III in fig. 1 are not feasible), yet there may be a different
bidder that could outbid him (allocative inefficiency), but that
bidder has not made such a bid. A non-Pareto-optimal,
allocatively efficient winning bid can occur when there are no
bidders that could outbid the current highest bidder
(allocatively efficient), yet his current bid could be Pareto
improved upon (areas I and III in fig. 1 are feasible, yet not
being bid in). In both cases, the complexity of the bid space
and unfamiliarity with the bid taker’s preferences lead to
performance degradations that could be ameliorated by
giving proper feedback.
If we look more closely at these three performance criteria,
we can distinguish between two information-related aspects
that influence these criteria: direction for improving the bid
and a sense of competition among the bidders.
Optimality is something that has mainly to do with the shape
of the utility curves: where do the regions of Pareto
improvement lie? This requires information feedback about
the direction in which to move the bid in order to achieve
optimality.
Efficiency on the other hand has to ensure that the most
efficient bidder wins, meaning that competition among
bidders has to be fierce. The more information bidders have
about their position relative to other bidders, the greater their
perception of competition and therefore the more aggressive
their bidding behavior.
Speed of convergence is improved by both kinds of
information: more aggressive bidding (through a higher sense
of competition) in a direction of fast improvement (through
better direction information) will lead to a quicker
convergence.
In summary, we have the following three propositions:
Proposition 1: Feedback that conveys more information
about the direction in which to improve the bid will have a
positive impact on the optimality of the auction.
Proposition 2: Feedback that conveys a higher sense of
competition among the bidders will have a positive impact on
efficiency of the auction.
Proposition 3: Both types of feedback will have a positive
impact on the speed of convergence of the auction.
In Table 1, we outline several feedback policies. Based on the
informational content with regards to direction and sense of
competition of each feedback policy, in conjunction with
propositions 1-3, each feedback policy is rated on the
performance criteria of speed of convergence, optimality and
efficiency. These are rough and qualitative ratings, as a useful
(mathematical) formalization of the directional content and
the sense-of-competitional content does not seem very likely.
Note that we have left out feedback policies dealing with
whether or not to reveal bidder’s identity, as the effects of
that are indeterminate to the best of our knowledge.
Feedback Speed Optimality Efficiency
Bid highest? (yes/no) - - -




Rank of bid o - +
Highest bid o o +
All bids + ranking + + +
Bid score + highest
bid score
- - o









Table 1: Feedback policies and the effect on auction performance
The performance measures outlined above all deal with the
economic performance of the auction mechanism. As
propositions 1-3 outline, more (appropriate) information will
improve economic performance. However, this is a somewhat
myopic view of auction mechanism performance. Auctions in
general and especially in the business-to-business
environment do not exist in a vacuum. They are embedded in
a set of economic and social relationships that may be
affected by the outcome of the auction and these relationships
can have a large effect on the performance of future auctions
(Smith 1989). This implies that the information revealed in
one auction will influence future auctions.
For instance, if the bid taker were to reveal his utility
function, not only would he possibly give monopoly rents to
one or more bidders, but more importantly it would likely
reveal sensitive competitive information about his internal
cost and production structure. Bidders in future auctions can
subsequently use this information against the bid taker. So
even though the short-term effect on the economic
performance of an isolated auction may be positive, the long-
term effect may turn out negative due to performance losses
in future auctions.
This leads us to introduce a concept we call the
‘informational balance of power’. In every auction setting,
each participants in this auction (either bidder or bid taker)
has some information about the other participants. This
means that there is a certain balance of power involved: do I
know more about this participant than he knows about me?
 The revelation of information by a participant can tilt this
informational balance of power if something significantly
new is learned from this by other participants. Specifically for
information revealed by the bid taker, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 4: The information feedback policy that is chosen
by the bid taker will be such that it preserves the
informational balance of power.
V. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH
There is no doubt that electronic markets and electronic
auctions in particular represent one of the fastest growing
segments of electronic commerce. As the possibilities of
information technology increase, more complex auction
mechanisms become feasible, for which in many cases no
theory exists.
In this article we have looked at one of these new auction
types, namely the electronic multidimensional auction. In the
multi-round setting that we analyze, an important issue both
for theory and practice is the information feedback given
during the auction. We have argued the relevance of this
topic and described the elements of any information feedback
policy. We have stated four propositions as to how these
elements affect the auction mechanism performance measures
of speed of converge, optimality and efficiency plus a more
strategic aspect, namely the informational balance of power
and illustrated these with several examples in Table 1.
Especially as business-to-business electronic auctions
become more prevalent each day, careful attention has to be
paid to the design of these auctions. The informational aspect
described in this paper is one of these issues. While this is by
no means a complete theory of all the informational aspects
involved in designing electronic auctions, we do believe we
have made some progress towards such a theory.
Subsequent research needs to address several things. The
ratings in Table 1 have been arrived at through simple,
somewhat ad hoc judgments. A more rigorous
operationalization of the informational content of feedback is
needed. Also, propositions 1-4 need validation. We are
planning a series of laboratory experiments in the spring of
2000 to validate propositions 1-3. We will run an electronic
multidimensional auction with student subjects bidding under
various information feedback policies. Proposition 4 cannot
be adequately validated in a lab experiment, since it is hard to
reproduce the proper social settings that are crucial to
analyzing the informational balance of power. We are
currently negotiating with an electronic auction provider to
either set up a field experiment testing proposition 4 or
conduct a case study of a multi-round procurement auction to
gain insight into participants’ perception of the informational
balance of power and changes therein. Hopefully the
validation and further development of these aspects will help
theorists and practitioners with the many design issues faced
when developing and analyzing electronic auctions.
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Abstract - Information systems are identified as enablers of 
agile manufacturing.  Despite the continuous utilisation of IT/IS 
applications, there is growing evidence that information 
technology/systems do not deliver their expected benefits.  In 
this work we investigated three main issues related to 
information systems: competitive bases-general goals, 
development and infrastructure.  We tested our approach with 
information gathered from 14 manufacturing companies based 
in the UK.  The results of this work make it possible to link 
information systems to other dimensions of agility like 
competitive bases and agility attributes to define an assessment 
framework. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Manufacturing organisations are facing an ever increasing 
change in their business environment.  These changes are 
represented by an increase in competition, changes in 
customer requirements, changing business objectives to 
mention just a few.  In order to cope with these challenges, 
manufacturing organisations must become agile.  Agility 
means the capability of operating profitability in a 
competitive environment of continually and unpredictably, 
changing customer requirements [1].  The current literature 
identifies information systems as enablers of the concept of 
agile manufacturing [1], [2], [3].  Moreover, the introduction 
of new tools in information systems enables the execution of 
new ways of work not experienced before (e.g. concurrent 
design operations).  Authors agree that information systems 
lend competitive advantage to organisations, describing 
some characteristics of information systems to support the 
challenges facing manufacturing organisations [4].  On the 
other hand, parallel to the development of sophisticated 
information systems, we find the problem of information 
systems evaluation [5].  The literature shows few examples 
of the evaluation of information systems in manufacturing.  
In fact, different researchers follow different approaches in 
evaluating manufacturing information systems.  Some of 
them evaluate the benefits of information systems in the 
entire organisation [6], others, like Kelley [7], measured the 
productivity achieved through the introduction of automated 
devices focusing on the upgraded process instead of the 
company as a whole.  If examples of information systems 
evaluation in manufacturing are few, the allusion of practical 
guidelines for information systems requirements, 
specifications and assessment to support agility are seldom 
mentioned in the literature, making imperative the 
development of practical guidelines for todays 
manufacturing needs of the organisation. 
 
To ensure the success of information systems in 
supporting agile manufacturing it is necessary to define a set 
of requirements.  Dove [8] was the first researcher to address 
the importance of information systems as a critical business 
practice for agility.  However, little empirical research is 
available in the literature on identifying information systems 
properties to support agile practices.  This work addresses 
the current development of information systems in a study 
that included 14 manufacturing organisations and the 
importance of agility issues in information systems to 
support the development of business operations.  The 
framework of our study is presented in figure 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1 The Basic Framework for IS evaluation for agility. 
 
This framework identifies first the evolution and 
development of information systems with its related 
infrastructure, followed by the identification of a series of 
competitive bases and attributes in a single company. 
 
II.  INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND MANUFACTURING 
 
The importance of information systems in manufacturing 
is growing continuously.  Billions of dollars are spent in 
infrastructure (systems related to e-commerce, internet), 
planning (ERP Enterprise Resource Planning, APS 
Advanced Planning and Scheduling) and execution (systems 
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 The classification of information systems for this work is 
based on the evolution experienced by manufacturing 
information systems over the last few years.  The main 
characteristic of this evolution is the growing complexity of 
information systems to support new ways of collaboration.  
Table I represents this progression based on a classification 
presented by the Next Generation Manufacturing Project [9]. 
 
TABLE I 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS EVOLUTION 
Stage Information Systems Applications for Manufacturing 
1 MRP, manufacturing operations, material handling. 
2 MRPII, financial and planning modules to assist 
manufacturing operations. 
3 CIM, EDI, intelligent scheduling, integrate different 
internal and external activities of the company. 
4 ERP, Enterprise integration, systems that address not 
only the information needs of manufacturing but also the 
information needs of the enterprise. 
5 E-commerce, active agents, systems that addresses the 
needs of customers and suppliers. 
 
The description of the current state of development of an 
information systems structure, is the first step in the 
identification process of agility issues that affect other 
dimensions linked to the operation of the organisation. 
 
III.  INFORMATION SYSTEMS STRUCTURE TO SUPPORT AGILE 
MANUFACTURING 
 
The information systems characteristics in agility are 
based on a set of issues identified by Dove et al. [4], Boar 
[10] and the NGMP[9].  They cover the utilisation of 
information technology components to solve unique business 
needs in an overall corporate structure.  These issues are 
classified as proactive and reactive.  Being proactive means 
the ability to predict business trends.  On the other hand, 
reactive means the power to react to changes in the business 
environment.  
Proactive issues refer to those capabilities that are at the 
very focus of todays competitiveness.  These issues include: 
1. Creation.  Designing an infrastructure of global 
interaction standards that permits unique local solutions. 
2. Augmentation.  Improving the standards without 
impacting operational applications. 
3. Comparison.  Watching developments in information 
technology applications. 
4. Migration.  Anticipating future electronic interactions 
with customers and suppliers. 
5. Modification.  Adding new standards to the 
infrastructure without conflict with other existing 
implementations. 
Reactive issues are identified as those characteristics 
necessary to have at an entry level in any industry.  These 
issues include: 
6. Correction.  Fixing an infrastructure that is overly 
restrictive. 
7. Variation.  Accommodating variations to the 
infrastructure standards for unique requirements. 
8. Expansion.  Expanding the internal user community and 
number of supported business units. 
9. Reconfiguration.  Moving unique solutions from one 
business unit to another. 
 
Fourteen manufacturing organisations were asked to 
identify their information systems applications according to 
table 1.  Respondents occupy positions in manufacturing 
management, people that are users of information systems 
applications to support the companys operations.  Asking 
the final user to evaluate the information system structure 
gives the opportunity to know how well information systems 
help him/her to accomplish his/her daily activities. 
 
The respondents were asked to give their assessment to a 
set of nine statements based on the nine issues described 
above using a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 stands for 
completely disagree, 2 for not completely disagree, 3 for not 
agree or disagree 4 for not completely agree and 5 for 
completely agree.  The following statements represent the 
nine issues of information systems infrastructure asked of the 
companies. 
 
1.  Information technology in the enterprise provides an 
environment that promotes the development of 
customised solutions based on unique business needs. 
2. The information systems infrastructure ensures 
continued viability as components are improved, added 
or removed. 
3. The organisation constantly monitors developments in 
information systems in our industry and bechmarks it 
against other industries. 
4. Our information technology infrastructure anticipates 
future electronic interactions with customers and 
suppliers. 
5. New standards can be upgraded or modified to the 
information systems infrastructure without breaking 
other applications. 
6 In case of problem, fixings to the information systems 
infrastructure are in short periods of time. 
7 It is possible to make variations to the information 
systems standards in order to accommodate unique 
requirements. 
8 The information systems function is in constant 
expansion to support all business units and user 
community. 
9 Our information systems infrastructure supports the 
portability of solutions from one business unit to 
another. 
 
IV. THE DEFINITION OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR AGILITY. 
 
The companies that took part in this work come from 
different business backgrounds.  In fact there were three 
companies from the automotive sector, three from aerospace, 
four from electronics and semiconductors and four from 
general manufacturing (ceramics and plastics).  At first sight 
it appears that the nature of the business determines the 
complexity of the information required by the organisation.  
Nevertheless, the heterogeneity of the companies surveyed 
gives the opportunity to appreciate in a wider context the 
 utilisation of information systems to the concepts introduced 
in the previous section. 
 
A. Information Systems Development 
 
The purpose of this section is to ascertain the current 
development of the companies according to the evolution of 
information systems in manufacturing.  The first question 
addressed the development of information systems in 
manufacturing organisations.  The respondents were asked to 
identify the current development of their information 
systems function within their organisation based on the 
evolution of information systems presented in table I. 
 
The results of information systems development in 
manufacturing organisations show that MRP and MRPII 
modules are still the most common information systems 
applications in manufacturing.  Surprisingly for us, six of the 
14 companies surveyed identified the presence of E-
commerce and active agents applications in their information 
systems infrastructure, taking in consideration that in the 
utilisation of these applications manufacturing organisations 
lag behind the financial and services sectors.  The results are 
shown in figure 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Information systems development in surveyed 
companies. 
 
Each bar represents the number of companies that 
identified the utilisation of a specific application within their 
information systems infrastructure (i.e. eight companies of 
the total of 14 identified the utilisation of MRP and MRPII 
applications, three companies of a total of 14 work with 
applications identified with ERP).  From the automotive 
companies of our sample, all of them identified the 
utilisation of e-commerce to support activities with 
customers and suppliers. 
 
B. Information Systems Structure 
 
In this section we used Kendalls tau-b to find if there is 
any correlation present between the issues presented in 
section III.  Table II presents the most significant correlation 
factors identified using Kendalls tau-b. 
 
TABLE II 
KENDALLS TAU-B RESULTS 
Creation Augmentation 0.654 
Comparison Migration 0.626 
Migration Modification 0.696 
Correction Variation 0.567 
Correction Expansion 0.519 
 
The correlation coefficients found in this section reveal the 
close association of developing information systems for agile 
manufacturing, used to integrate business units and anticipate 
future business needs.  It seems that all respondents agreed 
that a proactive policy, creation and augmentation showed 
correlation based on the results of our case study companies.  
Moreover, respondents clearly identified reactive statements 
very similar amongst them, showing correlation for 
correction, variation and expansion. 
 
An analysis of the answers given to the questionnaire 
shows that augmentation and creation are the most important 
issues for information systems infrastructure to support 
agility.  The results of this analysis are shown in table III. 
 
TABLE III 












Moreover, the results of the three automotive companies 
that have implemented E-commerce modules within their IS 
infrastructure gave the highest scores to the properties of 
augmentation and creation (mean of 4.33).  According to a 
report from the UK Department of Trade and Industry the 
automotive sector has been identified as a sector subject to 
increasing competition at national and international levels.  
Semiconductors and electronics which have implemented 
MRPII and E-commerce modules identified creation and 
augmentation (mean of 4.0 and 3.75 respectively).  
Aerospace industries (currently working with ERP modules) 
identified Reconfiguration as the most important issue (mean 
of 4.33).  General manufacturers (two of them working with 
e-commerce applications) identified creation and 

























































































 According to our results, the most important 
characteristics for an information systems infrastructure in 
terms of agility include augmentation and creation. 
 
V.  BUILDING SUITABLE FRAMEWORK FOR IS ASSESSMENT IN 
TERMS OF AGILITY. 
 
Once the characteristics for development and 
infrastructure have been determined the next step is the 
identification of supported characteristics in terms of agility.  
The framework introduced in this work tries to answer how 
to bring together issues that are related specifically to the 
characteristics of information systems to a more global 
assessment that includes intangible issues such as 
competitive bases.  The framework identifies the current 
development of information systems within the organisation 
with the assessment of information systems issues to support 
agility. 
 
The scope of information systems for agile manufacturing 
affects all the operations of the enterprise.  Two dimensions 
that affect manufacturing enterprises are competitive bases 
and agility attributes [11], [12].  For our particular interests, 
figure 3 depicts how these elements relate to the concept of 
agility and information systems.  Competitive bases 




Figure 3.  Competitive bases, agility, information systems 
and attributes. 
 
The agility dimensions cover six competitive bases (speed, 
proactivity, quality, cost, innovation and flexibility) [11].  A 
description of them is given: 
 
• Speed: concept-to-cash time or the time it takes to 
respond to perceived customer needs. 
• Flexibility: the ability to adapt to variable customer 
requirements. 
• Innovation: succesful exploration of new ideas for 
products, services and procedures. 
• Proactivity: the ability to influence and predict market 
trends. 
• Quality: products and services that satisfy customer 
expectations over their life-times. 
• Cost: the expense of resources required to produce 
goods or services to satisfy a market need which are 
lower than those of the competition. 
 
A set of 32 agility attributes identified in the literature of 
agile manufacturing [11], [13] were gathered in five 
groupings. These include: Organisation commitment to 
integration and co-operation -A1-, Culture of quality and 
responsiveness -A2-, State of technology to enhance 
flexibility and operations performance -A3-, Organisation 
commitment towards change -A4- and Education and 
welfare of human resources -A5-.  Table IV, presents the 
attributes and groupings. 
 
TABLE IV 







































Given this scheme, we focused in defining a general 
function for agility as presented in (1). 
 
      (1) 
 
 
Where                   is the sum of all the significant  
coefficients of the attributes identified for that competitive  
basis in grouping A1 , and so on for A2, A3, A4 and A5.  CB 
is any of the six competitive bases we have defined for our 
model, SCB Speed-, FCB Flexibility-, PCB Proactivity-, ICB 
Innovation-, QCB Quality- and CCB Cost-.  The idea 
behind this approach is to identify the importance of 
Organisation commitment to integration and 
cooperation - A1 
Multi-venturing capabilities - A11 
Encouragement of teaming with other customers  A12
Rapid formation of partnerships  A13 
Strategic customer relationships  A14 
Close supplier relationships  A15 
Trust based customer and supplier relationships  A16 
Enterprise integration  A17 
Cross-functional teaming  A18 
Concurrent execution of business activities  A19 
 
Culture of quality and responsiveness  A2 
Quality over product life  A21 
Addition of value to products A22 
First time right designs  A23 
Satisfaction of customer requirements  A24 
Rapid development cycles  A25 
Rapid response to changing market requirements  A26
Frequent new product innovation  A27 
Customer-driven innovations  A28 
State of technology to enhance flexibility and operations 
performance  A3 
Technology awareness  A31 
Leader in the use of current technology  A32 
Using skill and knowledge enhancing technologies  A33 
Use flexible production technology  A34 
Open information environment  A35 
 
Organisation commitment towards change  A4 
Continuous improvement  A41 
Embracing a culture of change  A42 
Descentralisation of authority  A43 
Learning organisation  A44 
Bespoke business practice and structure  A45 
 
Education and welfare of human resources  A5 
Employee satisfaction  A51 
Multi-skilled and flexible workforce  A52 
Continuous training and development for  
Personnel  A53 
Workforce skill upgrade  A54 
Workforce empowerment  A55 
   n             n             n               n              n 






 competitive bases with the concept of agility and information 
systems.  These competitive bases constitute the goals-
benefits of information systems.  By identifying a number it 
may be possible to determine the most important competitive 
basis for a specific organisation. 
 
The nature of the issues introduced in this section is 
intangible, so it is very difficult to define a specific measure 
for them.  Moreover, the definition of an agility function for 
competitive bases and agility attributes by conventional 
methods is impossible.  The most adequate way to define a 
function that includes the relationships between the issues of 
competitive bases and agility attributes in terms of agility 
and information systems is one that gives them weights.  The 
definition of weights is fuzzy by nature.  A membership 
function for agility is one that takes values from 0 to 1, 
making it necessary to define a scale of grades.  The scale of 
grades is used to simplify operations and it is similar to 
others used in methodologies to evaluate tangible and 
intangible issues.  This scale is shown in figure 4 and is 
utilised to identify the importance of competitive bases and 
attributes for a specific organisation with a specific 
information systems infrastructure.  The fuzzy language 
values used to derive their fuzzy numbers are presented in 
table V. 
 
Figure 4 Agility assessment curve 
 
TABLE V 
LINGUISTIC VALUES REFERENCES 
Linguistic values Mean of fuzzy numbers 
Completely Disagree (very poor) 0 
Disagree (poor) 0.25 
Fair  0.5 
Agree  (good) 0.75 
Completely Agree (very good) 1 
 
This is in complete agreement with the theory of fuzzy 
logic where a fuzzy set is a number µA(X) ε [0,1].  Using the 
values presented in table V, we can construct an evaluation 
matrix to identify the most important competitive bases.  To 
facilitate our task we have adapted a model developed by 
Cheng et al [14]. This method eliminates the utilisation of a 
scale of values that range from 1 to 9 using traditional AHP 
[15] or the utilisation of fuzzy numbers in complex matrices 
[16]. 
 
In this work the same companies of the previous section 
were asked to assess the importance of each competitive 
basis to information systems and the concept of agility.  
Furthermore, the companies were asked to assess the 
importance of each agile attribute in terms of competitive 
bases. We have used the above approach to identify the most 
important competitive basis of one of the organisations that 
answered our questionnaire. 
 
We start constructing and evaluation matrix,. where S 
denotes the elements under assessment (CB, competitive 
bases) Xj denotes the criteria with which performances are 
measured (agility, information systems and agility attributes 
A1, A2, A3, A4 and A5) and Xij denotes the performance 
score of element Si with respect to criteria Xj. 
 
 X1  Xj  Xn 
S1 X11/t1  X1j/tj  X1n/tn 
: :  :  : 
Si Xi1/t1  Xij/tj  Xin/tn 
: :  :  : 
Sm Xm1/t1  Xmj/tj  Xmn/tn 
 
      
 µ1(X1)  µ1(X1)  µ1(Xn) 
 :  :  : 
= µi(X1)  µi(Xj)  µi(Xn) 
 :  :  : 
 µm(X1)  µm(Xj)  µm(Xn) 
 
Once this is done, we normalise all total scores for every 
element of the criteria.  Then we apply a power of 
dilation/concentration depending on the importance of each 
element of the criteria.  The power of dilation is determined 
by a linguistic hedge or modifier; an operation that modifies 
the meaning of a term fuzzy set-.  Power of dilation is 
shown in (2) and power of concentration in (3). 
 
µcon(u) = (µA(u))n; where n >1   (2) 
 
µdil(u) = (µA(u))1/n, where n>1   (3) 
 
After applying the power of dilation/concentration the 
most important competitive base is determined by 
maximising the minimum membership value over all the 
elements of the criteria using (4). 
 
µA(xi) = maxi(minj µij)    (4) 
 
Using this approach we are able to identify the most 
important competitive basis in a specific manufacturing 
organisation.  As a numerical example of this method we 
employed the answers given to us by a leading aerospace 
organisation currently working with an ERP application- to 
identify the most important competitive bases for the 
company in terms of agility, information systems and 
attributes for agility.  It is important to note that the 
aerospace industry has very long lead-times and product 
development.  In this case the person answering the 
questionnaire identified. The following values: 











SCB FCB ICB PCB QCB CCB 
0.5 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.75 
 
Information Systems 
SCB FCB ICB PCB QCB CCB 
0.75 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 
 
The complete evaluation matrix including the values for 
the groupings of agility attributes- for the aerospace 
company is shown in table VI (see appendix).  The 
normalised matrix is shown in table VII of the appendix.  
Since in our study we wish to recognise agility and 
information systems as very important issues we gave them a 
power of concentration of 1.5 [14].  The resultant matrix is 
shown in table VIII of the appendix. 
 
According to these results Innovation is the most 
important competitive basis behind the operation of 
information systems and agility from the point of view of our 
studied aerospace company.  The maximum value for the 
minimum of each competitive basis is for Innovation with 
0.080.  If we identify the maximum, the value is 0.229 for 
Innovation.  These results can be used later to benchmark 
companies in the same industry. 
 
The use of this approach enables us to determine a number 
-agility index- for a specific competitive basis matching the 
requirements for agility and information systems and of 
course, the attributes required for agility. 
 
It is, hence, possible to appreciate that creation and 
augmentation are part of the information systems function 
directly related to competitive bases. 
 
The adoption of the scheme introduced in this work can be 
used to make better decision on the information systems 
function in order to improve the overall performance of the 
organisation.  
 
VI.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The information systems development and infrastructure 
and their support to competitive bases were the components 
introduced in this work.  The support to the concept of agility 
by development and infrastructure, enabled us to identify in 
our case study that organisations with better developed 
information systems are committed to creating and 
improving current operations by using such technologies.  
The approach was complemented with the utilisation of 
fuzzy language variables to determine the most important 
competitive basis for a specific organisation in terms of 
agility, information systems and attributes. 
 
The results of the questionnaire employed for this case 
study cannot be considered as statistically valid, but they 
give valuable indications for the preparation of adequate 
assessment models on information systems for organisations 
in competitive business environments. 
 
The development of assessment tools of information 
systems for manufacturing would require the consideration 
of some of the concepts introduced in this work.  The 
concept of agility is changing the way manufacturing 
organisations conduct their businesses. 
 
A clear understanding of the issues introduced in this work 
would give practitioners and researchers the opportunity to 
develop information systems assessment tools suitable for 
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AEROSPACE COMPANY MATRIX 
CB Agility IS A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 
Speed 0.5 0.75 4.75 4.0 2.5 1.75 2.5 
Flexibility 0.75 0.25 4.0 3.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 
Innovation 0.75 0.5 4.5 4.5 2.75 2.5 3.5 
Proactivity 0.5 0.25 5.5 4.0 3.25 3.25 2.5 
Quality 0.75 0.25 4.0 3.5 2.75 2 2 
Cost 0.75 0 4.5 3.75 4.25 2.25 2.25 
 
TABLE VI 
AEROSPACE COMPANY NORMALISED MATRIX 
CB Agility IS A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 
Speed 0.125 0.375 0.174 0.107 0.147 0.122 0.163 
Flexibility 0.187 0.125 0.146 0.150 0.088 0.175 0.163 
Innovation 0.187 0.25 0.165 0.198 0.161 0.175 0.229 
Proactivity 0.125 0.125 0.201 0.172 0.191 0.228 0.163 
Quality 0.187 0.125 0.146 0.150 0.161 0.140 0.131 
Cost 0.187 0 0.165 0.161 0.25 0.157 0.147 
 
TABLE VIII 
AEROSPACE COMPANY MATRIX AFTER APPLYING POWER OF CONCENTRATION 
CB Agility IS A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 
Speed 0.044 0.185 0.174 0.107 0.147 0.122 0.163 
Flexibility 0.080 0.044 0.146 0.150 0.088 0.175 0.163 
Innovation 0.080 0.125 0.165 0.198 0.161 0.175 0.229 
Proactivity 0.044 0.044 0.201 0.172 0.191 0.228 0.163 
Quality 0.080 0.044 0.146 0.150 0.161 0.140 0.131 
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Abstract-Many analysts argue that the Internet is producing
a fundamental change in the way that business works. The
network economy grows faster every day. Internet markets are
developing rapidly with information being the single most
traded commodity on the Internet. This paper looks at the
extent to which conventional pricing theory applies to this type
of good and whether it requires modifications in order to be
applicable to cyberspace.  Do issues such as the ease of consumer
arbitrage activity, privacy or convergence constitute a major
impediment to the application of conventional price theory? The
thesis considers these issues with particular reference to the
implications for consumer welfare on the one hand and
economic efficiency on the other.
The findings of the research with respect to the economic
theory’s applicability to the digital information goods and
services traded on the Internet is mitigated.  The diverse pricing
schemes will be applicable according to different industries
trading electronically.  For the establishments of price
discriminatory schedules to be efficient and welfare enhancing,
three conditions must be reunited: side issues such as consumer
arbitrage, unbundling ought to be resolved and the seller ought
to be aware of consumer price sensitiveness and market output
must increase.
Key Words: Digital Information goods and services,
Electronic Commerce, Consumer Arbitrage, Price
Discrimination, Welfare and Efficiency
I.   INTRODUCTION
The network economy grows faster every day.  Potential
markets on the Internet are developing at a rapid pace.
Information is the single most traded commodity on the Net.
Recent literature on the economics of the Internet has
attempted to apply tools of long-established economic theory
to the goods and services bought and sold throughout the
network.  These goods and services are referred to as digital
information product and services, which represent what the
content of the Internet, essentially the World Wide Web,
provides on a commercial basis.  In applying economic
theory, especially pricing theory, to the Internet, the
fundamental question that arises for economists is whether
the Internet, and more specifically commerce on the Net, is so
different from conventional markets that conventional
economic theory either does not apply or needs modification
to be applied successfully?
This Paper investigates briefly the cost structure of
digital information products, followed by the extent to which
traditional pricing theory applies to digital information.  It
revises briefly the theory of pricing, in particular the theory
of price discrimination, as it is applied to information goods
and services.  Product differentiation and bundling theories
are both considered along with the mainstream pricing
theory, with respect to their potential application to digital
products.  It is argued that issues arising from the
implementation of pricing policies to digital information
goods and services potentially jeopardise the efficiency of
these pricing strategies.  Finally, having assessed the theory
and application of cost and pricing structures of information,
the implications of applying such pricing structures are
considered in terms of welfare enhancement and efficiency
gains.  The pricing strategies associated with infrastructure
and connection to the network are not considered.  It is
assumed that consumers and firms have access to the Internet
at a constant fee.
II.   COST STRUCTURE OF DIGITAL INFORMATION
Information goods have high fixed costs of production
and low variable costs of reproduction.1  The fixed cost can
be considered as “sunk” or non-recoverable cost once it is
invested in the production process.  Contrary to a common
view, however, the marginal cost is not zero.  Variable costs
must incorporate the copyrights cost involved with the sale of
each commodity.2  In addition to these copyright costs,
network costs should also be embodied in the variable costs
scheme.
Note that Whinston (1997) incorporates a congestion
component in the variable costs curves.3  Congestion depends
on the distribution of quantity demanded over time and its
effects should be included in a dynamic model.  Congestion
will occur if demand for a digital product/service is highly
concentrated at a point in time and exceeds the capacity of
dissemination of the network provider.
Moreover, for long run marginal cost or fully distributed
cost some fraction of total fixed cost needs to be accounted
for. Mathematically, the total costs (TC) to produce the ith
unit for person j are represented as follows:4
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 Shapiro, Carl and Varian, Hal R., Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to
the Network Economy, Harvard Business School Press, Boston,
Massachusetts, 1999, pp. 20-22
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 Leer, Anne C., It’s a Wired World: The New Network Economy,
Scandinavian University Press, Oslo, Norway, 1996, pp.112-120
3Whinston A. B, The Economics of Electronic Commerce, by Choi Soon-
Yong, Stahl D. O. and Whinston A. B.,Macmillan Technical Publishing,
Indianapolis, Indiana, 1997. p.349
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 Inspired from Nicholson, Walter, Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles
and Extensions, Sixth Edition, The Dryden Press, O rlando, FL, 1995, p.
690, footnote 15.
2Here c is the marginal cost of production, qi,j is the ith output
for person j and S is the fraction of the sunk costs recovered
by person j buying the ith good.  As the share of acquiring the
good increases, a greater amount of the sunk costs are
recovered so that the sale of the commodity is profitable.  In
part, it is this mix of high production and low reproduction
costs that causes difficulty for pricing and cost recovery. In
economic theory, price discrimination is a common solution
to this problem.
III.  THEORY OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION
The theory of price discrimination is generally discussed
within a monopoly framework.  Although the theory of price
discrimination is directly relevant to this paper, monopoly-
pricing schemes are not discussed here.  The theory of price
discrimination involves selling different units of an identical
product at different prices to the same or different consumers.
This allows the producer to discriminate with respect to an
exogenous (such as age or gender) or an endogenous (such as
time, amount and type of purchase) classification.  It directs
the consumer towards self-selection, as the consumer chooses
the category he fits in best.  Self-selection may be precarious
for fraudulent moves and lead to arbitrage problems.
Even though this drawback exists, price discrimination
seems to be adopted, as it enhances profits, and potentially
enhances welfare and efficiency in pricing.  The pricing
scheme is attractive for firms to increase profit, but is it
necessarily improving the efficiency and economic welfare as
intended? The effects of price discrimination on efficiency
were first analysed by Ramsey (1927).5  Ramsey looked at
the magnitude of efficiency gains through his own style of
pricing (Ramsey Pricing).  Efficiency and welfare effects are
reviewed and analysed with respect to digital information
goods in the last section of this paper, and Brown and Sibley
(1986) extensively debate the same issue.6
Dupuit (1962) analysed the effect of discrimination upon
prices, output and welfare.7  He distinguished and examined
several types of discriminatory strategies, now called
“degrees” of discrimination after the taxonomy of Pigou
(1920).8  Pigou distinguishes three degrees of price
discrimination, which are briefly defined here.
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 Ramsey, F. P., “A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation”, Economic
Journal, Vol. 37, 1927, pp. 47-61, passim.
6
 Brown, Stephen J. and Sibley, David S., The Theory of Public Utility
Pricing, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, Chp.3 & 7
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 Pigou, A. C., Economics of Welfare, Macmillan and Co., London, 1920, 4th
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A.   First-Degree
The first-degree price discrimination is also termed
perfect price discrimination.  In this case, consumers have
unit demand and the producer knows exactly consumer’s
marginal willingness to pay as well as being able to avoid the
arbitrage problem.  The Producer will charge individualised
prices set to equal consumer’s marginal willingness to pay, or
“reservation price”.  The “reservation price” is the highest
price the buyer is willing to pay for one unit of the
commodity.  Perfect price discrimination is rarely observable
in the real world.
B.   Second-degree
The second-degree price discrimination is also known as
non-linear pricing.  Through this process of discrimination,
the price per unit of output is dependent on the quantity
purchased by the consumer.  The system of pricing implies
quantity discounts and quantity premium.
C.   Third-degree
In third-degree discrimination, the producer is able to
identify each customer belonging to different consumer
groups, separated from one another by more or less
distinguishable characteristics, and can charge different
prices to the members of the different groups.9
More importantly, “[e]ssentially what is required is
knowledge of group-specific demand functions.”10  It is
essential to know the elasticity of the demand with respect to
price (εp,d) to price discriminate at any of the three degrees
along with the ability to separate market according to the
different types of demand (discriminated by the firms
exogenous or endogenously).  Mathematically:11
The first order condition for this particular problem is:
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3The Elasticity of demand in market i (εi) allows one to
rewrite the latter expression in this manner:
This latter equation illustrates the relative importance of the
elasticity of demand as an important measure for consumer’s
price sensitiveness.
IV.   IS THE THEORY APPLICABLE TO THE INTERNET?
The major departure from accepted pricing theory is to
price at marginal willingness to pay.  The theory of price
discrimination analyses the pricing strategies at marginal
cost, whereas information is priced at the consumer’s
marginal valuation.  The style or degree in pricing that ought
to be adopted for digital information goods and services
depends on the characteristics of the goods themselves rather
than the universal application of a particular price
discrimination scheme.  Two pricing strategies apply to most
goods and services traded on the net: versioning
incorporating third degree price discrimination augmented by
product differentiation, and perfect price discrimination, or
personalised pricing. 12
A.   Versioning
“[…] the ‘product’ policy of a firm involving a different
adjustment of its ‘product’ in each market, and the policy of
price discrimination go hand in hand, and the former is
frequently a prerequisite of the latter.”13
In many respects product differentiation or versioning
appears as an extension of the third-degree price
discrimination.  In the case of digital products and services,
versioning may actually be the basis for price discrimination,
contrary to the mainstream economic theory where price
discrimination is the basis for product differentiation.  By
differentiating the product, the producer can divide the
market into two different demand types and can recover
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Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXI, November 1947, p.105
revenue from the low-demand section of the market without
jeopardising the high-demand component.14
A recent paper by Denackere and McAfee (1996)
proposed to differentiate products by voluntary degradation
or “damaging” of the good to suit the lower ends of the
market whilst providing the complete version of the
commodity to the high-end.15  Offering different versions of
the same product or service may surmount, by induction, the
self-selection problem implied by third-degree price
discrimination.  Versioning appears to be the most popular
approach to price discrimination on the Internet.
Product differentiation, but also price discrimination,
seems to be applied strictly with respect to digital products
within the network.  Authors, such as Whiston (1997) and
Shapiro and Varian (1999) give little consideration to the
potential pricing relationship between digital products and
their physical equivalent.16   Often the digital products are
either substitutes for on-line “damaged” versions of their
physical counterparts or complements to the physical
equivalent.  In the latter case if the digital good actually
complements the physical commodity, the manufacturer will
find it advantageous to promote it.  In the former case it will
be in the manufacturer’s interest to charge the on-line
product, recovering cost either through advertising or fees.17
Moreover the digital product may be packaged as a different
version to avoid direct competition with the off-line good.
Consider the following example of The Economist, which
illustrates versioning on the Internet.
Fig. 1. Versions of the Economist
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4In the above, it is assumed that the cost of access to the
Internet is not counted into the price of the two online
versions.  The graph shows the different levels of
differentiation.18  The printed version will suit the customer
with a higher marginal willingness to pay. The lower-end of
the market, with a lower reservation price, can benefit from
either a full payable on-line version or an abbreviated free-of-
charge version.  This particular case highlights the
possibilities of differentiation: on-line version being a
substitute for an off-line product and versioning of the on-line
product.  This example also illustrates the ability to segment
the market according to consumer’s incremental price.  Free
download, free access and other give away samples are often
the result of marketing strategies whereby firms try to attract
the consumer to buy the full version of the product or service.
In this particular case, versioning (or more precisely
intentional degradation of the commodity) aims at product
promotion more than an effort to supply the lower end of the
market on top of the high-end.
B.   Personalised Pricing
The structure and properties of the Internet makes
personalised pricing possible, especially in the case of
information services and brokerages.  Some authors, for
example Whinston (1997), seem to suggest that the electronic
economy provides the perfect background to discriminate
price at the first degree, as it is relatively easy to collect
consumer information over the network.19  In fact, in order to
apply first degree price discrimination, the manufacturer will
require detailed consumer information, since prices are
individualised.  Practically, information is obtained either
through registration and billing or through observation from
search queries.  Web sites collect a maximum of information
about consumers visiting and purchasing on their sites.  For
example, if one searches for a piece of literature on
Amazon.com, the site will often recommend books other
clients have purchased from the same category.20
Personalising involves bundling of desired attributes
according to one’s preference.
Whether such discriminatory procedure is feasible or not
for digital information products and services is highly
dependent on the properties of the good themselves.  There
are, however, important issues surrounding discrimination
that are discussed further below. Furthermore some goods
and services are adapted to the application of such
discriminatory schedules.  Information agents and search
brokers services are an example of a case where
customisation is favourable.  In fact, the Internet enables the
consumer to find precise information about a particular area
of interest, with the help of the information filtering and
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gathering services.  In other words, the Internet proposes the
depth rather than the breadth of information; the bundling of
desired information would really only be efficient if it
responds to the consumer’s demand criteria.  Both goods and
services can be customised.
C.   Issues
The general argument in the literature states that simple
price discrimination theory applies to the Net.  The digital
nature of online product and the difficulty of both defining
and imposing a clear online jurisdiction, however, means
there are issues that require resolution in order for the basic
theory of pricing in economics to be applicable on the Net.
1)  Consumer arbitrage: The central issue is consumer
arbitrage.  This is a major issue on the Internet that has yet to
be fully resolved.  Consumer arbitrage can be briefly defined
as illegal reproduction and distribution of a product licensed
by firms, violating copyright.  The restriction of consumer
arbitrage is required for successful price discrimination.  It is
related to the basic technical properties of information,
namely transmutability and reproducibility.  Illegal copies
may crowd out legitimate sales and producers may not be
able to recover their costs of production.  The challenge for
the Internet is to ensure the proper implementation of
copyright and reduce consumer arbitrage.  In other words, to
make copyright work in the electronic sphere.21
2)  Reversing Process – Unbundling: Consumer arbitrage
issue is in part connected to the ease of unbundling.
Transmutability makes it such that on the Internet it is easy to
reverse the process of both bundling and “damaging”
(versioning) goods, to re-bundle at will and recover the full
version.  Both consumer arbitrage and the reversing process
imply self-selection problems so that consumers with a higher
marginal willingness to pay acquire either the full version
from another “non-official” source or acquire the lower-end
version and then recover the full version.  Both cases
represent a loss of revenue for the seller, an inefficient
outcome in terms of price discrimination and a decrease in
welfare (as producer surplus is not maximised).
3)  Elasticity of demand: Another issue that impedes
efficient application of the pricing schemes is the lack of
knowledge of the elasticity of demand for the diverse digital
information goods and services.  Without this knowledge, it
is difficult for the seller to segment the market at the different
incremental values and to create appropriate versions of
goods. The Internet enables the seller to collect numerous
amounts of data on consumer preferences, for example, when
businesses require registered billing and subscription.  This,
however, does not imply that the producer is supplied with
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5the relative price sensitivity – the elasticity of demand - of
each buyer.
4)  Privacy: Another issue that arises from price
discrimination at the first degree is the loss of consumer’s
bargaining power and the related issue of privacy.  By
revealing his own preference to the producer, the consumer
loses his bargaining potential to the producer, who can extract
the entire consumer surplus.  This loss of bargaining power is
not very appealing from a consumer’s point of view.22  This
partly explains the recent debates over privacy issues on the
Internet, and the intentions of governments to ensure that
privacy rights are respected on the Internet:
“US internet regulation ‘is inevitable’: […] the bipartisan
Online Privacy Protection Act of 1999 was introduced into the
US Senate, […].”23
In some cases though, it is in the consumer’s interest to
provide the producer of digital information goods or services
with personal information, in order to optimise the
satisfaction yielded by the good or the services provided.  If
the consumer could supervise the process of personal
information provision, privacy issues would be lessened.
V.   WELFARE & EFFICIENCY
 Pricing and the Internet
Although some argue to the contrary, economists would
take the view that resources on the Internet are finite. In this
case, the presence of price discrimination and product
differentiation seems to be a good scheme to improve welfare
and improve the efficiency of the allocation resources.  If on
the other hand, technology keeps expanding as it has for the
last ten years and the Internet technically does not exhibit
excess capacity (relative to the number of users), then these
pricing techniques are going to be primarily about increasing
firm’s profit.  They will have a role in maintaining a high
level of quality and commitment to consumers in the
provision of services and products throughout the connected
network, but most importantly in ensuring full cost recovery.
As has been argued previously there are transaction and
reproduction costs involved with the net and these need to be
covered with economic returns.
One, then, can ask the question: does the producer
intentionally create different versions of products to recover
costs and enhance profit providing both ends of the market?
The product differentiation theory is applicable for goods and
services traded on the Internet. Such versions of some goods
are available from electronic commerce sources in the form
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of a  “free downloadable”. In this case, they can be
considered as promotional tools for the actual product for
sale.  In other words, the simplified versions of e-
commodities aim at providing “experience” rather than trying
to satisfy the diverse section of the market and thereby
recovering cost non-linearly.  This is corroborated by the fact
that most of these lower end goods and services are often free
and not for a minimal fee.  It is, however, possible that at the
present stage of development of the Internet the lower end
incremental value is close to zero. Hence, making these
versions free is consistent with pricing theory.  Furthermore,
even in this case when the firm does not attempt to recover
costs and enhance profit through the free give-away samples,
the existence of the low end versions improves welfare by
providing both types of demand (low versus high demand)
with the product in a form consistent with what they are
willing to pay.
A more crucial question is whether price differentiation
or more precisely, versioning enhances welfare in the case of
digital information goods and services?  Theoretically,
welfare will improve if and only if the output increases as a
result of the creation of versions of the product and the
associated price discriminating. 24  Is this the case for digital
information goods and services? The simple answer to this
question would be yes, given the analysis on price
discrimination and its application to e-commerce.  This
conclusion is consistent with that of Shapiro and Varian
(1999).25  However, while a conventional reading of the
theory leads to this conclusion there are important caveats
that need to be stressed and which emerge from this research.
These caveats relate to the impact and operation of versioning
and third degree price discrimination in the particular context
of digital information goods and services.
Is Pricing Efficient?
The first crucial issue is that successful price
discrimination requires a detailed knowledge of the elasticity
of demand with respect to price. This is necessary for the
resultant prices to promote efficiency and increase welfare.  It
is an important piece of information for the online seller to
acquire.  Information on consumers price sensitivity or more
directly on the marginal willingness to pay enables the
producer to match each version of a good or a service with
the appropriate characteristics to the consumer at the
appropriate price.  In the case of most digital information
goods and services, such knowledge is unavailable, which a
priori means that price and product differentiation is
inefficient. Data on consumer price elasticity or incremental
valuation for offline products could be used as a proxy to the
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6elasticity of demand or marginal willingness to pay for online
goods, depending on the different types of industries.
Information, however, on consumers will increase. As
electronic commerce for some industry grows, data is
accumulated, as online traders require registered billing.  This
is the case for example with Amazon.com, which requires the
consumer to register and proposes to create a personal
account.  As a result of this strategy, the supplier of books is
able to gain information about the consumer and matching
their preferences very closely to similar consumers who
purchased other books in the same category.  This, however,
is not a perfect substitute for knowledge of the elasticity of
demand for specific digital goods and services, which as
noted above, is necessary for prices and product
differentiation to be optimal.
Other issues are important for welfare and efficiency
improvements to occur.  The previously discussed availability
of reversing or recovering process (such as unbundling) is a
serious problem. Two important issues arise: consumer
arbitrage and self-selection.  The reversing process implies
that the full versions intended for the high end of the market
could be recovered from the “damaged” version without the
online seller’s approval and without paying for the right to do
this.  In this situation, the seller would loose some surplus
and be technically less efficient.  Efficiency loss may also
occur due to the self-selection problem.  Self-selection issue
arises, as it becomes more advantageous for some consumers
to purchase the lower end product and use recovery
techniques to re-create the full version.  Different versions of
the same software may be an example, where a consumer
buys the simplest version and searches the Internet for the
upgrading parts unbundled from the full version.  Another
example, somewhat different in appearance but intrinsically
the same, is the case of shared membership of a fee-based
site.
Furthermore, unbundling or the reversing process creates
consumer arbitrage problem.  It should be noted that
consumer arbitrage is an issue not solely associated with the
recovering process.  The presence of these illicit copies
potentially crowds out legitimate sales and the producers may
therefore not be able to recover their costs of production.
This is a major threat to firms trading electronically, which is
becoming more and more important as electronic commerce
grows and the Internet expands. Arbitrage and the reversing
process problem potentially creates high policing costs in
order to avoid the propagation of these illicit copies.
It will be necessary to resolve these issues in an efficient
way, so that the application of the price discriminatory
schemes comes close to full efficiency and maximum welfare
enhancement, ensuring a total output increase.  These issues,
however, do not necessarily need to be solved for the pricing
to take place, but the potential benefits from solving these
issues, in efficiency and welfare terms, are lowered.
Furthermore, the output increase from third degree price
discrimination and versioning cannot be guaranteed.  Such
total output increase is a necessary condition for welfare to
improve.
First Degree
First-degree price discrimination is, by definition,
perfect.  Customising enables the producer to satisfy the
consumer fully and at the same time, the producer surplus, is
maximised.  Consumer surplus, on the other hand, is equal to
zero.  In other words, first degree price discrimination may be
considered as socially efficient.  First degree price
discriminating would lead to a Pareto optimal situation,
where consumer surplus would be completely extracted and
producer surplus maximised.  This pricing scheme is
applicable in the case of goods and services sold on the
Internet, but only for some particular industries.  Moreover,
the online industries best fitted for this pricing strategy are
the digital information database services, which can calibrate
their supply according to a consumer’s preferences.  The
number of industries, for which such scheme is possible, is
limited.  Furthermore, as with versioning, issues such as
unbundling leading to consumer arbitrage problems, which
must be solved until full efficiency and welfare enhancement
can be achieved.
VI.   CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the main issue for this paper has been
whether long established microeconomic theories can be
easily translated to the online world.  Is the Internet by nature
so different that long established theories must be changed?
The answer is a qualified “no”.  The Internet can be
considered a reflection of the off-line world, which partly
explains why a lot of goods and services are identical in the
off-line and on-line world.  It can also explain the attitude of
economists, such as Shapiro, Varian and Whinston, who
attempt to draw straight parallels and apply well-established
economic theory directly to the network economy.  The issue,
however, is not as clear-cut as implied. The very nature of the
digital information goods and services traded on the Internet
makes consumer arbitrage relatively easy and facilitates
unbundling or reversing processes. In addition, there is an
apparent lack of knowledge of consumer’s price sensitiveness
across market segments.  Therefore, while the theory is
essentially applicable, achieving the potential efficiency and
welfare gains that correct pricing could produce requires
some fundamental issues to be resolved.
The following table summarises some of the key issues that
have been identified and their implications.
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Unlike the off-line markets, empirical analysis of Internet
markets is virtually non existent. There is a need to increase
understanding of Internet pricing issues through further
empirical studies designed to test the applicability of price
discrimination theory to online goods. These should include:
• Surveys of top online-trading firms to document their
pricing policies and determine whether their online
output is increasing as a result of price discrimination
being applied.
• Comparing online and offline versions of products and
services to determine the extent to which the pricing
policies are different in the on-line world and the extent
to which the on-line world is treated as another market
segment in the overall pricing structure.
There is a need to consider the role of governments in
tackling some to these issues. Most important, the pricing
policies apply globally and there is a need to consider how
limited jurisdictions can deal with some of these issues, most
notably unbundling, revering and arbitrage processes that
operate across jurisdictions.
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Abstract- According to Network Effect literature network ex-
ternalities lead to market failure due to Pareto-inferior coordina-
tion results. We show that the assumptions and simplifications 
implicitly used for modeling standardization processes fail to 
explain the real-world variety of diffusion courses in today’s 
dynamic IT markets and derive requirements for a more gen-
eral model of network effects. We argue that Agent-based Com-
putational Economics provides a solid basis for meeting these 
requirements by integrating evolutionary models from Game 
Theory and Institutional Economics. 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE STATUS QUO 
It is common in many markets that the buying decision of 
one consumer influences the decisions of others. Interde-
pendencies such as the bandwagon, snob, and Veblen effect 
are broadly discussed in economic literature (e.g. Leibenstein 
1950, Ceci/Kain 1982). Besides these general effects apply-
ing to all the consumer decisions, some markets are deter-
mined by strong positive network effects, the so called de-
mand-sided economies of scale, deriving from the need of 
product compatibility. This means that the willingness to 
adopt a product innovation correlates positively with the 
number of existing adopters. Popular examples are the infor-
mation technology and telecommunication markets. The 
network effects in these markets mainly originate from two 
different areas, the need for compatibility to exchange infor-
mation or data and the need for complementary products and 
services. Parallel with the growth of the telecommunication 
and information technology markets in recent years, a new 
area of research emerged aiming at explaining the phenom-
ena of strong positive network effects in markets and their 
implications on market coordination and efficiency. We will 
refer to this research field as the theory of positive network 
effects.  
The primary goal of most traditional approaches is an 
analysis of particular properties of modern information and 
communication technologies, i.e. increasing returns to mar-
ginal adopters, or network effects (e.g. Farrell/Saloner 1985, 
Katz/Shapiro 1985, Besen/Farrell 1994). Thus, the particular-
ity of network effects lies in the fact that they are considered 
to be characteristic of IT products and standards that are 
therefore different in character from more traditional com-
modities and subject to different problems not as smoothly 
solvable by markets (Katz/Shapiro 1985, Farrell/Saloner 
1985, Arthur 1996). Various perspectives can be distin-
guished in the literature (Kleinemeyer 1998, Yang 1997). 
Looking at empirical approaches authors mainly try to prove 
the existence of network effects and estimate their values by 
using regression analysis to estimate the hedonic price func-
tion of network effect goods (Hartmann/Teece 1990, Gandal 
1994, Economides/Himmelberg 1995, Moch 1995, Bryn-
jolfsson/Kemerer 1996, Gröhn 1999). Theoretical approaches 
mostly use equilibrium analysis to explain phenomena such 
as the start-up problem (Rohlfs 1974, Oren/Smith 1981, 
Katz/Shapiro 1985, 1994, Wiese 1990, Besen/Farell 1994, 
Economides/Himmelberg 1995), market failure (Far-
rell/Saloner 1985, 1986, Katz/Shapiro 1986, 1992, 1994, 
Gröhn 1999), instability (also called "tippiness") of network 
effect markets (Arthur 1989, 1996, Besen/Farell 1994, Far-
rell/Saloner 1985, Katz/Shapiro 1994, Shapiro/Varian 1998), 
and path dependency (David 1985, Arthur 1989, Besen/Farell 
1994, Katz/Shapiro 1994, Liebowitz/Margolis 1995b).  
These models focus on individual buying decisions, mar-
keting strategies of competing vendors, supply and demand 
equilibria, and welfare implications. Common results are the 
following:  
• In many cases, the existence of network effects leads 
to Pareto-inferior results in markets.  
• Demand-sided positive network effects inhibit multi-
ple equilibria and the market will finally lock-in to a 
monopoly situation with one standard winning total 
market share. 
• Instability is a typical characteristic describing the fact 
that multiple, incompatible technologies can only sel-
dom coexist and that the switch to a single, leading 
standard can come suddenly, leaving some users 
stranded with unsupported products. 
• The start-up problem prevents adoption even of supe-
rior products; excess inertia can occur as no actor is 
willing to bear the overproportional risk of being the 
first adopter of a standard. 
• On the other hand, excess momentum can occur, e.g. if 
a sponsoring firm uses low prices in early periods of 
diffusion to attract a critical mass of adopters. 
• In the case of sponsored technologies there is a possi-
bility to internalize the otherwise more or less lost 
network gains by strategic intertemporal pricing. 
There are private incentives to providing networks that 
can overcome inertia problems; still they do not guar-
antee social optimality per se.  
• The question arises if the laissez-faire of decentralized 
markets should be replaced by centralized state control 
to ensure favorable diffusion of technologies subject to 
network effects.  
While the traditional models greatly contributed to the un-
derstanding of a wide variety of particular (macroeconomic) 
problems associated with the diffusion of standards, they fail 
to explain the phenomenological variety of diffusion courses 
in today’s dynamic information and communication technol-
ogy markets. The examination of network effects is done in a 
rather general way, which does not cover the heterogeneous 
properties of the markets with products such as digital televi-
sion, cellular phones, office software, Internet browsers, or 
EDI-solutions. Furthermore, the specific interaction of poten-
tial adopters within their personal socio-economical envi-
ronment, and potential decentral coordination of network 
efficiency are neglected. As a result, important phenomena of 
modern network effect markets such as the coexistence of 
different products despite strong network effects, the appear-
ance of small but stable clusters of users of a certain solution 
despite the fact that the competition dominates the rest of the 
market, or the fact that strong players in communication 
networks force other participants to use a certain solution can 
not sufficiently be explained by the existing approaches. 
Additionally, few approaches focus on the impact of increas-
ingly important open standards [Gallaugher/Wang 1999]. 
In the remainder of this article, we will first systematically 
reveal deficiencies in the models of positive network effects 
by analyzing common assumptions and conclusions (section 
2), before extending this criticism to the more general prem-
ises of the neo-classical framework (section 3). Based on our 
findings we will identify areas of improvement proposing a 
new approach to model markets with strong positive network 
effects. The article ends with first results of simulations based 
on our framework as a sound basis for further research. 
II. COMMON DRAWBACKS IN TRADITIONAL NETWORK EFFECT 
MODELS 
In contrast to focussing on macroeconomic public policy 
implications, our goal is to use and extend already elaborated 
theoretical findings to support individual decision processes 
associated with the diffusion of standards. We propose the 
hypothesis that assumptions and simplifications implicitly 
and uncritically used for modeling standardization problems 
inevitably lead to the described results such as market failure 
under network effects and that the analysis of the diffusion of 
standards needs to be extended in order to descriptively cap-
ture real world phenomena and be actionable. 
A Direct vs. indirect network effects  
Although the distinction between direct and indirect net-
work effects (introduced by Katz/Shapiro 1985) is almost 
commonplace in the introduction of articles about standards 
there is very little consideration of these differences in the 
models. But  indirect network externalities have different 
economic implications (Katz/Shapiro 1994). Empirical re-
search shows that direct and indirect network effects are 
evaluated differently by potential buyers and also depend on 
the category of the network effect product (Westarp et al. 
1999). Still, the distinction is not carried out in the models, 
adding to the vagueness of their results. 
B Network effects versus network externalities 
Liebowitz/Margolis (1994, 1995a) argue that not all net-
work effects are externalities, in fact. Generally speaking, in 
accordance with traditional literature on economics or exter-
nalities in particular, a network externality exists if market 
participants fail to somehow internalize the impact of a new 
network actor on others; with positive network externalities 
the private value from another actor is smaller than the social 
value, leading to networks smaller than efficient. Although an 
individual standards adopting actor is not likely to internalize 
his effect (from joining the network) on others, in owned 
("sponsored")1 networks there is no essential obstacle to a 
network owner internalizing these effects. Thus, the existence 
of network effects does not necessarily imply market failure, 
especially in the case of competing sponsored technologies. 
Liebowitz/Margolis (1995a) show under what conditions the 
profit maximizing network size is also socially optimal. 
Katz/Shapiro (1986, 825) show problems of sponsored tech-
nologies when competing with unsponsored technologies and 
second-mover advantages, i.e. advantage of one sponsored 
technology that will be superior in the future over another. 
Still, the proposed ubiquity of failing markets remains doubt-
ful. Generally speaking, it appears to be difficult to find ex-
amples of inferior standards having prevailed over superior 
ones, partly because of uncertainty of not pursued paths and 
their results inherent to a not deterministic world and the 
imperfect foresight of individuals (ex ante vs. ex post effi-
ciency)2, and possibly because – in a world with potential 
Schumpeterean entrepreneurs - there is no such situation. The 
reason could be e.g. exhaustible networks effects and hetero-
geneous preferences and therefore parallel or equally desir-
able networks or the fact that most standards are somehow 
supported by actors with patents, copyrights or other forms of 
property rights. A similar argument can be made focussing on 
satisficing instead of maximizing actors. Supposed the 
QWERTY keyboard really is superior (see Lie-
bowitz/Margolis 1990 for a critical discussion) the question 
remains who benefits from being able to type 100 words a 
minute when typing skills restrict one to a fraction of this.3 
This argument somewhat resembles what Liebowitz/Margolis 
call first-degree path dependence: There is a sensitivity to 
early historic events but no implied inefficiency. And if, 
therefore, different standards are equally beneficial after all, 
“efficiency models cannot be expected to predict which of 
several equally efficient possibilities will be chosen” (Lie-
bowitz/Margolis 1995b). 
The point made here is not the irrelevance of externalities but 
rather to raise the question if standards really are that differ-
ent in terms of economic implications from ‘traditional’ 
goods4 and to identify areas of improvement on modeling 
diffusion processes of standards.  
                                                           
1
 A quite commonly adopted terminology distinguishes be-
tween market-mediated diffusion processes of compatibility 
standards (leading to de facto standards) and de jure stan-
dards resulting from either political (“committee”) or admin-
istrative procedures. De facto standards can either be spon-
sored (with certain actors holding property rights and the 
capability to restrain the use of the standard) or unsponsored 
(no actors with proprietary interests). David/Greenstein 
(1990), S. 4. 
2
 This corresponds to what Liebowitz/Margolis call sec-
ond-degree path dependence: Sensitive dependence on early 
events may lead “to outcomes that are regrettable and costly 
to change. They are not, however, inefficient in any meaning-
ful sense, given the assumend limitations on knowledge” 
(Liebowitz/Margolis 1995b).  
3
 “...the QWERTY keyboard appears to be fast enough for 
almost all uses of it. If you are just driving around town you 
do not need a 500 horsepower V8” (Poole 1997) 
4
 If this is the case - with network effects constituting par-
ticular instances of market failure – then and only then tech-
nology policies different from traditional industrial policies 
should be considered. 
C The bigger the better  
The proposition of indefinitely increasing positive network 
effects as described in the literature (e.g. Chou/Shy 1990, 
Katz/Shapiro 1986, Farrell/Saloner 1992) implies natural 
monopolies. If optimal networks under network externalities 
are the size of the whole population (monopolies), all net-
works are too small. If network effects were exhaustible 
multiple networks could coexist. Even though IT might be 
less subject to physical limitations going together with the 
law of diminishing returns, there might be organizational or 
managerial problems restraining optimal network size (Rad-
ner 1992). Thus, the question raised by the existence of tradi-
tionally described network effects is not optimal network size 
but optimal network since inferior standards could battle out  
better ones. While Arthur (1989) proposes an example con-
sisting of one technology that has greater value in earlier but 
smaller in later diffusion stages leading - under increasing 
returns - to (ex post) regrettable market outcomes Lie-
bowitz/Margolis (1995a) argue that "synchronization effects" 
are more likely uniform as there is no difference in the value 
of one more user of videorecorder technology to others in 
either a VHS or Beta network. 
D Homogeneous network effects 
Another limiting assumption is that of similar and actor-
independent valuation of networks and growth of network 
effects. Heterogeneity of preferences can have substantial 
impact on the evaluation of different competing networks as 
well as on the value assigned to new actors. For example, a 
close colleague of an engineer will add more value to the 
engineer’s network than a sociologist from China. Another 
example is VHS with compared to Beta possibly inferior 
picture quality but longer recording times (Poole 1997, Lie-
bowitz/Margolis 1990). Heterogeneous preferences increase 
the chance of efficient coexistence of networks and overcome 
natural monopoly tendencies. Good examples of asymmetric 
partner contingent valuations of network effects can be found 
between intra-group communications standards e.g. used in 
corporate intranets between specialized professionals and the 
inter-group communication standards within and outside that 
same company. Thus, installed base effects cannot be gener-
alized without regard to who is part of the personal network 
and who else uses compatible technologies outside the usual 
interaction scope of the respective individual.  
E Costs of network size 
If optimal networks under network externalities are mo-
nopolies, all networks are too small. This hypothesis only 
holds under constant or falling (average) costs of adding new 
members to a network. The costs of network size are ignored 
in almost all models. Thus network effects are not sufficient 
for natural monopoly and one single standard is not a com-
pulsory social optimum. Instead, there can be optimal net-
work sizes below the entire population and different stan-
dards can coexist. 
F Confusion of Centralized and Decentralized Decision 
Making 
Different instances of standardization problems are subject 
to different institutional backgrounds. For example, in corpo-
rate intranets, there are - at least in principle - different possi-
bilities of approaching strategic situations of interdependent 
actors. Thus, we propose a distinction between centrally and 
decentrally coordinated networks (Westarp et al. 2000). In 
contrast to the distinction between sponsored and unspon-
sored technologies, the institution of centralized control 
within a hierarchy could coordinate dependencies due to 
network effects even of non-proprietary standards. Addition-
ally, autonomous actors could change their institutional 
background by founding and submitting to a central authority 
and therefore transform the problem of market failure to a 
traditional agency problem, for example; this is basically how 
the emergence of enterprises is explained in organization 
theory.  
Additionally, Poole (1997) describes institutional impacts 
of corporate cultures and the associated path dependent prop-
erties on innovation diffusion using the failure of the steam 
locomotive industry in the first half of the 20th century as an 
example. 
G Normative Implications 
Closely related to the problem of designing advantageous 
coordination designs is the need for normative results. 
Whether or not public intervention is necessary in network 
effect markets is a common controversy in the literature. 
Recommendations vary from centralized standard setting or 
restriction of market power by the government on the one 
hand side to total laissez-faire without intervention on the 
other. Since network effects don’t stop at national borders, 
the question arises whether public intervention might be out 
dated. New emerging phenomena like the Internet show the 
power of decentralized coordination while the basic implica-
tions of network effects remain the same. Despite this, ap-
proaches to improve decentralized coordination of standardi-
zation - especially in the context of particular groups of indi-
viduals, e.g. within enterprises -  can not be found in the 
traditional models. Finding advantageous coordination de-
signs, efficient intermediaries and network specific cost and 
incentive structures may lead the way to answer questions as 
of the optimal network size, the trade-off between architec-
tural (open) standards as XML and - based upon these - (pro-
prietary) complementary technologies.  
Thus, most traditional approaches towards diffusion proc-
esses of standards fail to properly consider costs and charac-
ter of network effects and lack consideration of actor contin-
gent knowledge and of institutional personal neighborhood 
structures. 
 
III. GENERAL DRAWBACKS OF THE NEO-CLASSICAL PARADIGM 
Although individual utility maximization, as unanimously 
agreed upon throughout the neoclassical paradigm, should 
not be disputed here, the "Homo oeconomicus" comes with 
further premises, the economic literature on network effects 
quoted above implicitly assumes to hold. What these prem-
ises are and which one of them may default within an inter-
disciplinary context, will be discussed in the sequel. 
However, if (and only if) all of these premises hold, then 
the validity of the following two so-called "fundamental 
theorems of welfare economics" (Hildenbrand 1976) can be 
proven: 
• A competitive total equilibrium always represents a 
Pareto optimal allocation of the total bundle of eco-
nomic goods (a so-called Pareto optimum). 
• For each realizable Pareto optimum a (positive) price 
vector exists, for which this Pareto optimum repre-
sents a competitive equilibrium. 
The goal of an economy thus is to reach a Pareto-optimal 
allocation5 of goods. The ability of the market mechanism to 
accomplish this task (more or less strongly) depends on the 
following implicit assumptions: 
• Absence of Externalities: 
In earlier definitions, an externality was considered to 
be present whenever the utility function Ui(.) of some 
economic agent i includes real variables whose values 
are chosen by another economic agent j without particu-
lar attention to the welfare effect on i’s utility. As shown 
by Coase, the market mechanism may overcome some of 
these problems by adding “property rights” as tradable 
goods to the economy. Therefore, nowadays an external-
ity is said to be present whenever there is insufficient in-
centive for a potential market to be created for some 
good and the non-existence of this market leads to a non-
Pareto-optimal equilibrium. So far, the absence of exter-
nalities is the only premise, network effect literature – as 
discussed above – is trying to relax.  
• Complete rationality of the Homo oeconomicus: 
Network effect literature often relies on the neo-
classical assumption that all agents do not only know 
their own action space and utility function but likewise 
have a complete and realistic model of all the other 
agents' current allocation, action spaces and utility func-
tions as well! In a pure neo-classical "exchange econ-
omy" this assumption may be relaxed and even when we 
only bargain with our direct neighbors the decentralized 
exchange still leads to a unique and Pareto-optimal equi-
librium, but unfortunately only if there are no network 
externalities or indivisibilities (see below). But for 
“realworld” individuals, parametric and strategic (or stra-
tegic and statistical (Williamson 1985)) uncertainty 
(Hayek 1937) imposes constitutional bounds (Hayek 
1994, 171) to the knowledge, their decisions can be 
based upon. Additionally, heterogeneous institutional 
and structural environments influence the decisions of 
individual socio-economic actors. 
Therefore, research in the area of  New Institutional 
Economics (Hodgson 1993) rejects this concept of com-
plete rationality in favor of a "learning" individual and 
search-theoretical models of evolutionary systems. Equi-
librium analysis models are replaced by models of the 
evolution process of the examined multi-agent system, in 
which the optimal action of actor i at time t is modeled as 
function of his individual knowledge at this point in 
time. 
• Exclusion principle:  
Prices only lead to Pareto-optimal collective action in 
a multi-agent system if the exclusion principle applies to 
the goods to be exchanged i.e. unique possession and 
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 An allocation x is considered to be Pareto-optimal if and 
only if no other allocation y exists, which is weakly preferred 
over x by all individuals and strongly preferred by at least 
one individual. 
ownership exists, permitting consumption only to a sin-
gle individual. When common use or free duplication of 
products is possible (as being the case for information 
products like software), the equilibrium price is zero (if 
there were no copyrights artificially restricting this du-
plication as an incentive to the producer). 
• Consumption paradigm : 
Utility is drawn exclusively from consumption, i.e. the 
destruction of resources. The temporary possession of a 
good (like e.g. a piece of art or a game software), which 
is sold to some other individual after some periods, can-
not be evaluated in the utility function. When extending 
the model to a multi-period economy, this inclusion be-
comes possible but immediately destroys the validity of 
price coordination. Especially for information products 
the neo-classical notion of “consumption” (together with 
the exclusion principle mentioned above) poses a major 
obstacle to market coordination. 
However, if not the consumption but the use of the re-
source comes to the center of attention, property rights 
lose their additional potential of generating utility com-
pared to usufruct rights. "Network Economics" of the In-
formation Age has to migrate from a consumer-oriented 
to a user-oriented discipline, in which the efficient solu-
tion of scheduling problems (which resources is used 
when in which process?) will turn out to be a critical 
success factor for an efficient creation of social welfare. 
• Separation of consumers and producers 
The classification of the economic actors into consum-
ers and producers turns out to be problematic in a world 
replacing the classical notion of  “work” more and more 
by freelance activities, thus “mixing” both concepts. In a 
“prosumer economics” we must not neglect the fact that 
human work does “flow out of the power plug socket" 
like energy but humans represent discrete renewable re-
source, whose entire economic and "recovery process" 
must efficiently be synchronized with other individuals 
of the network. 
• Divisibility of resources 
One of the most extensive restrictions certainly is the 
neo-classical assumption of arbitrary divisibility of all 
goods,  i.e. each apple must be permitted to be cut into n 
pieces, sold separately. What may be acceptable for the 
apple, is impossible for screws or information. Interest-
ingly enough, in defense of equilibrium theory it is ar-
gued, that the "rounding error" from unjustified accep-
tance of the divisibility assumption "washes out” for 
large quantities. While this may be true with screws, the 
argument breaks down at least for all  goods, for which 
the optimal quantity of an individual’s use is close to one 
(e.g. automobiles, houses and all information goods). 
• Concave Utility Functions / no complementarities 
The preference orders of the consumers over the bun-
dles of goods must be representable by (strictly) con-
cave, continuous utility functions. How far this assump-
tion misses reality becomes clear if we realize that this 
does not allow for modeling complementary goods al-
though complementarities can be found in all areas from 
recipes (if one ingredient is not available in sufficient 
quantity, the cake cannot be baked) and service indus-
tries (if I’d like to spend a three weeks vacation on an is-
land, the flights without the hotel are equally worthless 
as the hotel without being able to book the flights) to in-
formation (if we do not know the concept of Pareto op-
timality and there is no definition provided, the funda-
mental theorems stated above are of no value to the 
reader). This problem of complementarity is it, which 
renders the “market solution” of scheduling problems 
impossible: If a resource is needed for ten time slices in 
sequence and the process is not preemptive (like with the 
hotel stay), buying the ten time slices in separate auc-
tions leaves me with too high a risk to end up with some 
slices missing. 
• Absence of transaction costs 
Neo-classical economics abstracts from transaction 
costs, i.e. from costs, which are induced by the prepara-
tion or execution of the exchange process. In New Insti-
tutional Economics the effect of transaction costs is ex-
plicitly modeled and for example considered to be one 
reason for the emergence of companies economizing on 
transaction costs by being “islands of more centralized 
control” in a decentralized market. 
IV. TOWARDS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY OF NETWORK 
EFFECTS 
A Required modeling power of an interdisciplinary 
theory of network effects  
After the critique of economic network effect theory and 
the neo-classical paradigm in general the question arises, 
which requirements have to be met by an interdisciplinary 
theory of network effects, allowing to integrate and explain 
social and economic interaction of human actors and auto-
mated agents (e.g. software agents trading at the stock ex-
change). 
• Modeling of knowledge and uncertainty / bounded 
rationality 
The network effect theory must allow for modeling 
knowledge of individual participants (human or automated) 
and uncertainty concerning this knowledge (in particular 
concerning the behavior and knowledge of other participants 
of the multi-actor system, we will call the “society” in the 
sequel). 
• Evolutionary System Dynamics 
However, since assuming bounded rationality usually im-
plies the impossibility of determining analytical (ex ante) 
results for an aggregated entity - such as a whole network 
consisting of individually deciding agents - in terms of the 
existence and/or efficiency of equilibria, a recourse towards 
empirical and simulative approaches seems unavoidable. 
While historic case arguments like the prominent 
QWERTY example (Liebowitz/Margolis 1990) or the battle 
for VCR standards (Liebowitz/Margolis 1994) proved to be 
at least ambiguous6, numerical simulations based upon inter-
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 Poole (1997) identifies another common misconception 
when trying to identify winning inferior standards. He argues 
that the often cited DOS vs. Macintosh example is different 
from e.g. U.S. 110 volt 60 cycle AC vs. European 220 volt 50 
acting software agents can help to get empirical evidence for 
such complex systems giving up complete rationality renders 
the system of interactions to be “unsolvable” to an analytical 
determination of equilibria and proof of their uniqueness. 
Therefore, we must rather rely on simulation of system dy-
namics and analysis of the observed behavior of the simula-
tion model 
• Emergence of system components and links 
The approach should also be able to model the emergence 
of new participants and their "death" in the evolution process 
(to model for example the establishment or dissolution of 
institutional participants) as well as the emergence and disso-
lution of new links between existing actors, i.e. allow for an 
evolution of network structure. 
• Abolishment of  convexity and divisibility assumptions 
Since many of the decisions to be modeled will be discrete 
choice and exhibit interdependence to decisions made by 
other actors, convexity and divisibility assumptions are to-
tally inadequate and thus have to be dropped (which is less 
problematic in a setting that has already given up all hope for 
analytical solvability). 
• Economics of Intermediation 
To overcome the lack of normative results from traditional 
models, a new approach towards a theory of network effects 
should consider institutional designs for managing network 
related dependencies between individual network actors. In 
this context, the role of intermediaries needs to be empha-
sized. Generally speaking, intermediaries can compile and/or 
reallocate information necessary for coordinating dependen-
cies between actors. Considering the uncertainties inherent to 
novel technologies, intermediaries could contribute to solving 
coordination problems associated with positive network ef-
fects. Quite contrary to the prominent hypothesis of disinter-
mediation due to reduced transaction costs on markets, the 
benefits associated with IT such as decreasing communica-
tion and information processing costs appear to be available 
to intermediaries, as well. Thus, a new approach should inte-
grate the analysis of intermediate coordination designs, 
essential data requirements and associated incentives 
problems for intermediaries to contribute to solving 
dependency issues problematic for markets. 
B Alternatives to a Neo-classical Theory of Network 
Effects ? 
As already stated above, New Institutional Economics ex-
plicitly addresses the emergence and function of institutions 
and their change over time. Institutions are considered to be: 
• informal rules (habits) as boundary conditions on the 
social behavior of the individuals 
• formal regulations (laws, property rights or contracts) 
• instruments for the enforcement of formal and informal 
regulations 
Although sharing much of our criticism, Institutional Eco-
nomics often neglects the explicit modeling of any behavioral 
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DOS/WINTEL is still evolving.  
assumptions for the actors, and therefore neither analytical 
nor simulative equilibrium models can be formulated and 
used for answering the question, which institution is best 
suited to achieve a given social goal. The evolutionary branch 
of Game Theory (Aumann 1994) makes a valuable contribu-
tion to close this gap by mainly focusing on discrete interac-
tion and making all behavioral assumptions explicit. 
While most game-theoretical approaches still strive for 
analytical solutions (and are thus restricted to very small 
models) the research direction of Agent-based Computational 
Economics (ACE) (Vriend 1996, 1999) rejects this goal for 
being able to model more extensive multi-agent systems with 
complex behavioral structure, based on a discrete (often dis-
tributed) “state-transition” system model. It should be undis-
puted through all disciplines, that the following "labeled state 
transition system (LST)" as basic model of the real world 
would not come with any serious restrictions of modeling 
power: 
In each state si ∈ STATES a subset of the society’s actors 
is able to execute an action of type act which lets the system 
change its state to sj . The transitions are labeled because they 
do not only describe the transition from one state to another, 
but additionally have to distinguish, which agent initiated this 
transition. Formally, this may be modeled by L-
TRANSITIONS ⊆ STATES × ACTORS × ACTIONS × 
STATES. 
If (for each participant) there exists a preference order over 
all paths (chains of transitions) of  this LST system, it be-
comes possible to not only compare different target states of 
the systems but also to evaluate different paths of reaching 
the same target. The social goal now is to find an institutional 
setting that lets the LST system take a path which is Pareto-
efficient and maximizes or fulfills one or a set of postulated 
“justice criteria”. 
Unfortunately, an immense complexity problem results 
from this introduction of path-dependent preferences. As a 
compromise we may of course restrict ourselves to social 
preference relations over the “outcome” of the process - in 
those cases in which an equilibrium is reached - and only 
analyze the impact of institutional settings on this equilib-
rium. 
Of course, in such a general setting we might ask whether 
all of the multi-actor networks of cooperating and competing 
“players” should still be called “economies” or what criteria 
of a multi-actor network game are necessary or sufficient to 
call it an economic one. Although there seems to be no una-
nimity, a plausible criteria to distinguish a general social 
game from the subclass of economic games could be “trans-
ferable utility”, presupposing that among other objects there 
is at least one (common!) class of objects (e.g. money or 
gold) having the property that the utility of every individual 
(strictly monotonously) grows with the amount of endow-
ment. For a game of chess or soccer this does not hold or at 
least paying the other side for letting me win is considered 
“against the rules”, i.e. breaks the institutional setting of 
chess or soccer games. Once transferability is given, the 
problem of finding the optimal action sequence can be sepa-
rated from the distribution of the welfare (e.g. by taxation). 
Note, however, that transferability of utility does not imply 
by any means that the welfare maximization problem may 
efficiently be solved by a decentralized market mechanism. 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS 
We developed a simulation model of an agent-based com-
putational economy which addresses some of the important 
requirements outlined above. So far, it should be seen as a 
first step in the direction of evaluating and improving our 
approach of an interdisciplinary theory of network effects 
rather than a completed study. In the following we will only 
present the basics of the model and the simulations results. 
For a comprehensive description refer to Westarp/Wendt 
(2000) and Wendt/Westarp (2000). 
Our simulation is based on a simple model of the individ-
ual buying decision in network effect markets. A participant 
buys a certain product exhibiting network effects whenever 
the benefits (sum of stand-alone benefits and network effect 
benefit; the latter depending on the number of other adopters 
that are linked to this participant) are larger than the costs. In 
case of competing products in a market, the consumer buys 
the product with the maximum surplus if this exceeds 0. The 
decision is discrete, meaning that it is not rational to buy or 
use more than one unit of the same product or even of differ-
ent products. This is an assumption which especially makes 
sense for information goods like software or telecommunica-
tion products. The network effects in the utility function only 
depend on decision behavior of the direct communication 
network of the potential buyer. This assumption is confirmed 
by empirical research in the software markets (Westarp et al. 
1999) and also pays tribute to the bounded rationality of real-
world actors. Therefore, in contrast to the installed base of 
traditional models, we distinguish between relevant and ir-
relevant network effects.  
All simulations are based on the simplifying assumption 
that network structure, the consumers' preferences and the 
prices of the network effect products are constant during the 
diffusion process. All networks had a size of 1,000 consum-
ers. We also tested our simulations for other network sizes 
without significant difference in the general results. A total 
number of 10,000 independent simulations were run until an 
equilibrium was reached, each iteration of the respective run 
showing one state of the network during the evolution proc-
ess. To analyze the diffusion process the distribution of prod-
ucts reached in this equilibrium was then condensed into the 
Herfindahl index used in industrial economics to measure 
market concentration (e.g. Tirole 1993). All entities of our 
model were implemented in JAVA 1.1 and their behavior 
was simulated on a discrete event basis. 
Our main hypothesis was that the (macro) dynamics of 
network effect markets as multi-actor systems not only de-
pends on the individual (micro) decisions of the participants 
but also on personal neighborhood structures reflecting insti-
tutional patterns of networks. The influence of various deter-
minants on the diffusion process of network effects goods 
such as price, heterogeneity of preferences, and connectivity, 
centrality, and topology of networks were tested. The results 
strongly support our hypotheses.  
• The effects of cost and stand alone utility were ana-
lyzed by varying price and the heterogeneity of pref-
erences. In high price markets we find more diversity 
of products, due to the higher switching costs. We did 
not find any significant dependency between hetero-
geneity and market concentration for close topolo-
gies7, but a slight but significant negative correlation 
for random topologies. 
• The influence of the networks topology on the diffu-
sion of innovations in networks was proven. While the 
close topology generally is the basis for a greater di-
versity of products (since clusters or groups of con-
sumers may decide relatively independent from diffu-
sion processes in the rest of the market), the random 
topology tends to dominance of one or few products. 
• Intensity of communication (represented by connec-
tivity) is the source of personal network exposure 
within the diffusion process and is shown to have a 
positive effect on equilibrium concentration. 
• Intra-group pressure positively correlates with close-
ness of the network’s topology and closeness is shown 
to negatively correlate with concentration8, meaning 
that although this pressure enforces group conformity, 
it also inhibits inter-group conformity. 
• Opinion leadership has been simulated by centrality 
and heterogeneity of node sizes (the latter was used to 
represent the strength of influence on others). We find 
a positive correlation between centrality and concen-
tration, showing that some central participants can 
significantly influence the diffusion process. Differ-
ences in power within the network did not have any 
effect on concentration unless it was combined with 
centrality.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The increasing pace of advances in information and com-
munication technology and the associated emphasis on com-
patibility standards constituting networks has brought diffu-
sion processes of standards to a broad public and academic 
attention. A common finding is the existence of network 
effects, i.e. the increasing value of a network as the number 
of its users increases (demand side economies of scale) lead-
ing in many cases to Pareto-inferior results of standardization 
processes.  
We propose the hypothesis that assumptions and simplifi-
cations implicitly and uncritically used for modeling stan-
dardization problems fail to explain the phenomenological 
variety of diffusion courses in today's dynamic markets and 
lead inevitably to the described results such as market failure 
under network effects. In addition, the particular socio-
economical environment of interacting adopters is neglected.  
We have shown methodological deficiencies of traditional 
approaches concerning network effects. Together with a 
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 The network topology is generated by either choosing the 
c closest neighbors measured by euclidean distance (close 
topology) or selecting c neighbors randomly from all n-1 
possible neighbors (random topology). 
8
 As a direct measure of intra-group pressure we calculated 
the „relative 2nd order radiality“, being the sum of the number 
of indirect neighbors of each node divided by the hypotheti-
cal maximum of indirect neighbors (if there were no double 
nominations by any direct neighbor). This measure positively 
correlates (.405) with concentration, since a low value indi-
cates strong intra-group links and thus resistance to outside 
pressure.  
critical examination of the neo-classical paradigm we propose 
a requirements framework towards an interdisciplinary theory 
of network effects.  
An interdisciplinary network theory should incorporate, 
among others, uncertainty and bounded rationality on behalf 
of the deciding network actors as well as evolutionary system 
dynamics, i.e. the emergence of new or the 'death' of existing 
actors in an evolutionary process. The complexity resulting 
from these propositions requires empirical methodologies and 
simulation models in particular. As a first step towards ex-
tending theories in the proposed direction we developed a 
model showing that the dynamics of networks do not only 
depend on individual decisions but also on their personal 
neighborhood structures reflecting institutional patterns. 
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